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Abstract 
 
 
 
Despite intense debate over the impact of globalisation on state sovereignty, 
there is a gap in the literature on conceptualisation, measurement, and 
research on the depth of international policy cooperation. This thesis 
introduces a new concept, jurisdictional integration, defined as international 
agreements that constrain, to varying degrees, a state’s jurisdiction to make or 
enforce policies free from external involvement. State jurisdiction - the 
recognized authority to govern by domestic law - is a more coherent and 
tractable concept than the traditional concept of Westphalian sovereignty. A 
generic spectrum of points of increasing integration of state jurisdiction is 
presented, together with a taxonomy of points of increasing depth of 
international economic policy cooperation. The practicality and value of the 
framework is illustrated in two ways. First, an empirical analysis is presented 
of the depth of jurisdictional integration in Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs), using WTO data, to test hypotheses of the relationship between 
economic integration and the depth of policy cooperation in RTAs. The 
results indicate that the average frequency of occurrence of the deep policy 
cooperation provisions increased by 118% in RTAs signed 1990-1998 
compared to those signed prior to 1990. Secondly, international cooperation 
in competition policy is analysed through compilation of a new database of 
stand-alone Competition Enforcement Agreements (CEAs), and the 
provisions in the Competition Policy Chapters of RTAs. Ordinal indices of 
increasing depth of jurisdictional integration with respect to competition 
policy are developed. New families of agreements are identified through 
vector analysis. Ninety-two international agreements are ranked on an 
enforcement cooperation index, and are used to test descriptive propositions 
about international competition policy cooperation. There are an increasing 
number of North-South agreements; and there has been both a widening and 
deepening of enforcement cooperation over time. Contingency table analysis 
is conducted of the relationship, given the existence of an agreement, between 
depth of enforcement cooperation and predictor variables. Whether all 
signatories are OECD members is a very good predictor of deep enforcement 
cooperation. A lack of similarity between substantive competition laws is a 
very good predictor of low enforcement cooperation. The level of trade 
integration is a moderately good predictor of the depth of enforcement 
cooperation; while geographic proximity is a good predictor for RTAs but not 
for CEAs. The depth of cooperation is almost independent of the level of 
economic asymmetry between signatories. These results are consistent with 
theories of regulatory competition and elite norm diffusion as causal 
mechanisms of increased international economic policy cooperation. The 
depth of enforcement cooperation is also found to be a very good predictor of 
whether agreements are “intergovernmental” or transgovernmental. The 
thesis suggests that the concept of jurisdictional integration can make a 
significant contribution to measuring the depth of all types of international 
economic cooperation agreements, and potentially also to cooperation in non-
economic domains; to research on the causes and consequences of 
international policy cooperation; and to policy development and public debate 
on the management of globalisation.  
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Chapter 1 
_________________________________________ 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“…the state is not disappearing, it is disaggregating. Its component institutions…are all 
reaching out beyond national borders in various ways…the official observers of the 
international scene – scholars, pundits, policymakers – cannot fully see and appreciate 
this phenomenon because they are handicapped by the conceptual lenses of the unitary 
state. Although they are accustomed to thinking of “governments” domestically – as 
complex conglomerates of different institutions responsible for different governance 
functions – they think of “states” internationally.”  
 
Slaughter, A New World Order.1 
 
 
 
International economic cooperation is a central feature of modern international 
relations. Virtually every country in the world is now a party to international 
agreements that impinge in some way on their formal authority to make and implement 
economic policies free from external interference or involvement. Such agreements 
cover a wide range of areas. They include agreements on trade, monetary cooperation, 
investment, regulation, and taxation. They are embodied in bilateral, regional, and 
multilateral agreements, and may be described as treaties, conventions, executive 
agreements, agency-to-agency agreements, memoranda of understanding, declarations, 
or codes and guidelines issued by international organisations. 
 
Yet while globalisation is the subject of much public and academic interest, attention 
has focused on international economic integration. International policy cooperation has 
received much less attention.2 Concerns are often expressed about the impact of 
economic globalisation on the sovereignty of states; and of course policy makers design 
                                                           
1 Slaughter 2004, pp. 31-31. 
 
2 The main categories of globalisation usually identified are economic, policy or political, and cultural. 
See Babones, in Ritzer, Ed, 2007, Chapter 7. 
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international economic cooperation agreements on the basis that some constraints on 
sovereignty are likely to result in increased economic integration e.g. increased trade 
and/or foreign investment. However, while there is a wide range of measures of 
international economic integration, there are no satisfactory measures of the varying 
impacts of international policy cooperation on state sovereignty.3   
 
The objectives of this thesis are to develop a new conceptual framework to measure the 
depth of international economic policy cooperation; to operationalize the framework by 
measuring international cooperation in specific policy domains; and to undertake 
exploratory statistical analysis of some of the factors influencing decisions by states to 
commit to shallow or deep forms of cooperation. 
 
The key point to grasp at the outset is the distinction between international policy 
integration (or cooperation), and international economic integration. The two 
phenomena are quite different. And yet the terms are often used interchangeably, 
unintentionally conflated, or merely confused one for the other. 
 
International policy integration - hereafter referred to generically as international policy 
cooperation - refers to the wide variety of agreements or arrangements between states to 
cooperate in the development or implementation of government policies. International 
policy cooperation is embodied in international agreements, official international 
organisations, or less formal cross-border interactions between official institutions. 
 
International economic integration, on the other hand, can be defined broadly as 
increasing levels of trade and foreign investment, the transnational integration of 
production chains within firms, and the progressive creation of single markets for 
factors of production. The concept of international economic integration is commonly 
operationalized by measuring variables such as the ratio of a country’s international 
trade to its gross domestic product (GDP), or the ratio of its foreign investment to GDP.  
 
In contrast, current approaches to measuring international policy cooperation are 
seriously inadequate, for a number of reasons.  
 
                                                           
3 For measures of international economic integration, see OECD (2005), and Babones (2007). 
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First, and foremost, there is no conceptually coherent basis for measuring the depth of 
international policy cooperation. The depth of policy cooperation is defined here as the 
extent to which a state has agreed to constrain its recognized authority to make and/or to 
enforce policies free from external interference or involvement. Both the disciplines of 
international relations and international law, for instance, have paid relatively little 
attention to voluntarily agreed limitations on state authority to make and/or to enforce 
policies.  
 
Measurement and research on the depth of international economic policy cooperation 
remains unduly focused on the stages of economic integration. However, whether an 
international agreement is classified as a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) or a Customs 
Union, for instance, is less and less useful as a proxy measure of the depth of 
international policy cooperation.4  
 
From a different perspective, many researchers have recorded whether selected 
provisions are present or not in a sample of international economic agreements, but not 
the varying depth of the provisions.5 Alternatively, a widely known measure of a 
country’s level of international policy cooperation - the A.T.Kearney/Foreign Policy 
measure of international political engagement - merely measures the number of selected 
Treaties signed, and membership of selected international organisations, irrespective of 
the varying depth of cooperation these engagements entail.6  
 
The second reason that current approaches to measuring cooperation are inadequate is 
that international economic policy cooperation, even that confined to official 
government-to-government cooperation, is effected by a large number of entities, using 
a wide range of instruments. There is typically no centralized repository of information 
on the extent of international economic policy cooperation, either within a single state 
across all agencies and policy functions, or across states by a single policy function. 
                                                           
4 The stages of economic integration refer to specific types of international economic agreements, starting 
with Free Trade Agreements, and ending with economic unions such as the European Union. See section 
4.4 of the thesis for a discussion. Examples of research that has used the stage of economic integration as 
a proxy measure of the depth of international economic and/or policy cooperation is that by Schiff 2000, 
and Wu 2004. 
 
5 See for example OECD 2006, Cernat 2005.  
 
6 See the A.T.Kearney Globalization Index, discussed further in Chapter 12.1, at 
http://www.atkearney.com/main.taf?p=5,4,1,127 
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Thirdly, the increasing depth of policy cooperation in FTAs is a relatively recent (post-
1990 or so) phenomenon, and data classification and research have not yet caught up 
with this. For instance, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) retains its primary, 
historical, legally based classification of Regional Trade Agreements as either FTAs or 
Customs Unions. 
 
For these reasons, cross-country quantitative research on international economic policy 
cooperation has focused on the burgeoning number of Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs) as the source of information.7 RTAs, along with the WTO agreement itself, are 
probably the single most important vehicle for international economic policy 
cooperation. They function as a coordinating and umbrella mechanism in a wide range 
of policy areas. More recent RTAs typically go well beyond trade issues to incorporate 
a range of provisions on behind the border issues such as investment, competition, 
domestic regulation, and so on. They therefore have some validity as a source of 
information on signatory countries’ depth of international economic policy cooperation.  
 
However, RTAs by no means capture the full extent of any particular country’s level of 
international economic policy cooperation – not even the full extent of cooperation in 
any particular policy domain covered in the agreement. Government agencies are 
increasingly cooperating directly with their counterpart agencies in other states, rather 
than through the mechanism of an RTA. In the field of competition policy (anti-trust) 
cooperation, for instance, a key instrument, in addition to Competition Policy Chapters 
in RTAs, is the stand-alone competition enforcement agreement between two or more 
national Competition Authorities. To properly measure the depth of policy cooperation 
by country in a specific policy domain, therefore, it is necessary to assemble a dataset 
across all the international instruments in which such cooperation is embodied.  
 
This thesis attempts to address each of the weaknesses that prevent satisfactory 
measurement of the depth of international economic policy cooperation. It does so by: 
                                                           
7 The term RTA is used in this thesis to refer to all types of regional or bilateral trade agreements, 
including FTAs, Customs Unions, Common Markets, and Economic Unions, and including agreements 
between countries in different regions. 
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1. Developing a new conceptualisation of the impact of international economic 
cooperation on state sovereignty, by using the lens of state jurisdiction, rather 
than the contested concept of state sovereignty. 
2. Identifying different dimensions of state jurisdiction, and developing a stylized 
spectrum of increasing generic points of imposition on state policy autonomy 
arising from the different provisions in international economic agreements. 
3. Using an existing WTO dataset on non-tariff provisions in RTAs to measure the 
changing depth of international policy cooperation over time, and to test 
hypotheses about the relationship between the depth of policy cooperation in 
RTAs and multilateral trade liberalization. 
4. Developing ordinal indices of the depth of international economic policy 
cooperation in a specific policy domain – competition policy. 
5. Assembling a new comprehensive dataset of international agreements that 
embody competition policy cooperation. The dataset incorporates both the 
provisions in RTAs, and stand-alone agreements outside RTAs. 
6. Testing descriptive propositions about the nature of international competition 
policy cooperation, and hypotheses about its causes. 
 
There appear to have been few previous attempts to directly measure the depth of 
international policy cooperation. One notable exception is the work of Smith (2000), 
who devised a measure of legalism in dispute settlement mechanisms in RTAs. A much 
earlier exception was the work of Lindberg (1970) and Nye (1968), who developed 
measures of regional policy integration. 
 
There have also been few attempts to assess policy cooperation in a specific policy 
domain across the different international instruments in which such cooperation is 
embodied; a number of studies, for instance, analyze international policy cooperation in 
a particular policy domain by looking only at the provisions in RTAs  e.g. OECD 2006, 
UNCTAD 2005. 
 
The thesis is organized in four parts. The remainder of Part One presents a statement of 
the research problem (Chapter 2), and a discussion of the Purpose Statement and 
Methodology (Chapter 3). 
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Part Two of the thesis commences with a focused, integrative review of the main 
strands in the literature on international cooperation, focusing on international economic 
cooperation (Chapter 4). The objective is to substantiate the claim that existing 
frameworks for conceptualizing and measuring the impact of international cooperation 
on formal legal (de jure) state authority are inadequate.  
 
Chapter 5 then discusses the contested concept of state sovereignty, and argues that the 
alternative concept of state jurisdiction provides a more coherent, and more tractable 
foundation for measuring the depth of international economic policy cooperation.  
 
In Chapter 6, stylized spectrums of increasing jurisdictional integration are presented, 
together with a taxonomy of the depth of international economic policy cooperation.   
 
Part Three of the thesis applies the concept of jurisdictional integration to specific 
policy domains and international agreements. It demonstrates the practicality of the 
concept, and its potential contribution to more accurate measurement of, and research 
on the depth of international economic policy cooperation. 
 
Chapter 7 discusses competing hypotheses of the general causes of international 
economic policy cooperation, and the key variables influencing decisions by states over 
the extent to which they will agree to constrain their jurisdiction. 
 
Chapter 8 then analyses the changing depth of policy cooperation in RTAs, by applying 
the concept of jurisdictional integration to existing WTO data on non-tariff provisions 
in RTAs. This allows some testing of competing hypotheses about the relationship 
between policy cooperation in RTAs and multilateral trade liberalization.  
 
Existing datasets have severe limitations, however, in terms of measuring the depth of 
international economic policy cooperation. To that end, the remaining chapters in Part 
Three apply the concept of jurisdictional integration to international cooperation in 
competition policy.  
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Chapter 9 provides an overview of the evolution of international cooperation in 
competition policy, while in Chapter 10, ordinal indices of jurisdictional integration of 
competition policy are derived. Chapter 11 sets out research questions on international 
competition policy cooperation, to be tested along with the general hypotheses in 
Chapter 7, using a new dataset of international competition policy agreements compiled 
in Chapter 12. Agreements are then ranked (Chapter 13) on the jurisdictional integration 
indices, and statistical analysis is conducted in Chapter 14, primarily using the depth of 
cooperation in enforcing competition policies as the dependent variable.  
 
Part Four presents the conclusions of the thesis. First, an assessment is made of the 
thesis’ contribution to knowledge. This is followed by a discussion of its limitations, 
and suggested avenues for further research. 
 
 18  
 
Chapter 2 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
 
 
International economic cooperation is a central feature of modern international 
relations. In 1996, for instance, Trachtman declared that “…economic integration is the 
leading motivation for new public international law today”, describing it as the 
“international economic law revolution.”8 The increasing internationalization of 
economic exchange has been accompanied by a significant increase both in the number 
of international economic agreements, and in the extent to which they impact on 
“behind the border” issues hitherto largely the sole preserve of domestic policy.9 That 
is, while traditional trade agreements regulated tariffs, quotas, and other policies “at the 
border,” modern agreements increasingly also regulate domestic regulatory policies, 
such as regulatory standards, intellectual property, or competition policy.  
 
This has resulted in a blurring of the boundary between international and domestic 
policy. Bolewski has described this as the “internationalisation of domestic policy”, or 
the “administrative diversification of foreign policy.”10 
 
Yet despite intense public and scholarly debate over the impact of international 
economic integration on state sovereignty, existing frameworks for analysing 
international cooperation are inadequate for the task. This is because they pay 
insufficient attention to the differential impacts of alternative forms of cooperation on 
                                                           
8 Trachtman 1996, p. 3. 
 
9 Evidence for the increased number of international economic agreements is usually cited from the 
number of RTAs notified to the WTO – see Crawford and Fiorentino 2005.  There has also been a less 
well-documented increase in the number of other types of international economic agreements, such as 
international regulatory agreements, and investment treaties. Evidence in support of the increasing depth 
of international economic agreements is cited later in this thesis (Chapters 8.2, 13.2, and 14.4). 
 
10 Bolewski 2007, p. 19. 
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the de jure autonomous authority of the state.11 While such impacts attracted 
considerable interest during an earlier wave of scholarship on regional integration, and 
have been the subject of increased attention in recent years, there remains a significant 
gap in the literature in this area. This gap continues to hinder theorisation, measurement, 
research, and policy development on globalisation and state sovereignty.  
 
For instance, much scholarly debate over the impact of international economic 
agreements on the de jure policy autonomy and authority of the state has focused on 
broad concepts such as “derogations of sovereignty”, “sovereignty costs”, or 
“impingements on legal sovereignty.” Scholte asserts the “end of sovereignty” and the 
arrival of a new world of “post-sovereign governance.”12  
 
It is well recognized that sovereignty is a multi-faceted, ambiguous, and at times 
emotive term (see for example Krasner 1999, and Jackson 2003). Analysing and 
debating the impact of international cooperation in terms of the umbrella concept of 
sovereignty is therefore highly problematic and fruitless. As Lowe has noted, the 
concept of sovereignty is often used “…as a rhetorical flourish in discussions of 
constraints upon the freedom of States to act. But it does little else.”  
(Lowe, 2008, p. 79). 
 
Less well recognised is that conceptualizing the issue in binary terms is also inadequate. 
Formulations such as soft or hard international law, intergovernmentalism or supra-
nationality,13 shallow or deep integration,14 negative or positive integration,15 
sovereignty-bound or intrusive regionalism,16 government or governance,17 inter-
governmental or transgovernmental agreements18 – do not on their own allow for the 
                                                           
11 The term autonomous authority is used here to refer to the authority to make and implement decisions 
free from interaction with or interference from external authority structures. 
 
12 Scholte 2000, pp. 135-138. 
 
13 Sandholtz and Sweet 1998. 
 
14 Lawrence 1996. 
 
15 Trachtman 2007, p. 64. 
 
16 Acharya 2002. 
 
17 Krahmann 2003. 
 
18 Slaughter 2004. 
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fact that there is a large and growing menu of policy integration options available to 
states that vary in a number of dimensions in terms of their impact on a state’s policy 
autonomy.19  
 
Some other analysts are inclined to retain an overly sharp disjuncture between an 
increasingly borderless international economy, on the one hand, and a political world 
that remains divided into nation states with fixed borders and a monopoly of legitimate 
coercion over their citizens. For instance, Alesina and Spolaore state that “…the EU 
does not have the monopoly of legitimate coercion over its citizens, and it is extremely 
unlikely that the member states…will ever relinquish it.”20 Yet the coercive powers of a 
state - while jealously guarded - are in principle divisible and can be allocated between 
a state and international institutions. It is not a binary choice of a monopoly at the level 
of EU member states, or a monopoly at the EU level. For instance, EC regulatory 
agencies in some cases have authority to promulgate new regulations, to use coercive 
enforcement powers, and to have their decisions enforced, albeit through national court 
systems. In similar vein, Schiff (2000, p. 8) notes: “Rather than assume that public 
goods are provided either at the union [EU] level [or] at the country level….it seems 
more realistic to assume that these public goods can coexist at the various levels. Also, 
it seems more fruitful to think…in terms of a continuum with, say…countries within a 
RIA [Regional Integration Agreement] becoming more or less politically integrated.” 
 
While EC-style supranational institutions are uncommon, virtually all states have 
entered into international arrangements that involve constraints of varying degrees on 
their de jure policy autonomy. Political borders as well as economic borders are 
increasingly porous.  
 
This thesis surveys the various literatures on international cooperation, focusing on 
international economic cooperation.  In very general terms, a key finding is that the 
                                                           
19 Policy integration is defined here, not as approximation or harmonization of substantive policy settings 
per se – although it includes this - but as increasing levels of international cooperation and coordination 
of the formal processes by which policies are formulated and implemented. Policies can be coordinated in 
a wide variety of ways, including by information exchange, explicit agreement, or by setting up joint 
institutions that play an on-going role in establishing or implementing joint policies. The latter may be 
termed institutional integration, but for the rest of this article the umbrella term international policy 
cooperation will be used to refer to all forms of international policy cooperation and institutional 
integration. 
 
20 Alesina and Spolaore 2003, p. 205. 
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literature has neglected the phenomena of voluntarily agreed limitations on a state’s 
recognised authority to make and to enforce rules.  
 
More specifically, the existing literatures either: 
• Have relatively little to say on classification of the full range of types of 
international policy cooperation in terms of their differential impacts on de 
jure state policy autonomy e.g. international law, recent regional integration 
theory. 
• Conflate economic and policy integration e.g. stages of economic 
integration. 
• Do not cover the full range of policy integration mechanisms e.g. more 
recent regional integration theory, the international policy cooperation 
literature, international law, and international relations theory. 
 
This thesis attempts to demonstrate that the concept of state jurisdiction is both more 
conceptually coherent, and provides more tractability than the concept of sovereignty 
for the purpose of analysing the impacts of international economic cooperation on the 
formal authority of the state. 
 
State jurisdiction is the authority of a state under international law to govern persons or 
property by its municipal law i.e. its domestic or national law. Jurisdictional integration 
is defined here as a process by which a state chooses, through entering formal 
agreements with other states, to restrict its de jure authority to autonomously make, 
and/or to enforce decisions in a specific domain or domains.  
 
More specifically, jurisdictional integration is conceived of as a spectrum running from 
complete policy autonomy through to, but stopping short of, full political integration. It 
covers all forms of cooperative (as opposed to unilateral) policy cooperation, and all 
types of institutional integration short of full political integration. 
 
The concept of jurisdictional integration builds on those parts of the literature in 
international relations that view states as the primary actors in the international arena. 
That is, while recognizing that other actors - such as sub-national governments, and 
non-state actors such as standards bodies and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) - 
are becoming increasingly important, states are considered to remain a key locus of 
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decision-making and legitimisation in all policy domains, and, overall, remain the key 
locus.  
 
Whether a state can, in practice, exercise effective control over specific economic 
activities is outside the scope of this enquiry. That is, the focus is solely on formal legal 
authority, not the state’s capacity to exercise that authority. As Howse has noted, these 
two questions are often not clearly separated: “Part of the project of demystifying the 
notion of “sovereignty lost” is to address these questions separately.”21 The framework 
developed in this thesis is intended to provide an improved basis for researching the 
relationships between de jure state authority and de facto state capacity. 
 
The concept of jurisdictional integration responds to the calls of international relations 
theorists for research on the transformation of fundamental structures in international 
relations, such as state sovereignty (Czempiel and Rosenau 1989, Ruggie 1993).  
Jurisdictional integration encapsulates what Ruggie describes as the “unbundling” of 
exclusive territoriality, what Cohen depicts as the unbundling and repackaging of the 
state’s authority, and what Slaughter describes as the disaggregation of sovereignty.22 It 
uses as its point of departure Krasner’s careful differentiation between different aspects 
of state sovereignty (Krasner 1999).  The concept builds on the suggested continuum 
running from intergovernmentalism to supra-nationality proposed by Sandholtz and 
Sweet (1998).23 
 
Similarly, the concept of jurisdictional integration addresses the “…almost urgent need 
for new ideas and much better analytical and disaggregated explorations of existing 
international law and international economic law concepts” (Jackson, 2006). In this 
regard, it develops Jackson’s suggested focus on the allocation of government decision-
making power in deriving a refined concept of sovereignty.  
 
 
 
                                                           
21 Howse, 2008, p. 65. Abbott et. al. (2000, p. 402) make the same point with respect to the relationship 
between the formal legalization of international relations, and the effects legal rules have on behaviour 
and outcomes.   
 
22 Ruggie 1993, p. 165, 171; Cohen 2001, p. 80; Slaughter 2004, p. 5. 
 
23 Sandholtz and Sweet, 1998, pp. 8-9. 
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Jackson states that there is a need to:  
 
“…disaggregate and to analyze: break down the complex array of “sovereignty” 
concepts and examine particular aspects in detail and with precision to 
understand what is actually at play. A major part of this approach is to 
understand the pragmatic functionalism of the allocation of power as between 
different levels of governance entities in the world.”24  
 
The concept builds on the early work of Lindberg and Nye in disaggregating regional 
integration into conceptually distinct components, and on recent scholarship on the 
legalization of international relations.25 The concept also helps to meet an identified 
need for research on international economic integration that transcends individual 
regions, and that is capable of comparing and throwing light on integration 
arrangements of varying types (Moravcsik 1998, Laursen 2003). This includes the need 
to incorporate the European Union (EU)26 in comparative studies, instead of viewing it 
as sui generis, or as the standard against which other regions are implicitly or explicitly 
judged.27  
 
In doing so, the thesis builds on Stein's framework for analysing the level of integration 
of international organisations (Stein 2001), Smith’s analysis of the level of legalism in 
dispute resolution mechanisms in RTAs (Smith 2000), and on other research on the 
depth of RTAs e.g. Dorrucci et al 2002, 2004, Wu, 2004. 
 
Finally, the concept responds to the pressing need for governments to determine how 
best to manage increasing international economic integration. As Keohane and Nye 
have observed, “sovereignty is up for grabs in a way that has not been seen since the 
                                                           
24 Jackson, 2008, pp. 24-25. 
 
25 Lindberg 1970, Nye 1968; Abbott et. al. 2000. 
 
26 The EU comprises three pillars: the European Communities; the Common Security and Foreign Policy; 
and the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. The first pillar, in turn, comprises the European Steel and Coal 
Community 1952, the European Community (EC), and the European Atomic Energy Community. The 
EC, originally the European Economic Community created by the Treaty of Rome 1957, is the main 
vehicle for economic cooperation, and contains deeper cooperation than the second and third pillars. 
Hence most references to economic cooperation between EU member countries in this thesis will be to 
the EC. 
 
27 Breslin et. al. 2002, pp. 11-13. 
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seventeenth century.”28 Keohane (2002, p. 748) has also suggested that sovereignty can 
be viewed as a bargaining chip, something to be given up in limited ways in the pursuit 
of other goals. This research aims to provide improved clarity over how “sovereignty” 
is being used as a “bargaining chip.” In doing so, the thesis builds on the literature on 
international policy cooperation (Cooper 1987, OECD 1994, Goddard 2002), and 
responds to calls for improved conceptual tools to facilitate higher quality debate on 
globalisation (Jackson, 2006). 
                                                           
28 Keohane and Nye, 1989, p. 25.  
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Chapter 3 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
PURPOSE STATEMENT AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 PURPOSE STATEMENT 
 
The objectives of this thesis are to: 
1 Provide an improved conceptualisation of state sovereignty, the 
fundamental unit of analysis in international relations, international law, 
and foreign economic policy. 
2 Provide an improved basis for describing and measuring the functioning 
of the inter-state system. 
3 Define a new variable – jurisdictional integration - to measure the depth 
of international economic policy cooperation. 
4 Define conceptually coherent and distinct dimensions of this variable, to 
facilitate accurate measurement. 
5 Introduce a taxonomy to describe broad levels of the depth of 
international economic policy cooperation. 
6 Develop instruments to measure the depth of international economic 
policy cooperation in comparative research in a specific policy domain. 
7 Present a theoretical perspective on the variables likely to be associated 
with decisions by states to enter international agreements entailing 
different depths of cooperation. 
8 Measure the level of jurisdictional integration in selected international 
economic cooperation agreements, and test descriptive propositions 
about the nature of international cooperation in a specific policy domain. 
9 Conduct exploratory statistical and other analysis of selected 
international economic agreements, to test hypotheses on the causes of 
international economic cooperation, and to demonstrate the potential 
contribution of the framework to research and policy analysis.   
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10 Assist policy makers to identify the full range of options available to 
states for the governance of international economic integration, and some 
of the key trade-offs involved. 
 
The thesis is intended to contribute to knowledge by addressing specific research 
questions of both a descriptive and inferential nature. 
 
Descriptive questions: 
1 What is the depth of policy cooperation in selected international 
economic agreements? 
2 How has the depth of policy cooperation in international economic 
agreements changed over time? 
3 What cross-country patterns (or “families” of agreements) can be 
identified? 
 
Inferential questions: 
4 Has the depth of policy cooperation in RTAs increased over time with 
increasing international economic integration? 
5 Is there any significant relationship between the depth of policy 
cooperation in selected agreements, and whether the agreement is an 
FTA or a Customs Union? 
6 Do country pairs that have a higher level of international economic 
integration sign deeper policy cooperation agreements? 
7 Do country pairs that sign deeper policy cooperation agreements have 
similar sized economies? 
8 Do countries that sign deeper policy cooperation agreements have higher 
quality governance?  
9 Do country pairs that sign deeper regulatory enforcement cooperation 
agreements have more similar domestic laws? 
10 Do neighbouring countries sign deeper policy cooperation agreements? 
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3.2. THE SCHOLARLY FRAMEWORK 
 
3.2.1 Philosophical assumptions 
The proposed research approach is based mainly on the “scientific method” - also 
referred to as positivist/post-positivist research, or quantitative research in which data, 
objectivity, and rational analysis generate knowledge. It is presumed that outcomes in 
the real world have possible or likely causes that are capable of being discovered 
through the application of empirical research methods – although it is also recognized 
that reality is complex and the ability to reach strong conclusions about causality in the 
social sciences is severely limited. 
 
The objective, however, is to test for statistical relationships between a small set of 
variables that are hypothesized to be important on the basis of a theory of causality - a 
so-called reductionist approach. The researcher collects data that is presumed to 
measure objective reality. The data either supports or refutes the theory, which is then 
modified as necessary. It is recognized that research findings are always imperfect, and 
knowledge often advances through rejection of hypotheses rather than proof of 
hypotheses. 
 
The proposed research also adopts the perspective of pragmatism, a school of thought 
on knowledge claims that focuses on problems and the applications that work in solving 
them, rather than on the research methods themselves. This is an appropriate approach 
for a PhD in public policy, in which the policy problem is central and the analyst uses 
whatever approaches are necessary to throw light on the problem. It reflects the fact that 
the author’s interest in this research topic was stimulated in the course of a consulting 
assignment he undertook for the New Zealand government on how best to analyse and 
manage global integration.29 
 
3.2.2 Personal perspective 
The approach to this research is non-normative. Increasing international economic and 
policy integration are not necessarily desirable ends. While they will often contribute to 
higher living standards, they can instead impose economic costs. They will impact on 
different groups within and across countries in different ways, and entail trade-offs 
between competing public policy goals, such as legitimacy, efficiency, and flexibility.  
                                                           
29 See Economics and Strategy Group 2002. 
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That said, however, the underlying perspective is one that views international economic 
integration as a major potential source of improvements in the human condition 
globally, and choices over how to manage international integration as one of the key 
strategic issues facing any government and society. 
 
The research perspective is therefore in line with those writers who, rather than seeing 
globalization as placing countries in a straight jacket, view it as presenting governments 
at the same time with new constraints on policy choices as well as new opportunities for 
achieving public policy goals (see for instance OECD 1994, Kahler and Lake Eds., 
2003). 
 
The thesis also adopts a neutral perspective in the debate over regional versus 
multilateral approaches to international economic integration. The framework 
developed here is intended to contribute to better measurement, description, research, 
and analysis of all forms of international policy cooperation, whichever of the “laterals” 
in which they are embodied. The thesis is therefore intended to assist comparison of 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral approaches, while promoting neither regionalism nor 
multilateralism. The observation is made, however, that “behind the border” provisions 
increasingly found in RTAs often require the existence at the national level of 
developed systems of law and regulatory capacity. These pre-requisites present serious 
obstacles to a multilateral approach, and mean that bilateral or regional approaches may 
in some circumstances be the only realistic alternative, in the short term, to no reduction 
in non-tariff barriers. While a multilateral approach may be theoretically optimal in a 
zero transactions costs world, a bilateral or regional approach my in some situations be 
optimal in the real world. 
 
Furthermore, in at least one policy domain, bilateral or regional cooperation may 
inherently be on a Most Favoured Nation basis. For example, in the field of anti-trust, 
international cooperation to prosecute a domestic or international cartel benefits all 
exporters active in the relevant markets. Exporters from non-cooperating countries – 
provided they have access to the market - cannot be excluded from benefiting from the 
more competitive markets that result. 
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Finally, the research approach is also non-teleological. The historical record indicates 
that increasingly deep international economic policy cooperation is by no means 
inevitable, or unidirectional. Amongst numerous examples of fluctuations in the depth 
of international policy cooperation is the abandonment of the Gold Standard in the 
1930s; a period of no international cooperation on exchange rates; the introduction of 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1946; the collapse of that system 
in the early 1970s; and its replacement from 1978 by the current system of floating 
exchange rates. In the post-World War II period, member states agreed to maintain the 
value of their currencies within one percent of their par value, and to adjust the par 
value only with the concurrence of the IMF. These restrictions on economic policy 
autonomy are no longer in place. 
 
3.2.3 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework in which this research is embedded is one that recognizes 
that international economic cooperation is the outcome of both the demand for, and the 
supply of cooperation by governments, and is also the result of inter-state negotiation. A 
number of broad theories of the determinants of international economic policy 
cooperation are discussed more fully in Chapter 7. Of these, a key theoretical 
determinant is economic integration, but the relationship between international 
economic integration and international economic cooperation is a two-way relationship. 
Policy-makers focus on the expected impact of international cooperation on economic 
integration. The few empirical studies in this area find some support for an impact of 
policy cooperation on economic integration – see Appendix 1 for a summary table of 
selected studies. 
 
However, it is also likely that, in some circumstances at least, economic integration 
creates a demand for increased policy cooperation (Lawrence 1998). Consistent with the 
overall focus of the thesis on re-conceptualizing the impact of economic integration on 
state sovereignty, the perspective that will be adopted will be to treat policy cooperation 
primarily as the dependent variable, and to begin to explore the conditions influencing 
states to sign up to international economic cooperation arrangements entailing varying 
depths of cooperation. 
 
This will contribute to the small empirical literature on the causes of international policy 
cooperation, which at present is largely confined to studies looking at a binary choice of 
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cooperation versus no cooperation e.g. Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2002, Baier 
and Bergstrand 2002, or studies that use a combined measure of economic and policy 
integration as the dependent variable e.g. Wu 2004. 
 
Competition policy is a good candidate for this research, for a number of reasons. First, 
increasingly mobile economic actors create the need for increased “regulatory reach” 
and potential jurisdictional conflict. This can be seen from the increase in international 
mergers, and increasing concern about the activities of international cartels. Secondly, 
there has been a rapid expansion in the last two decades in the number of countries that 
have national competition laws, resulting in a large increase in the potential for 
jurisdictional conflicts. Thirdly, there are a growing number of international 
competition policy agreements, incorporating all dimensions of state jurisdiction, and at 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels. Furthermore, these agreements are generally 
available on web sites of competition agencies and international organizations. 
Fourthly, there is no comprehensive WTO agreement on competition, so that a 
country’s economy-wide international commitments can be assessed on the basis of 
specific bilateral and regional agreements, without the need to compare those 
geographically bound commitments against broader multilateral commitments. Finally, 
for some time there has been a high level of international policy and research interest, 
reflected, for instance, in the long-standing competition policy work programs of 
UNCTAD and the OECD, and reflected more recently in the creation of the 
International Competition Network in 2001. 
 
3.3 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH. 
 
It is proposed to adopt a deductive approach that tests a theory and hypotheses derived 
from the theory. The literature reviews have been used to identify and clarify testable 
hypotheses and to prompt the development of new hypotheses. The overall scientific 
approach to the research points to the use of statistical analysis as the main 
methodology. 
 
Following Lazarsfeld, the development of the concept of jurisdictional integration is 
followed by the identification of distinct underlying dimensions, reflecting different 
aspects of the concept.30 These dimensions, based on different types of state 
                                                           
30 Lazarsfeld, 1958, cited in Bryman and Cramer, 1994, pp. 67-69. 
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jurisdiction, are drawn initially from international law (as discussed in Chapter 5). The 
identification of dimensions reduces the abstractness of a concept, making it easier to 
operationalize for measurement and research. Ordinal scales are then developed for each 
of the dimensions, against which individual international agreements can be ranked.  
 
The theoretical framework requires data on the depth of international cooperation at the 
country level. To the author’s knowledge, there is no existing dataset of the provisions 
of a substantial number of international economic agreements that would allow the 
ranking of countries by the depth of policy cooperation. This is first and foremost a 
reflection of the lack of a conceptually coherent basis for measuring the depth of 
international policy cooperation. Existing datasets were primarily compiled to measure 
phenomena such as the legal form of an agreement, the simple presence or absence of 
specific agreement features, or the extent to which provisions are compatible with the 
multilateral trading system, not to measure the depth of cooperation.  
 
A WTO inventory of non-tariff provisions in RTAs is utilised in Chapter 8 to derive a 
measure of the depth of policy cooperation in a sample of agreements, but the data is 
not sufficiently disaggregated to allow a measure of the depth of cooperation by 
country.  
 
Furthermore, RTAs do not necessarily capture the full extent of signatories’ level of 
international economic policy cooperation in a specific policy domain covered in the 
agreement. A country may also be party to bilateral agreements, other regional 
agreements, or multilateral agreements that must also be taken into account when 
measuring its level of international cooperation in a particular area. To fully measure the 
depth of policy cooperation by country, therefore, it is necessary to assemble a dataset 
that incorporates provisions in at least the main relevant international instruments to 
which that country is party.  
 
To that end, a new dataset of international agreements is constructed in Chapter 12, 
comprising bilateral, regional, and multilateral agreements containing provisions on 
international competition policy cooperation. The agreements are then ranked against 
ordinal indices of the depth of international competition policy cooperation derived in 
Chapter 10. Because the data for the dependent variable, and for a number of the 
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predictor variables, is ordinal data, the appropriate technique to use to test for statistical 
relationships is contingency table analysis, drawing on a variety of approaches. 31 
Hypothesized relationships between the depth of enforcement cooperation and predictor 
variables are explored. 
 
Given the methodological approach, the validity of the results is influenced by how 
robust the ordinal indices are, and by the reliability of the ranking of agreements against 
the indices. The indices are based on an extensive review of the competition policy 
literature, and have been tested against expert opinion. The reliability of the ranking has 
been subjected to a test of inter-rater reliability, to provide some assurance that other 
researchers and competition policy experts would rate the agreements in broadly the 
same way. To that end, a stratified random sample of 10 of the 92 agreements in the 
dataset was selected for independent ranking, as described in Chapter 14.9. 
 
The pragmatic perspective adopted for this thesis suggests the desirability of using more 
than one approach in an attempt to throw additional light on complex reality. Mixed 
methods approaches are generally seen as involving both quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies (Creswell 2003).  
 
This thesis attempts to achieve a form of convergence primarily through the use of 
different types of quantitative approaches - for instance, simple quantitative analysis of 
the overall depth of policy cooperation in RTAs, supplemented by statistical analysis of 
the relationship between the depth of competition policy enforcement cooperation and 
predictor variables by country and/or by agreement. The statistical analysis, in turn, 
utilises techniques suited both to large populations and small populations, in order to 
increase the robustness of the results. This reflects the fact that the relatively small size 
of the dataset constructed in Chapter 12 limits the extent to which standard large 
population statistical techniques can be relied upon. In addition, both classical 
                                                           
31 Ordinal data is categorical data i.e. data measured in terms of categories, in which the observations 
have a natural or built-in order. For example, health status measured in terms of the categories “poor 
health, fair health, good health, excellent health” is an ordinal variable, and a dataset consisting of such 
categories is ordinal data. The sequence “poor health, fair health, good health, excellent health” is an 
ordinal index, and may be arbitrarily numbered from 1 (poor health) to 4 (excellent health). In contrast, 
categorical data merely records whether a particular observation is or is not a member of a specific 
category. However, ordinal data is not count or interval data. That is, the distance between poor health (1) 
and fair health (2) is not necessarily the same as the distance between fair health (2) and good health (3).  
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confidence tests and Bayesian techniques are used to shed light on how much 
confidence can be placed on the strength of the statistical results. 
 
The specific type of mixed methods approach is a concurrent procedure, in which all 
data is collected at the same time and the results are integrated in the overall 
conclusions (Creswell, 2003). 
 
The approach to the research has primarily been to conduct exploratory statistical 
analysis with the objective of operationalising a new dependent variable – jurisdictional 
integration. The aim is not to attempt to rigorously identify all the predictor variables, or 
to control for all likely confounding variables, much less to attempt to establish the 
direction of causality running between, for instance, international policy cooperation 
and international economic integration. Rather, the objective is to begin to explore 
relationships between the more salient predictor variables, to test some descriptive 
statements and hypotheses, and to point the way to avenues for future research.  
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PART   2 
_________________________________________ 
       
    
 
Jurisdictional Integration: A New Concept 
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OVERVIEW 
 
In Part 2, the literature on international cooperation is reviewed as a prelude to the 
development of a new concept that better captures the impact of economic globalisation 
on state sovereignty.  
 
Chapter 4 presents a focused, interdisciplinary literature review. 
 
This is followed in Chapter 5 by a discussion of the contested concept of state 
sovereignty. The argument is developed that the alternative concept of state jurisdiction, 
well established in international law, provides a more coherent and tractable foundation 
for conceptualising, and ultimately for measuring, the depth of international 
cooperation. Jurisdictional integration is then defined as the process by which states 
increasingly constrain their formal policy authority through signing international 
agreements. 
 
Chapter 6 presents a stylized spectrum of jurisdictional integration, and an associated 
taxonomy of the depth of cooperation. The spectrum is illustrated with examples of 
international economic cooperation of increasing depth. Generic trade-offs between 
competing public policy objectives are discussed as a state moves from low to higher 
levels of jurisdictional integration. 
 
Part 2 of the thesis provides the conceptual tools for the measurement and statistical 
analysis of the depth of international economic cooperation that is undertaken in Part 3. 
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Chapter 4 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
THE LITERATURES ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEW 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE LITERATURES 
 
Meeting the objectives set out in Part One requires, inter alia, substantiation of the claim 
that the literature has paid insufficient attention to the varying impacts of different types 
of international cooperation on the de jure authority of the state.  
 
The type of literature review conducted is an integrative review that summarizes a broad 
theme running across the different disciplines.32 
 
A number of disciplines deal extensively with international cooperation, including 
political science, economics, law, and public policy. Some strands of the literature are 
themselves inter-disciplinary – for example, there is recent collaboration between 
international relations theorists and international lawyers on the “legalization of 
international relations.”  
 
This chapter contains a review of a wide range of the relevant literatures in: 
• International law.  
• International relations theory. 
• The legalization of international relations. 
• Regional integration theory. 
• The literature on stages of economic integration. 
• The literature on international policy coordination. 
• The literature on fiscal federalism.  
 
                                                           
32 Cooper, 1984, cited in Creswell, 2003, p. 32. 
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Figure 1 presents a Literature Map to provide an accessible overview of the relevant 
literatures. 
 
These literatures are voluminous, and any attempt to extract key contributions with 
respect to any one topic will inevitably fail to do justice in some regard. Given space 
limitations, the focus is limited to those aspects bearing on the impact of international 
cooperation on the de jure authority of the state. 
 
4.2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
“International law deals with the propriety of the exercises of jurisdiction by a state, and 
the resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction between states.”33  
 
As this quote suggests, in general, international Law has been primarily concerned with 
the problems of avoiding excessive unilateral extra-territorial assertions of jurisdiction, 
and ameliorating the problem of a party facing conflicting requirements from two or 
more states asserting jurisdiction over the same party or activity, rather than with 
international cooperation between states.  
 
This focus is reflected in the emergence of principles that limit jurisdiction to prescribe, 
to adjudicate, or to enforce to circumstances where the exercise of such jurisdiction is 
reasonable.34 It has lead to a rule that a state may not conduct official activities in the 
territory of another state without that state’s consent e.g. law enforcement officials of 
one state may take judicial enforcement actions in the territory of another state only 
with the consent of the other state. It has also resulted in the defence of foreign 
government compulsion - a state may not require a person to do something in another 
state (or refrain from doing something) that is prohibited (or required) by the law of that
                                                           
33 American Law Institute, 1987, p. 233. 
 
34 American Law Institute, 1987, pp. 244-254 (with respect to jurisdiction to prescribe), pp. 304-313 (with 
respect to jurisdiction to adjudicate), and pp. 320-339 (with respect to jurisdiction to enforce). Note that 
the standards of reasonableness are not the same across the different categories of jurisdiction. 
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state or by the law of the state of which he is a national; while a state may require a 
person of foreign nationality to do something in that state (or refrain from doing 
something) even if it is prohibited (or required) by law of the state of which he is a 
national.35  
 
Finally, limitations on state jurisdiction are reflected in the Act of State Doctrine in 
United States law. Under the Act of State Doctrine developed by the US Supreme 
Court, “…courts in the United States will generally refrain from examining the validity 
of a taking by a foreign state of property within its own territory, or from sitting in 
judgment on other acts of a governmental character done by a foreign state within its 
own territory…” and “A state or state instrumentality is immune from the jurisdiction of 
the courts of another state, except with respect to claims arising out of activities of the 
kind that may be carried on by private persons.” 36 There is no such general immunity 
from jurisdiction to prescribe, provided it is reasonable, except that relating to 
diplomatic and consular activities, and even governmental acts can be enforced through 
non-judicial means. 
 
In international law, the long-recognized ability of states to enter into commitments 
amongst themselves is regarded as constituting an attribute of sovereignty, rather than 
being a diminution of sovereignty.37 In general, however, international law does not 
distinguish between different types of international treaties or agreements. For instance, 
neither the International Law Commission, nor the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, makes a distinction between different types of treaties.38 Distinctions have at 
times been made between primary international (treaty) law, and secondary 
international law (law created by international organizations),39 and between the few 
                                                           
35 See American Law Institute 1987, p. 341. 
 
36 American Law Institute 1987, pp. 366-376 (Act of State Doctrine); p. 396 (state immunity from foreign 
courts); and p. 440 (immunity from jurisdiction to prescribe). 
 
37 In the Wimbledon case the Permanent Court of International Justice ruled that the right to enter into 
international commitments is an attribute of State sovereignty, not an act of abandoning sovereignty. 
(1923), PCIJ, Ser. A, no I, p. 25.  
 
38 See Brownlie 1998, pp. 638-639, on which this paragraph draws. 
 
39 See Alvarez, 2005, p. 13 for a discussion of law making by international organizations. Alvarez 
identifies four ways in which international organisations make law: by serving as a venue for inter-state 
negotiations; through enacting internal rules dealing with intra-organizational issues; through political 
organs taking action which is hortatory or binding to various degrees; and through the activities of 
institutionalised dispute settlers. 
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treaties, such as the United Nations Charter (Article 103) that assert a superior 
relationship to other treaties. 
 
Beyond these broad distinctions, international law also recognizes more intensive inter-
state cooperation - such as found in the EU and other regional agreements - in the form 
of the concept of “associations of states” or confederations. At some point, the 
concessions or delegations of powers granted by one state to others in an association, or 
to an international organization, may result in the extinction in international law of the 
separate legal personality of a state, and the creation of a dependent state or of a 
federation.  Brownlie identifies the following criteria of extinction of personality: “the 
obligatory nature of membership; majority decision-making; the determination of 
jurisdiction by the organization itself; and the binding quality of decisions of the 
organization apart from consent of member states.”40  
 
Crawford argues that a broad discretionary authority to intervene in the internal affairs 
of a state, even if arising from consent of that state, would appear to be inconsistent 
with formal independence, and therefore with statehood.41 He also suggests that a 
distinguishing feature of a federation i.e. a single state, as opposed to a confederation of 
states, is that the central government’s powers include substantially all the foreign 
affairs powers.42 
 
Note, however, that there is a strong presumption against the extinction of a state once it 
is firmly established in international law, despite at times extensive loss of actual 
authority. Crawford states that extinction is not effected by substantial loss of 
independence, and that even deep forms of cooperation - such as the creation by 
Austria-Hungary between 1861-1918 of joint organs for foreign affairs, defence, 
finance and trade - do not necessarily derogate from formal independence. Crawford 
states that Austria and Hungary “probably remained separate legal entities” during this 
period.43  
 
                                                           
40 Brownlie 1998, p. 292 and p. 73.  See also Sarooshi, cited in Howse 2008, p. 65. 
 
41 Crawford, 2006, pp. 71-72. 
 
42 Crawford, 2006, p. 485. 
 
43 Crawford, 2006, p. 701, and p. 70. 
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The criteria for extinction of state personality overlap somewhat with features of a very 
small number of international economic agreements – typically confined to the EC 
Treaty and WTO 1994 – that are considered by some legal scholars to be more in the 
nature of constitutions than international treaties.44 Trachtman considers treaties to be 
“constitution-like” that “establish bases for further legislation and adjudication i.e. 
treaties that do more than simply create substantive rules for application, but create a 
method, beyond mere intergovernmentalism, for creating further substantive rules either 
through legislation or adjudication.”45  
 
With respect to the EC, the supremacy of EC law over domestic law, and its direct 
effect in the legal systems of member states are viewed as the key mechanisms for 
constitutionalization.46 In relation both to the EC and WTO 1994, Petersmann considers 
the protections of the ability to exercise individual economic rights across international 
borders free from abuses of governmental powers, to fulfil constitutional functions.47 
 
While the criteria for extinction of international legal sovereignty, and the indicators of 
constitutionalism are all highly pertinent to identifying the highest levels of 
international cooperation, they are not found in the vast majority of international 
agreements. International law has much less to say on classification of the plethora of 
less deep forms of cooperation in terms of their differential impact on de jure state 
authority. 
 
Trachtman has suggested that there is a growing range of options for the use of 
international legal rules, from less binding force to greater binding force. He briefly sets 
out the following options to promote international cooperation: rules of jurisdiction; 
rules of treatment e.g. national treatment; rules of proportionality of national law; rules 
of recognition of foreign regulation, including mutual recognition; harmonization of 
law; and institutions that will legislatively or adjudicatively conduct these tasks in the 
future.48 In a recent contribution, Trachtman distinguishes between negative integration 
                                                           
44 Trachtman 1996, note 7. 
 
45 Trachtman, 1996, note 7. 
 
46 Weiler and Trachtman, 1996-97, 17:254. 
 
47 Petersmann, 1996-97, p. 405. 
 
48 Trachtman, 1996, pp. 6-8. 
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rules – such as national treatment and least trade restrictive measure – that proscribe 
certain domestic measures taken by states, and positive integration rules - such as 
mutual recognition or harmonization of regulations - that establish new rules.49 
 
Trachtman’s approach covers a number of important elements in international economic 
cooperation, and his listing of options appears in a number of cases to be in some 
ascending order of degree of intrusion on state autonomy. However, rules of jurisdiction 
range from less intrusive rules over the horizontal interface between national legal 
systems e.g. double tax treaties, through to hierarchical relationships in which a 
supranational entity has jurisdiction of varying types over activities taking place within 
member states e.g. the competition policy enforcement authorities established by RTAs 
such as the EC and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), which 
are discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.   As will also become evident in Chapters 5 
and 6 and in Part Three, it is possible to significantly expand on Trachtman’s policy 
cooperation options, in part by distinguishing between prescriptive and enforcement 
activities, and by incorporating options other than legal approaches. 
 
Chayes and Chayes (1995) and Stein (2001) have each gone some way towards this end. 
Chayes and Chayes put forward a ‘managerial model’ of treaty compliance, suggesting 
that a range of ‘soft’ approaches are more effective than coercive instruments in 
inducing state cooperation. They identify regime participation; transparency provisions 
(reporting, monitoring, verifying) by a treaty body;50 non-binding conciliation and 
binding adjudication; and capacity building (helping countries to comply with their 
obligations). These are important elements of approaches to enforcement, and will be 
drawn on in Chapter 6 and Part Three. They leave out ‘hard law’ instruments, however, 
and also omit integration of rule making authority, and international cooperation 
between enforcement agencies.  
 
Stein classifies international organizations according to whether they are cooperative 
and non-rule directed; rule oriented (authorized to propose rules and treaties, impose 
international obligations, and adopt rules without or with direct effect in member 
                                                           
49 Trachtman 2007, p. 641. 
 
50 This echoes the arguments of international relations theorists that information, evidence, and proof 
have become essential instruments for getting states to “cooperate, comply, desist or otherwise alter their 
behaviour.” Rosenau, 1989, pp. 35-37. 
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states); or rule enforcing (providing reports on compliance, publicity, dispute 
settlements of various kinds).51 These three categories cover both legal and non-legal 
mechanisms, and differentiate between rule-making and rule enforcement. The 
approach outlined in subsequent chapters similarly distinguishes between rule making 
and rule enforcement, but introduces a number of further distinctions within these 
categories. 
 
4.3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
 
International relations theorists have tended to focus on the conditions under which 
international cooperation is likely to occur, and the functions it performs, rather than 
with the differential impacts of alternative forms of cooperation on state autonomy. In 
regime theory, for instance, international regimes are defined as sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.52 Regime theory thus 
combines instruments that have very different implications for state autonomy.  
 
In recent years, however, there has been increasing interest amongst mainstream 
international relations and international legal scholars in the proliferation of “quasi-
legal” instruments in international treaties in all domains, especially but not limited to 
international economic cooperation agreements. 
 
Smith, for instance, in a study of dispute resolution mechanisms in RTAs, devised a 
spectrum of legalism, beginning with agreements in which there is no right to 
independent third party review.53 He identified increasing levels of legalism represented 
by agreements with non-binding dispute settlement mechanisms; agreements giving 
states an automatic right to binding rulings by ad hoc arbitrators; agreements that 
establish a standing tribunal; and agreements giving rulings direct effect in national law, 
and allowing entities other than states to bring disputes for resolution. Smith’s levels of 
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52 Krasner 1983, p. 2.  
 
53 Smith 2000, pp. 139-143. 
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legalism are drawn on in Chapter 10 in identifying increasing depth of cooperation with 
respect to adjudication of inter-state disputes.54  
 
A more ambitious attempt to devise a framework covering all types of ‘legalism’ in all 
policy domains culminated in a special issue of the journal International Organization 
in Summer 2000 entitled ‘Legalization and World Politics.’ Legalization, as defined by 
these (mainly international relations) scholars, is characterized by three components: the 
degree to which rules are obligatory; their precision; and the extent of delegation to 
third parties.  
 
For each of the three components of legalization, the authors identify increasing levels 
of legalization. For instance: 
• The indicators of obligation range from non-binding norms and guidelines, 
through national reservations on specific obligations, to unconditionally binding 
instruments.  
• The indicators of precision range from standards which are meaningful only in 
specific situations, through broad areas of discretion, to determinate rules with 
only narrow issues of interpretation.   
• The indicators of delegation of dispute resolution (which has some similarity to 
Smith’s spectrum of legalism) range from pure political bargaining, through 
binding arbitration, to courts with general jurisdiction and direct private access. 
• The indicators of delegation of rule making and implementation range from a 
forum for negotiations; to recommendations and decentralized monitoring; to 
coordination standards; to legitimization of decentralized enforcement; through 
to binding regulations with centralized enforcement.  
 
These indicators, which are arrayed in order of increasing impact on de jure state 
autonomy, are drawn on in developing discrete levels of jurisdictional integration in 
Chapter 6 and Part Three.  
 
However, from the broader perspective of international policy cooperation, there are 
some limitations in the concept of legalization as adumbrated by these authors. First, the 
focus, not surprisingly, is on the use of legal and quasi-legal forms and processes 
                                                           
54 Note that Smith’s index of legalism covers both public and private law. For some purposes it may be 
desirable to treat them separately, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 10. 
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(courts, treaties, and dispute resolution), rather than on all the mechanisms through 
which international policy cooperation is effected. Legalization does not deal to any 
great extent with increasingly important ‘non-legalistic” mechanisms, such as 
agreements on common definitions of policy terms, technical cooperation, or informal 
trans-national networks of officials. 
 
Secondly, as noted by Finnemore and Tooope, the authors focus on delegation of 
authority to adjudicate.55 They pay little attention to delegation of authority to make 
rules, or delegation of authority to enforce rules through non-judicial means. One 
consequence of this, perhaps, is that the authors combine delegation of rule making with 
delegation of rule implementation, although these are conceptually distinct.56 They are 
treated separately in this thesis, along the lines of the distinction between the 
prescriptive jurisdiction and the enforcement jurisdiction (see Chapter 5.2). This assists 
in the identification and measurement of additional types of policy cooperation, such as 
international enforcement cooperation between regulatory agencies, and cooperation in 
the delivery of public services that span state borders.  
 
Thirdly, the indicators of delegation of rule making do not explicitly incorporate some 
important generic “legalistic” mechanisms – for instance, mutual recognition, majority 
voting, and direct effect. The omission of the last two mechanisms means that the 
legalization framework cannot differentiate between the EC and the WTO Agreement 
on Trade Related Investment Provisions (TRIPS agreement). Both are ranked by Abbott 
et. al. as the highest level of legalization, perhaps because the authors place greater 
weight on obligation compared to delegation (p. 405). Yet, in addition to binding third 
party adjudication, the EC also features majority voting and direct effect, very deep 
forms of delegation of rule making not found in the WTO-TRIPS agreement.57 
 
Finally, the legalization framework pays little attention to the relationship between 
“legalization” and state sovereignty. For instance, Abbott and Snidal note that 
sovereignty is a highly contested term. “We skirt these conceptual debates, focusing 
instead on the fact that states often perceive international legalization as infringing on 
                                                           
55 “The processes of law [in the special issue] are viewed overwhelmingly as processes of dispute 
resolution.” Finnemore and Toope 2001, p. 745. 
 
56 Abbott et. al. 2000, pp. 416-417. 
 
57 Abbott et. al. 2000, p. 406. 
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their sovereignty, broadly conceived.”58 The authors in the same special issue prefer to 
treat legalized restrictions on state autonomy as a general and vague imposition on 
“sovereignty.” They do not attempt to identify the different dimensions of state 
sovereignty, and consider how different forms of legalization impact on states’ authority 
for independent action along these dimensions. This latter perspective points to an 
alternative approach to classifying international policy cooperation, based on the 
disaggregation of state jurisdiction. 
 
A recent contribution to the literature by Krahmann focuses more broadly on the 
increasing fragmentation of state authority. Krahmann outlines a continuum between 
two ideal typical modes: “government” – the centralization of political authority within 
the state – and “governance,” structures and processes of coordination in the absence of 
a unifying political authority.59 She identifies dimensions in which authority is 
increasingly fragmented at the international level, including devolution to actors that 
regulate across national borders; differentiation in policy making processes by policy 
function; the devaluation of the norm of state sovereignty; a shift to non-consensual 
decision making; and policy implementation via self-enforcement mechanisms and 
voluntary agreements. Krahmann’s schema is useful as a broad framework. It does not, 
however, provide a basis for identifying discrete points on a continuum between 
government and governance. To do so requires both an exploration of how international 
cooperation impacts on state sovereignty, and the disaggregation of decision-making 
and implementation processes at the international level. 
 
4.4 THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
 
Following Balassa, economists have long distinguished between different stages of 
economic integration.60 The classic stages are Free Trade Area (FTA), Customs Union, 
Common Market, Economic Union, and total economic integration. By assumption, at 
each stage an additional layer of policy discrimination between economic actors in 
participating states is removed, creating an increasingly integrated economic space. 
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These stages are often conceived as being cumulative, so that each subsequent stage 
subsumes the features of the previous steps. 
 
Molle has suggested a refinement of this classic schema along the following lines: FTA, 
incomplete Customs Union, Customs Union, incomplete Common Market, Common 
Market, economic union, monetary union, economic and monetary union, political 
union, and full union. Political union is reached when integration is extended beyond 
the realm of economics to encompass such fields as policing, foreign policy, and 
security policy. Full union involves complete unification of the economies involved, 
and comprises some form of federalism.61 Wu adds sectoral trading agreements as a 
first, very limited stage, reflecting trade cooperation rather than actual integration 
(although, as Schelling has noted, sectoral cooperation may also entail deep policy 
integration, as in the European Coal and Steel Community).62 Cernat adds association 
agreements between the EU and neighbouring countries, as an intermediate step 
between Customs Unions and Common Markets, recognizing that, although these 
agreements do not adopt a common trade policy, they involve a high level of integration 
in trade-related areas.63 
 
There is an important association between the stages of economic integration, and the 
level of policy cooperation required to support it. For instance, compared to an FTA, a 
Customs Union signals the intention to negotiate a common external tariff and the 
setting up of administrative machinery to collect and share tariff revenues. Moving 
beyond a Customs Union has traditionally been viewed as entailing progressively more 
extensive policy coordination, as domestic policies that can distort trade and investment 
become subject to collective discussion and international cooperation.  
 
This literature has, however, largely treated international economic integration as being 
at the same time both an economic, and a political phenomenon. It has not attempted to 
clearly distinguish economic integration from policy integration, and to analyze them as 
distinct - albeit related - phenomena.  
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62 Wu, 2003, p. 5; Schelling, 1958. 
 
63 Cernat 2005, p. 9. 
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Yet, as earlier noted by Nye, economic and policy integration do not co-vary in any 
systematic manner.64 There is an increasingly large variation in the depth of policy 
integration within and across the different stages of economic integration. For instance, 
FTAs now generally cover more than just trade in goods e.g. services, investment, and 
therefore often contain (sometimes extensive) provisions on a range of “behind the 
border” policies, such as domestic regulatory settings. 
 
RTAs also exhibit a wide range of practice with respect to the creation and functions of 
new international organizations. This institutional variation does not necessarily co-vary 
with the stages of economic integration. For instance, the Closer Economic Relations 
Agreement between Australia and New Zealand has a number of features of both a 
common market and an economic union, but has no trans-national secretariat of any 
kind.  
 
Furthermore, some international economic agreements include elements of deep 
integration, but do not include all the ‘prior’ steps of shallow integration. For example, 
NAFTA has dispute resolution processes that allow non-state entities to bring actions 
against signatory governments, but is not a customs union.65  
 
Stage theory also limits international policy cooperation to bilateral or regional trade 
agreements. It is not capable of application to multilateral economic agreements such as 
the WTO, or to the large number of agreements that are not embodied in trade 
agreements.  
 
Stage theory, then, represents an important contribution to conceptualizing important 
dimensions of international economic integration. The stages are often also associated 
with increasing levels of policy cooperation. However, by conflating economic and 
policy integration, stage theory over-simplifies the nature of the relationship between 
the two, and submerges policy cooperation as a subject of study in its own right. 
                                                           
64 Nye, 1968, pp. 860-861. Molle also acknowledges that in practice FTAs, Customs Unions and 
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65 NAFTA has at least five different dispute resolution mechanisms, two of which (unfair trade laws, 
Chapter 19, and investment, Chapter 11) include binding rulings and standing for individuals. Smith 
2000, p. 158. 
 
 49  
 
4.5 REGIONAL INTEGRATION THEORY 
 
Regional integration theory has focused on describing the nature of integration in 
Europe since the formation of the European Economic Community in 1957. The main 
debate has been between those who view European integration as an intergovernmental 
phenomenon - with member states “pooling sovereignty” but retaining control66 - and 
those who view it as a new form of supranational governance in which EC institutions 
enjoy autonomous capacity to influence outcomes.  
 
In a restatement of the latter, neo-functionalist view, Sandholtz and Sweet put forward a 
continuum between two ideal-typical modes of governance: the intergovernmental and 
the supranational.67 However, the authors talk only generally of movements along the 
spectrum, and do not identify points between the two modes. 
 
In sharp contrast to this highly aggregated approach, an earlier wave of regional 
integration theorists, led by Lindberg (1970) and Nye (1968), stressed the need to 
disaggregate the concept of regional integration. They distinguished between economic, 
social, and political integration, and developed detailed frameworks for the 
measurement of each type and sub-type, noting that “political integration is by far the 
most ambiguous and difficult for which to develop satisfactory indices.”68 
 
For instance, to measure one property of political integration, Lindberg identified a six-
point scale of range of decision stages.69 In ascending order, the scale incorporated 
collective problem recognition; agreement on a range of compatible policies; collective 
decision on policy guidelines; detailed collective goal setting; policy decisions directly 
binding on individuals; and collective implementation and enforcement.  
 
Lindberg’s hierarchy appears to be based around the time sequence of the policy 
process, rather than the degree of intrusion on policy autonomy. For instance, collective 
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enforcement is at the top of Lindberg’s hierarchy. Collective enforcement in the form of 
non-binding independent arbitration is relatively common, much more so than decision 
making in regional organizations with direct effect in member states, and is less, rather 
than more constraining of state autonomy.70 
 
Lindberg also identified the resources available to collective decision makers as an 
important property, defining them to include whether international organizations have 
initiating, participatory, advocacy, policy making, or monitoring powers; whether future 
actions are self-executing; and whether there is majority voting.71 Lindberg listed these 
as attributes, noting that they could be redefined as continuous variables, although he 
does not appear to have done so.72 
 
Nye also disaggregated political integration into sub-types. Relevant here is his concept 
of jurisdictional integration, which he defined as the extent to which regional 
institutions have autonomy from direct control by member states. Nye suggested that 
jurisdictional integration could be measured, inter alia, by the degree of supra-
nationality in decision-making. He identified five levels, ranging from unanimity 
amongst member states, through decisions with and without a national veto, up to 
decisions made by the administrative organs of regional organizations.73 This captures 
an important element of policy cooperation as defined here, but omits international 
cooperation at earlier stages of the policy process, prior to the decision-making stage, 
and does not cover integration of enforcement authority.74  
  
From the perspective of this paper – the need for more disaggregated conceptions of 
international policy cooperation – the more recent regional integration literature is a 
backward step. The early wave of regional integration theorists developed an impressive 
set of tools for conceptualizing, defining, and measuring levels of regional policy 
                                                           
70  Lindberg noted: “…we may be interested in …precisely describing the extent to which the autonomy 
(range of choices and resources) of national decision makers is affected.” He does not appear, however, to 
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71 Lindberg 1970, pp. 682-697. 
 
72 Lindberg 1970, p. 684. 
 
73 Nye 1968, pp. 867-868. 
 
74 Nye also defined policy integration as a separate category, but defined it to include horizontal scope 
and political salience. He does not appear to have devised a concept of the depth of policy integration, 
aside from his concept of jurisdictional integration. Nye 1968, p. 868.  
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integration. While they appear to have confined their analysis to regional integration, 
the framework they developed would seem to be capable of application to other forms 
of international policy cooperation.  
 
It is curious that their work has not had more impact. It is perhaps due to the loss of 
favour of regional integration theory shortly thereafter.75 There remains today a clear 
tendency to use the stages of economic integration as a measure of regional policy 
integration. For instance, it is commonplace to assert that a Customs Union is a deeper 
form of policy integration than an FTA because of the existence of - or in some cases 
just the intention to create - a common external tariff. Comprehensive attempts to 
develop measures of international policy cooperation use only crude indicators of 
international policy cooperation.  
 
For instance, the measure of international political integration compiled by A.T. 
Kearney/Foreign Policy, defined as political engagement, incorporates membership in 
selected international organizations, contributions to UN peacekeeping missions, 
international treaties ratified per year, and governmental transfers. None of these 
provides a satisfactory or direct measure of the depth or scope of international policy 
integration.76 
 
The framework developed in this thesis has some similarities to the frameworks 
developed by Lindberg and Nye. Key differences are that the starting point in this paper 
is the disaggregation of the concept of state sovereignty; the focus is solely on the 
impact of policy cooperation on states’ recognized authority to make or enforce rules; 
and the analysis incorporates all forms of international economic cooperation. These 
differences result in the development of a new variable to measure the depth of 
international policy cooperation. 
 
 
 
                                                           
75 As suggested to the author by Joseph Nye in an email (2 October 2006). For instance, in 1976, a 
leading regional integration theorist, Ernst Haas, responding to the perceived stalling of European 
integration at that time, wrote a book entitled “The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory.” 
 
76 See A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy 2005. 
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4.6 INTERNATIONAL POLICY COOPERATION 
 
In contrast to much of the literature reviewed above, the policy cooperation literature, 
not surprisingly, focuses closely on the detailed mechanisms through which 
international cooperation takes place. In an important early contribution, Cooper 
identified a hierarchy of levels of international policy cooperation, ranging from 
information exchange and consultation, to progressively adopting common rules 
(convergence, approximation, unification), to, at the highest level, setting up a common 
institution to administer the same or similar rules. Cooper also subdivided information 
exchange and consultation into levels of increasing intrusion: exchange of information 
on the current situation; agreement on common definitions of concepts and 
measurements; agreement on norms and objectives; exchange of information on 
prospective policy actions; coordination of national actions; and joint action in the name 
of all participating parties.77 
 
Leebron has developed this approach with respect to ‘arms-length’ international 
regulatory coordination between states that share no common political or economic 
authority (by which he meant to exclude agreements such as customs unions, common 
markets and economic unions).78 Leebron distinguishes between unilateral and 
cooperative coordination. With respect to the latter, he distinguishes between 
harmonization of general policy objectives; harmonization of policy principles; 
harmonization of specific rules; and harmonization of institutional structures and 
procedures. 79  In similar vein, Goddard identifies the following mechanisms for 
international regulatory coordination: mutual recognition; common rules with separate 
national regulatory agencies; a single trans-national regulatory agency implementing 
separate national rules; and a single agency implementing common rules.80  
 
The international policy cooperation literature generally arrays policy integration 
mechanisms in broad relation to their impacts on de jure state autonomy in decision-
                                                           
77 Cooper 1987, p. 183. See also Kahler 1995, p. xvii, who identifies points on a continuum for the 
management of international convergence (mutual recognition, monitored decentralization, coordination, 
and explicit harmonization); and White 1997, pp. 13-17. 
 
78 Leebron 1996, pp. 43-50.  
 
79 Leebron defines harmonization as making the regulatory requirements or governmental policies of 
different jurisdictions identical, or at least more similar. 
 
80 Goddard 2002.    
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making. However, Cooper’s hierarchy only includes policy settings, leaving out 
international cooperation over policy implementation and dispute resolution. In 
addition, his intermediate steps (convergence, approximation, unification) are cast in 
terms of regulatory outcomes, rather than in terms of mechanisms that distinguish on 
the basis of differential impacts on de jure state authority. For instance, convergence, 
approximation, and unification can all be achieved unilaterally or cooperatively.   
 
Leebron’s characterization of international policy harmonization does not suffer from 
this last shortcoming. It does not, however, fully incorporate all the elements in 
international policy cooperation that impact on state jurisdiction, such as integration of 
dispute settlement or other enforcement activities, or the deeper forms of integration 
found in a number of RTAs and exemplified by the EC.  
 
4.7 FISCAL FEDERALISM 
 
Fiscal federalism is concerned with which economic functions should be performed by 
different levels of government. While the initial focus of the literature was on the 
allocation of fiscal functions between central and sub-national governments, the 
framework has been extended to cover the allocation of a wider set of functions, and to 
incorporate relationships between states and international or supranational institutions.  
 
A key insight in this literature is that, in principle, public goods such as economic 
regulation should be supplied by that level of government “whose jurisdictional 
boundaries are co-terminous with the geographic scope of the regions affected.”81 For 
example, regulation of economic activities that have no effects outside a country should 
be left to national or sub-national governments, but activities that impact significantly 
on other countries (such as international trade or investment) are potential candidates for 
international policy cooperation of varying types.  
 
Aligning jurisdictional boundaries with policy effects, by allocating functions to an 
international entity, can reduce transactions costs and externalities across jurisdictions. 
This comes at the cost, however, of having to tailor public goods to a more diverse and 
geographically dispersed population; the costs arising from having multiple overlapping 
jurisdictions; and the loss of economies of scope in concentrating authority for many 
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functions at the same level, which in most cases is at the level of the nation state 
(Alesina and Spolaore 2003). 
 
This literature treats the scope of state jurisdiction as a variable, rather than taking it as 
given, which is very much the perspective adopted in this thesis. However, the literature 
takes a broad and general view of the options for allocating functions between states 
and international organisations. For instance, there is a focus on the full attribution of 
prerogatives, or on the number of policy areas where an international institution is 
active, rather than on the different degrees of attribution of prerogatives to the 
international level, and the different types of activities undertaken. Ruta points to recent 
“a la carte” agreements in Europe, such as Economic and Monetary Union and the 
Schengen Treaty, which provide the potential for different “clubs” of varying 
membership.82  
 
However, from one perspective, these are only very deep examples of a more general 
phenomena. As Slaughter has argued in “The New World Order”, what is emerging in 
international relations is a world latticed by countless horizontal and vertical 
government networks. In practice nearly every country in the world is already a member 
of a variety of different “economic regulation clubs.”83 
 
This thesis will attempt to develop and operationalize a framework for measuring the 
depth of the rich variety of “economic governance clubs” that states are participating in, 
and to demonstrate that the policy and research menus are much more diverse than full 
allocation or non-allocation of authority to the national or international levels. 
 
4.8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
To summarize at this point, in very general terms - and with the notable exception of 
scholarship on comparative regional integration in the 1960s, and to some extent the 
recent focus on the legalization of international relations - the existing literatures: 
• Have relatively little to say on classification of the full range of types of 
inter-state cooperation in terms of their differential impacts on de jure state 
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authority e.g. international law, international relations theory, and regional 
integration theory; and/or 
• Conflate economic and policy integration e.g. stages of economic 
integration theory; and/or 
• Cover only a sub-set of the full range of international economic cooperation 
arrangements e.g. regional integration theory, stages of economic 
integration, and the literatures on international regulatory cooperation and 
the legalization of international relations. 
 
A key finding is that the literature has paid insufficient attention to the phenomena of 
voluntarily agreed limitations on a state’s recognised authority to make and to enforce 
rules. For instance, international law has focused much more on the problem of 
excessive extra-territorial assertions of state jurisdiction, and of overlapping and 
conflicting jurisdiction, than on the degree of intrusion on jurisdiction voluntarily 
agreed to between states. International relations, on the other hand, has focused on the 
conditions under which cooperation occurs, and the functions cooperation performs, 
rather than how cooperation varies in its impact on state authority. These conceptual 
shortcomings are in turn reflected in an inability to satisfactorily measure the depth of 
international policy cooperation. 
 
The literature on legalization goes some way to redressing this. Smith’s approach to 
measuring the depth of cooperation in dispute resolution mechanisms in RTAs shows 
the potential contribution of this avenue to measurement and research.84 More generally, 
the indicators of obligation, precision and delegation are important parameters that 
influence the depth of international policy cooperation, and will be drawn on 
subsequently. However, they are not sufficient for the objective of this thesis – to act as 
a framework for the reconceptualization, measurement, and analysis of all forms of 
international economic cooperation in terms of their impact on state authority. 
 
In the next chapter an attempt is made to develop a conceptual framework that addresses 
these shortcomings. This involves at the outset revisiting the foundational but contested 
concept of state sovereignty. 
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Chapter 5 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
SOVEREIGNTY, JURISDICTION, AND JURISDICTIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
 
 
“Much of the confusion about the implications of globalization for the nation-state is 
due to the reification of the state, reinforced by the concept of “sovereignty.”  
Picciotto 85 
 
 
 
5.1 STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND STATE JURISDICTION 
 
The term sovereignty is used in a wide variety of ways, creating ambiguity and 
confusion.  State sovereignty may refer to the possession of international legal 
personality, or to the possession of particular legal competences or powers. It may refer 
to de jure state authority or to de facto state capacity. It may be used to refer to the full 
set of a state’s legal powers or capacities, to the minimum autonomy a state must 
possess to be a state, or to just one or other of those powers and capacities. It is often 
not clear which aspect or meaning is being applied in a particular case. 
 
Crawford notes that, in its most common usage, “As a legal term ‘sovereignty’ refers 
not to omnipotent authority…but to the totality of powers that states may have under 
international law. By contrast, as a political term, its connotations are those of 
untrammelled authority and power and it is in such discourse that the term can be 
problematic.”86 
 
                                                           
85 Picciotto, 1996, p. 98. 
 
86 Crawford , 2006, p.33. 
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In an influential attempt at clarification, Krasner has identified four categories of 
sovereignty: 87 
1. Domestic sovereignty: the formal organization of political authority within 
the state and the ability to exercise effective control within the state’s 
borders. 
2. Interdependence sovereignty: the ability to control cross-border flows. 
3. Westphalian sovereignty: political organisation within a specific territory 
based on the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority 
structures.88  
4. International legal sovereignty: the possession of recognized legal 
personality on the international plane.  
 
Domestic sovereignty involves both state authority and state capacity; interdependence 
sovereignty is solely concerned with state capacity; and the last two categories involve 
state authority only. 
 
Krasner points out that these four meanings of sovereignty are not logically coupled, 
nor have they co-varied in practice. Indeed, he points out that the exercise of one type of 
sovereignty can undermine another. When a state enters into international agreements 
that recognize the authority of external actors within its territory - such as various types 
of international economic agreements - it is undermining its Westphalian sovereignty. 
“International legal sovereignty is the necessary condition for rulers to compromise 
voluntarily aspects of their Westphalian sovereignty.”89 But in retaining their 
international legal sovereignty, they also retain the right to withdraw from international 
agreements they have previously entered, thus reclaiming whatever Westphalian 
sovereignty they had previously compromised. 
 
A further illustration that the four meanings of sovereignty do not co-vary in practice is 
that compromises of Westphalian sovereignty in an increasingly interdependent world 
are often intended to strengthen interdependence sovereignty – as argued by the “new 
                                                           
87 Krasner 1999, p. 9. 
 
88 Westphalian sovereignty is also referred to as external sovereignty. 
 
89 Krasner 1999, p. 19. 
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sovereignty” theorists.90 That is, by giving up some of their de jure authority in 
international economic agreements, states can increase their de facto ability to influence 
trans-national activities or spill-overs. 
 
Krasner comments that, while Westphalian sovereignty can be compromised through 
invitation as well as intervention, invitation has received much less attention in the 
literature. He considers this is the case “…because observers have confounded 
international legal and Westphalian sovereignty. Intervention violates both. Invitation 
violates only Westphalian sovereignty.’91 
 
In international law, actions by a state to accept the jurisdiction of another state in it’s 
territory are described as derogations from that state’s sovereignty. However, the other 
state is not considered to thereby gain sovereignty i.e. legal personality.92 In similar 
vein, Keohane has stated that sovereignty as a legal concept should not be confused 
with the claim that a particular state actually does make its decisions autonomously i.e. 
has not given up its legal competence in some manner to another state or international 
organization.93 And Raustiala has argued that, if pooling sovereignty in the EU is 
functionally effective, ‘…then pooling (and “sacrificing”) national sovereignty may be 
the best way for Europeans to maximize their sovereignty…’.94 
 
The examples in the previous paragraph illustrate the somewhat tortuous and ambiguous 
usages of the term sovereignty. When the same action can be described as both 
sacrificing sovereignty and maximizing sovereignty it is time to revisit the language. As 
noted by Dingwerth and Pattberg, if concepts are to fulfil their basic function in social 
science of ordering and structuring our perception of the world, a single concept should 
not group together dissimilar phenomena. If this rule is broken, “…we cannot achieve a 
basic level of agreement on the terms by which we analyse the social world, [and] 
                                                           
90 For example, Chayes and Chayes 1995, Raustiala 2003. 
 
91 Krasner 1999, pp. 20-22. 
 
92 For instance, the administration of Germany after the Second World War by the four allied powers 
represented a derogation of German sovereignty, but the legal sovereignty of the German state continued 
(the legal basis was “akin to legal representation or agency of necessity”). Brownlie, 1998, p.107. 
 
93 Keohane, 2002, p.385. 
 
94 Raustiala, 2003, p.15. 
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agreement on conclusions is impossible.”95 With respect to the concept of sovereignty, 
multiple meanings reduce the analytical contribution of the concept, require added 
efforts by analysts to discern the meaning in specific instances, and may limit the 
cumulativeness of research. 
 
Motivated similarly to improve conceptual clarity, Jackson suggests that most debates 
over ‘sovereignty’ are actually about the allocation of power, usually government 
decision-making power.96 He suggests a pragmatic approach to analyzing such ‘core 
sovereignty’ issues in terms of careful analysis of the criteria that support the allocation 
of public powers to sub-national, national, and international levels. He labels this 
approach ‘sovereignty-modern.’ 
 
This thesis attempts to build on Krasner’s concept of ‘compromises of Westphalian 
sovereignty by invitation,’ and on Jackson’s suggested focus on the allocation of 
government decision-making powers. It does so by developing a new framework – 
jurisdictional integration – to conceptualise, describe, and provide a basis to measure 
the increasingly diverse ways in which states are choosing to restrict their authority by 
entering international economic agreements.  
 
The new framework is based on substituting the term ‘state jurisdiction’ for the 
awkward (and historically inaccurate) term ‘Westphalian sovereignty’97 - without 
disturbing the other meanings of sovereignty identified by Krasner or recognized in 
international law.98 
 
State jurisdiction is the recognized authority of a state under international law to govern 
persons and property by its municipal law i.e. domestic or national law. In European 
terminology, jurisdiction as recognized authority is also referred to as competence, as in 
“The European Commission has competence in agriculture policy.”  
                                                           
95 Gerring and Baresi, cited in Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2006, p. 187. 
 
96 Jackson 2003, p. 8. As a US court observed: “[Appellant would have us believe that sovereignty is an 
“all or nothing” concept…we disagree...[T]his argument ignores the distinction between sovereignty, or 
the legal personality of the nation, and jurisdiction, or the rights and powers of the nation over its 
inhabitants. Heller v US, 776F2d92, 96-7 (3rd Cir 1985). Cited in Crawford 2006, pp.32-33. 
 
97 For discussion of the ‘myth of Westphalia’, see Osiander 2001.  
 
98 As Crawford notes, the term sovereignty “…seems to be ineradicable, and anyway its eradication might 
only make matters worse.” (2006, p.32).  
 60  
 
State jurisdiction is at the same time a statement of the limits on a state’s authority, in 
order to limit the problem of excessive assertions of jurisdiction. 
 
In contrast to sovereignty, Arend has stated: “There seems to be little controversy over 
what “jurisdiction” as a legal concept means…while different states may have 
conflicting views over when a particular state has jurisdiction, the concept of 
jurisdiction is shared.”99 This meaning of jurisdiction also conforms broadly to how the 
word is used in more popular discourse, such as reference to the jurisdiction of a court.  
 
Jurisdiction involves both the right of a state to exercise authority, given the existence 
of a (generally territorially-defined) close connection with the state, and the duty to 
recognize the same right of other states. States have considerable discretion in deciding 
whether to claim jurisdiction. As noted in Chapter 4, the focus of attention in 
international law has been on the problem of limiting excessive (unilateral) claims of 
jurisdiction,100 and on managing overlapping and conflicting jurisdiction, rather than on 
cooperative approaches to inter-jurisdictional issues.  
 
5.2 THE DIMENSIONS OF STATE JURISDICTION 
 
State jurisdiction can be disaggregated into key substantive components. In Brownlie’s 
words:  
“Jurisdiction is an aspect of sovereignty and refers to judicial, legislative and 
administrative competence. Distinct from the power to make decisions or rules 
(the prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction) is the power to take executive action 
in pursuance of or consequent on the making of decisions or rules (the 
enforcement or prerogative jurisdiction).”101  
 
A more detailed analysis of the different dimensions of state jurisdiction appears in the 
Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, produced by the 
                                                           
99 Arend 1999, pp. 135-136. 
 
100 Mann 1970, pp. 10-11. 
 
101 Brownlie 1998, p. 301. 
 
 61  
American Law Institute.102  The Institute considers that the traditional distinction 
between jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce, which was the basis of the 
Second Restatement, is too simple. For example, enforcement may be carried on by 
agencies of the executive branch, such as regulatory agencies, rather than through the 
courts. On the other hand, “adjudication is often used for purposes that are not strictly 
“enforcement,” but rather for declaration of rights and vindication of private interests. 
The process of adjudication, whatever the purposes for which it is used, is a significant 
category in the foreign relations law of the United States.”103  
 
The Institute therefore puts forward three categories of state jurisdiction:104  
1. Jurisdiction to prescribe i.e. to make its law applicable to particular persons 
and circumstances, whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by 
administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court.  
2. Jurisdiction to adjudicate i.e. to subject persons or things to the processes of 
its courts or administrative tribunals, whether in civil or criminal 
proceedings, whether or not the state is a party to the proceedings.  
3. Jurisdiction to enforce i.e. to induce or compel compliance or to punish non-
compliance with its laws or regulations, whether through the courts or by use 
of executive, administrative, police or other non-judicial action.  
 
The overlapping relationship between these three categories of jurisdiction is shown 
diagrammatically, in stylized form, in Figure 2, based on the discussion in the Third 
Restatement.   
 
The Institute notes that it does not divide exercises of authority by a state into discrete 
conceptual categories – although it also notes that the three categories resemble the 
division of government authority into legislative, executive and judicial branches. 
Instead, the three-way division is a pragmatic one: it identifies “different aspects of the  
 
 
                                                           
102 See American Law Institute, 1987, Volume 1, Part IV. 
 
103 American Law Institute, Vol. 1, pp. 230-231. 
 
104 American Law Institute, Vol. 1, p. 232. The Institute also makes a distinction, with respect to 
jurisdiction to adjudicate, between general and specific jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction is limited to 
adjudicating claims arising out of conduct or activity in the forum state, while general jurisdiction is not 
so limited. 
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exercise of authority that, because they employ different means and have different 
consequences, have led to different rules of international law.”105 
 
Because international law gives states wide discretion in the exercise of jurisdiction, and 
does not generally provide for exclusive jurisdiction for one state, there is considerable 
scope for overlapping jurisdiction. For instance, territoriality and nationality are the 
principal bases of jurisdiction to apply laws to a person or activity, and will often lead to 
overlap or conflict between the state of nationality and the territorial state i.e. the state 
where the conduct took place.  
 
Increasing economic integration means that there is increasing scope for such 
overlapping jurisdiction, particularly with respect to jurisdiction over juridical persons 
e.g. companies such as multi-national corporations. In response, international economic 
agreements have increasingly moved beyond concepts of negative coordination, on 
which the international law approach to state jurisdiction is founded, to concepts of 
positive coordination.  
 
                                                           
105 American Law Institute, Vol. 1, pp. 232-233. 
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The significant increase in the number, scope and depth of international economic 
agreements requires new conceptual tools to capture the emerging reality. This is the 
genesis of the concept of jurisdictional integration, introduced in the next section. 
 
First, however, some pragmatic adaptations and refinements are proposed to the 
categories in the Third Restatement, to take into account the full range of international 
economic cooperation, and to reflect how different types of cooperation are effected in 
practice. This suggests the following categories and sub-categories of state jurisdiction: 
1. Prescriptive jurisdiction. The authority to make rules by legislation, 
executive acts or administrative regulation, or by the ruling of a court. 
2. Jurisdiction to enforce. For some purposes it may be desirable to subdivide 
the enforcement jurisdiction into judicial enforcement and non-judicial 
enforcement – for example, to help identify and analyse options available to 
policy-makers for increased enforcement cooperation. Non-judicial 
approaches are more readily amenable to change by executive action. On the 
other hand, non-judicial and judicial enforcement often work in tandem, and 
it may be difficult to disentangle them when analysing international 
cooperation in practice. For example, a regulatory agency may need a court 
order to obtain evidence; and enforcement action by a regulatory agency 
may be subject to appeal through the judicial system. 
3. Jurisdiction to adjudicate. For some purposes it may be desirable to 
subdivide this into public law and private law spheres. Adjudication with 
respect to private activities that has the character of judicial enforcement is 
incorporated in category 2 above. However, in customary international law, 
states are immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of other states, when 
conducting activities of a governmental character.106 The issue of rules to 
regulate adjudication of inter-state disputes of a governmental character has 
not therefore traditionally arisen in international law. In practice, however, 
dispute settlement mechanisms, to resolve inter-state disputes of a 
governmental character, are an increasingly common feature of international 
relations. Therefore a separate category of adjudication jurisdiction, referred 
to here as inter-state adjudication jurisdiction, will at times be a useful 
                                                           
106 “The immunity of a state from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state is an undisputed principle 
of customary international law” – except with respect to claims arising from activities, such as 
commercial activities, that can also be carried on by a private person. American Law Institute, 1987,  
p. 390. 
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category, and is employed in Part Three of this thesis with respect to 
international competition policy cooperation (see Chapter 10). 
4. Executive implementation jurisdiction. A final category of state authority 
that is relevant to international economic cooperation is the authority of a 
state to design and deliver public services to its resident population. Where 
these are regulatory or policy development services, they may be 
incorporated in the enforcement jurisdiction and the prescriptive jurisdiction 
respectively. However, there are other public services, such as transport or 
other infrastructure services that span state borders, or services associated 
with the production of regional public goods, that are delivered directly to 
residents through international cooperative arrangements. In a territorially 
based international system this authority is not one that has been challenged 
or that needed constraining in international law. States nevertheless 
voluntarily enter into international arrangements and commitments that 
constrain their autonomy to varying degrees in this sphere. At the simplest 
level are agreements between neighbouring countries establishing physical 
inter-connection standards for transport or infrastructure services that span 
state borders. A higher level of jurisdictional integration is represented by 
jointly provided services, such as a regionally owned shipping line or airline. 
 
The approach taken to measuring international cooperation in competition policy in Part 
Three of the thesis is based on an assessment of which of the above categories and sub-
categories of state jurisdiction best reflect the nature of cooperation in that particular 
policy domain. Ordinal indices are developed of increasing depth of cooperation with 
respect to the prescriptive, non-judicial enforcement, judicial enforcement, and inter-
state adjudication jurisdictions. These four categories of state authority best distinguish 
the different types of cooperation. However, in Chapter 13, when measuring a large 
number of international competition cooperation agreements, judicial and non-judicial 
enforcement are collapsed into a single category of enforcement jurisdiction. This is 
because, in most of the competition policy agreements, non-judicial enforcement is by 
far the predominant means of cooperation, and because, as noted above, the two 
dimensions of jurisdiction are closely linked in practice.  
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5.3 JURISDICTIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
Jurisdictional integration can now be defined as:  
 
A process by which a state chooses, through entering formal agreements with 
another state or states, to restrict its recognized authority to autonomously 
make, and/or to enforce, and/or to adjudicate decisions in a specific domain or 
domains.  
 
By juxtaposition, jurisdictional disintegration is a process by which a state augments its 
formal authority by amending formal agreements with other countries e.g. by 
withdrawing from a Treaty. 
 
Jurisdictional integration between states takes place by direct agreement between two or 
more states, with no intervening international organization, or indirectly through an 
official international organization comprised of member states. 
 
Jurisdictional integration therefore excludes all types of unilateral action that “import” 
or (attempt to) “export” jurisdiction across state boundaries. For instance, in the field of 
international regulatory coordination, unilateral recognition of the standards of another 
state, while an important policy option for effecting economic integration, does not 
constitute jurisdictional integration as defined here, because the recognizing state is 
completely free to reverse its policy without the formal need to amend an international 
agreement or explain its actions to another state. Similarly, neither unilateral assertions 
of jurisdiction by a state, nor the unilateral imposition of sanctions by one state on 
another, constitute jurisdictional integration. 
 
As with the term “integration” itself, jurisdictional integration can also be viewed as the 
end result of such an integration process at a particular point in time. However, the 
focus here is on jurisdictional integration as a process, to highlight the diverse range of 
phenomena involved – although Chapter 6 also introduces a taxonomy of international 
economic cooperation types that includes horizontal and vertical integration as specific 
points on a spectrum.   
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Jurisdictional integration is contrasted here with full political integration (or what 
Deutsch termed amalgamation),107 in which a country is fully subsumed under, or fully 
merges with the jurisdiction of another country to produce a new state under a single 
national government with a new and permanent international legal personality. 
Jurisdictional integration thus measures the impacts of formal international agreements 
on state authority, short of arrangements that extinguish the international legal 
personality of the state, and thereby create a single unified jurisdiction. 
 
This definition differs from Nye’s definition of jurisdictional integration, which was 
limited to measuring the extent to which regional institutions can make binding 
decisions.108 Nye’s definition did not incorporate collective action at stages of the policy 
process prior to decision-making e.g. consultation, or the many types of decisions or 
instruments that are non-binding, or that do not involve a regional organization. 
 
As defined here, jurisdictional integration does not include the involuntary foregoing of 
national autonomy, through coercive means or colonial-type relationships. The concept 
is therefore essentially the same as Krasner’s concept of ‘compromises of Westphalian 
sovereignty by invitation.’ Perhaps the only difference is that Krasner states that 
voluntary compromises of Westphalian sovereignty are never inconsistent with 
international legal sovereignty (Krasner 1999, p. 22). In principle, however, the 
international community could withdraw recognition of a state if it considered it no 
longer existed as a separate sovereign entity as a result of an association it had 
voluntarily entered with another state(s). The concept of jurisdictional integration, 
therefore, is defined here to cover compromises of Westphalian sovereignty by 
invitation consistent with maintenance of international legal sovereignty. However, 
there is a strong presumption in international law against the extinction of an already 
established state (Crawford 2006, p. 70), so that in practice there is very little difference 
between the two terms. 
 
                                                           
107 See Deutsch 1957. 
 
108 Nye 1968, pp. 867-868. Olson also used the term jurisdictional integration to refer to the creation of a 
larger area of free trade and factor mobility, as well as a shift in the institutions and locations that make 
some important decisions about economic policy (Olson 1982, p. 121). This definition combines 
economic integration and policy integration. Wolf used the term also, based on the Olson definition 
(source: email communication with the author, 2 September 2006). See Wolf, 2006, p.315. 
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Jurisdictional integration incorporates what Trachtman has described as ‘transactions in 
jurisdiction’, agreements by states to reduce barriers to trade.109 “When states regulate, 
they cause and encounter regulatory externalities…while not all regulatory externalities 
will be worth internalising, due to transactions costs, [their] existence…suggests the 
evaluation of the utility of transactions in regulatory authority.”110  
 
The focus on de jure authority is not to deny that in many instances, many states may 
have little realistic choice but to sign an international treaty, or to adopt a foreign 
standard, due to their lack of influence and limited unilateral options. Even powerful 
states are no longer able to achieve all their objectives without entering some 
international cooperative agreements that limit their freedom of action in some way. 
However, these are very different to the situation where a state lacks the formal legal 
authority to pursue independent action. 
 
Jurisdictional integration as conceived here incorporates the horizontal sharing or 
transfers of authority between sovereign states, and the vertical sharing or transfer of 
authority with international organizations comprised of member states.111 It does not 
include the allocation of decision rights and powers between institutions or levels of 
government within a country.112 It also excludes delegation of decision-making to 
private or non-official entities – except to the extent that the standards promulgated by 
or decisions taken by such non-official entities are validated or formalized by state 
action. For instance, the concept incorporates the various ways in which non-state 
entities are given standing to play roles in developing, monitoring, or enforcing official 
international rules.  
 
Because the powers to make and enforce decisions bear a relationship to the powers of 
the three branches of government, jurisdictional integration incorporates what Slaughter 
has termed “transgovernmentalism,” or the disaggregation of the state into its 
                                                           
109 Trachtman 1996, p. 16. 
 
110 Trachtman, 2007, p. 644. 
 
111 It also incorporates non-state entities that possess full autonomy in the conduct of their external 
economic relations, such as customs unions that are full members of the WTO but do not possess 
international legal sovereignty – for example, Hong Kong China. 
 
112 The issue does arise, however, of whether a national government authorises sub-national governments 
to enter international agreements, such as cross-border economic zones, and this could be incorporated 
within the definition of jurisdictional integration. 
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components - branches of government and individual government agencies - and their 
cooperation across state lines.113  
 
Note that some writers argue that globalisation has created gaps in state governance that 
the private sector, NGOs, and sub-state actors have moved in to fill – see for example 
Scholte 2000.114 However, the contention here, in line with that of Slaughter, is that 
states have also moved in many and diverse ways to address the emerging gaps in 
governance.115 This thesis is intended to contribute to better conceptualisation, 
measurement, research, and policy development with respect to this phenomenon. 
 
Jurisdictional integration focuses on formal agreements. Formal agreements have a 
particular salience in international law, and in the field of international economic law 
have largely supplanted general international law due to the requirement of states for 
reciprocity.116 Formal agreements are generally more easily observable than informal 
understandings or customary international law, which makes the concept of 
jurisdictional integration easier to operationalize for research purposes.  
 
State autonomy is the baseline, or counterfactual against which jurisdictional integration 
is assessed.117 Non-interference in the affairs of other states is considered to be one of 
the fundamental legal rules that structure the international system, being reflected in 
Article 2 of the UN Charter, and has become part of general international law. State 
autonomy has also been adopted as the baseline by a number of writers, including 
                                                           
113 See Slaughter 2004. 
 
114 Scholte 2000, p. 144. 
 
115 Slaughter 2004. 
 
116 As argued by Petersmann, 1996/97, p. 400. 
 
117 Skelcher, 2005, p. 93, has referred to state autonomy as “boundary (or external) integrity. Complete 
boundary integrity would mean that the jurisdiction was not subject to intrusion by other agencies of 
government, whether at higher or equivalent spatial scales and therefore that its authority could be 
exercised autonomously.” Skelcher defines boundary integrity as an element of “jurisdictional integrity”, 
a concept he introduces for the purpose of developing a general theory of network governance applicable 
to subnational, national, and supranational scales. Skelcher uses the term jurisdiction in the same way as it 
is used here, and as noted, boundary jurisdictional integrity has the same meaning as state autonomy, or 
the absence of jurisdictional integration. 
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Keohane and Nye 1989, Kahler 1995, Chayes and Chayes 1995, Trachtman 1996, 
Sandholtz and Sweet 1998, and Cohen 2001.118 
 
It is recognized, however, that this conception of state autonomy is one that may be 
limited by customary international law – what Abbott et. al. 2001 describe as “the 
background operation of the international legal system” (p. 404). For instance, the norm 
of pacta sunt servanda – that treaties are binding and should be observed – has been 
described as the basis for all other international law, and is logically prior to treaties or 
formal agreements. On the other hand, Jackson has argued that there are few customary 
laws in international economic law.119 Furthermore, while states may be able to contract 
out of some customary international law, customary law is generally not subject to 
policy choice, whereas policy choice is a central focus of jurisdictional integration. In 
any case, customary international law does not involve formal agreements, and 
therefore lies outside the definition of jurisdictional integration. 
 
It is also recognized that, in practice, state sovereignty does not mean absolute freedom 
from external interference in internal matters. States have long concerned themselves 
with the treatment of their nationals living as minorities within the territories of other 
states. Powerful states have always exerted influence over the internal affairs of less 
powerful states. Increasingly salient norms of human rights are coming increasingly into 
conflict with the norm of non-interference, and the international system has no 
mechanism for deciding between conflicting norms. As Krasner has analysed in detail, 
the international system of state sovereignty can be well characterised as one of 
“organised hypocrisy,” in which conformity with the norm of non-interference is often 
violated in the pursuit of national self-interest. 
 
Finally, the dualist theory of law holds that international and domestic law operate in 
completely separate spheres. “When municipal law provides that international law 
applies in whole or in part within the jurisdiction this is merely an exercise of the  
                                                           
118 Schiff and Winters identify most favoured nation treatment as the baseline, but it is hard to see this as 
anything other than a policy that states may or may not decide to commit themselves to. Schiff and 
Winters 2003, p. 181. 
 
119 Jackson 2006, p. 42. 
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authority of municipal law…”120 In practice, treaties are only part of domestic law in 
Britain and most Commonwealth countries if an enabling Act of Parliament has been 
passed. 121 In the USA, Petersmann notes that foreign trade legislation generally 
declares international trade agreements not to be self-executing i.e. they require the 
passage of specific domestic legislation to have legal force.122 Brownlie states that it is 
probably also the case in the majority of countries outside the Commonwealth that 
specific legislative incorporation is required before treaties have domestic force.123 In 
dualist legal systems, therefore, a state cannot, through signing an international treaty, 
fully restrict its de jure legal authority to make and enforce laws, because ultimately the 
legislature has the legal authority to enact domestic laws, now or in the future, that are 
inconsistent with the state’s international obligations. Technically, therefore, in dualist 
systems the definition of jurisdictional integration is confined to restrictions on de jure 
authority within the meaning of international law.124 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
120 Brownlie, 1998, p. 32. Monists, on the other hand, view international and domestic law as being part 
of the same system, and some monists consider international law to be supreme over domestic law.  
 
121 Although note that a state cannot in general point to the fact its domestic legislation restricts its ability 
to comply with its international obligations in order to limit the scope of its international obligations – 
unless the legal conflict was “manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental 
importance” (article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). Note also that in some states 
national courts may have the power to overrule domestic legislation on the ground that it is contrary to 
international law (Brownlie, 1998, p. 41). The Constitutions of Fiji, Hungary, Russia, South Africa, India 
and East Timor all give international law a formal role in the domestic legal system (Charlesworth et al, 
2005, p. 6) 
 
122 Petersmann, 1996-97, p. 416. 
 
123 Brownlie, 1998. 
 
124 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
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Chapter 6 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
A STYLIZED SPECTRUM OF JURISDICTIONAL INTEGRATION. 
 
 
 
6.1 CRITERIA FOR LOCATING POINTS ON THE SPECTRUM  
 
Jurisdictional integration, then, is conceived of as a spectrum running from complete 
policy autonomy through to, but stopping short of, full political integration. Krasner 
suggested that coercion of one state by another could be represented along a continuum, 
with the location determined by the costs of refusal for the target state. He did not 
similarly suggest that compromises of Westphalian sovereignty by invitation could be 
represented along a continuum.125  
 
Other observers have done so, however. Charlesworth et. al. note that there is no longer 
a rigid dichotomy between international and domestic law, and that they are better 
understood as part of a continuum.126 As noted in Chapter 2, Schiff suggests that the 
level of policy integration within RTAs can be more fruitfully thought of as a 
continuum,127 while the 2005 Report by the Consultative Board to the WTO Director 
General argued that state sovereignty in the WTO context is not all or nothing, but 
rather consists of disaggregated slices.128 
 
Viewing jurisdictional integration as a spectrum is based on a view that it is valid, at 
least for some purposes, to array different types of policy interventions along a single 
                                                           
125 Krasner 1999, p. 36.  
 
126 Charlesworth et. al. 2005, p. 2. 
 
127 Schiff, 2000, p.8. 
 
128 WTO 2005a. 
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continuum. From this perspective, legal rules are a particular form in which policy is 
expressed, rather than a qualitatively different phenomenon.129  
 
Intrusions into the domestic policy process are associated with changes to the fora in 
which policy debate and implementation take place. Even a requirement to notify 
current policies to an external actor implies a subtle shift from complete policy 
autonomy. At successively higher levels of jurisdictional integration, external actors 
may be authorized to require prior consultation over policy change, to lodge objections, 
to monitor and assess performance, to recommend broad or specific policy changes, to 
adjudicate disputes, or to promulgate new binding rules.  
 
Such interventions represent increasing levels of intrusion, and progressively raise the 
political cost to a state of non-cooperation or non-compliance. As Chayes and Chayes 
have argued, engagement between states in explanation, justification, and persuasion is 
an important factor in determining state behaviour.130 The spectrum can also be seen as 
running from “soft power” to “hard power.” As defined by Nye, soft power lies in the 
ability to co-opt other states by the power of persuasion and example, whereas hard 
power originates in rewards and threats that induce other states to act in certain ways.131 
 
What are some of the discrete points as one moves to the right on the spectrum? What 
are some of the criteria that assist in identifying these discrete points?  
 
Starting with legal theory, a distinction (due to Hart) has been drawn between primary 
and secondary rules.132 Primary rules are laws bearing directly on individuals or entities 
requiring them to do or refrain from doing certain acts, while secondary rules do not 
impose obligations but regulate the making of primary rules e.g. constitutions and rules 
of procedure.  While Hart’s positivist concept of law has been challenged from various 
                                                           
129 Alvarez notes that: “To the strict positivist, the possibility that law can exist along a spectrum of 
binding authority…is anathema…soft-law is an oxymoron…’ (p. 48). He himself argues, however, the 
difficulty of differentiating between binding and non-binding international rules (p. 224). He notes that 
the Yale School of international law description of authoritative decision-making processes ‘…is more 
receptive to accepting as legally relevant processes of interaction among the various actors in 
international society, especially when these were solidified in growing expectations of legitimate 
authority.’ Alvarez 2005, p. 52. 
 
130 Chayes and Chayes 1995, pp. 25-26. 
 
131 Nye 1990. 
 
132 Hart, 1961, p. 79, cited in Abbott et. al. 2000, p. 403, on which this paragraph draws. 
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perspectives, for the purpose of this application it seems useful to distinguish between 
specific laws, on the one hand, and underpinning framework laws that regulate how 
specific laws are made, on the other. Delegating authority to enact the latter, which in 
principle are wider in scope, is likely to evince more concern than delegating authority 
to enact the former.  
 
This broad perspective of the nature of the decisions being delegated is important in 
assessing the degree of jurisdictional integration.  
 
The criteria identified by international lawyers for determining the extinction of 
international legal sovereignty are particularly relevant to identifying high levels of 
jurisdictional integration. The key criteria in practice are majority decision-making, 
direct effect, the protection of individual rights, and the supremacy of treaty law over 
domestic law. In addition, Crawford considers the degree of discretion of an 
international organization to be an indicator of the level of integration.133 
 
A further consideration is the distinction in the public policy literature between policies 
aimed primarily at promoting efficiency, and policies aimed primarily at promoting 
equity (or inter-personal redistribution).134 In principle, only decision-makers directly 
accountable to the electorate should adopt policies that have the primary purpose of 
redistribution. Efficiency-enhancing policies that have the primary objective of 
improving the aggregate welfare of the community are in principle more amenable to 
legitimate delegation - for instance to entities that conduct technical activities such as 
regulatory functions.  
 
In addition, one class of laws that are typically introduced only by legislatures, and that 
are enforced only by direct executive action, are those entailing the use of the coercive 
powers of the state, such as the power to tax, and the power to define and enforce 
criminal laws. 
 
Other criteria that may be used to identify points of increasing integration are taken 
from the literature review in Chapter 4, and include whether the functions are non-rule 
                                                           
133 If there is considerable discretion, “…an association of states created with a view to international 
cooperation would be indistinguishable from a federation.” Crawford 2006, FN 70. 
 
134 The discussion in this paragraph draws on Majone 1996, pp. 13-15. 
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directed, rule-oriented, or rule enforcing (after Stein);135 the scope of the legal rights and 
obligations created, whether they are between states (and international organizations) 
only, or also between states and other parties; Lindberg’s scale of decision stages;136 
Nye’s levels of supranationality of decision-making;137 Cooper’s and Leebron’s 
indicators of increasing depth of regulatory coordination;138 Smith’s levels of legalism 
in dispute resolution mechanisms; 139 and Abbott et. al.’s indicators of obligation, 
precision, and delegation.140 
 
6.2 A GENERIC SPECTRUM OF JURISDICTIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
Figure 3 presents a stylized generic spectrum of jurisdictional integration, comprising 
simple cooperation, coordination, horizontal integration, and vertical integration. The 
object is to identify key generic points representing increasing depth of international 
cooperation – where depth of cooperation is measured in terms of degree of constraint 
on de jure state authority. 
 
The spectrum combines the main dimensions of state jurisdiction discussed in Chapter 5 
viz. prescriptive jurisdiction, enforcement jurisdiction, and jurisdiction to adjudicate. 
The three dimensions of jurisdiction are arrayed in a single diagram here to attempt to 
capture some generic cooperation types that transcend the three dimensions, and for 
ease of exposition. 
 
The spectrum is parsimonious. Because it combines international cooperation of very 
different types, discrete points on the spectrum can only be defined in broad terms 
rather than on a definitive basis. At this level of generality, the spectrum is intended 
only to be broadly indicative of increasing impact on state autonomy. Within each 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
135 Stein 2001, p. 494. 
 
136 Lindberg 1970, pp. 670-671. 
 
137 Nye 1968, pp. 867-868. 
 
138 Cooper 1987, p. 183, and Leebron 1996, pp. 43-50. 
 
139 Smith 2000, pp. 139-143. 
 
140 Abbott et. al. 2000, pp. 408-417. 
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category, the sub-categories incorporate a variety of cooperation mechanisms, so that 
the sub-categories are to some extent overlapping in terms of depth of cooperation. 
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Figure 3 is based on a simple taxonomy of the depth of international economic policy 
cooperation, to aid the identification, analysis, and discussion of broad alternatives. At 
the first level the taxonomy distinguishes between unilateral and cooperative 
approaches. It then sub-divides cooperative approaches into simple cooperation; 
coordination; horizontal integration; and vertical integration. Box 1 contains further 
discussion of the taxonomy.  
 
Because international integration of state authority to make and to enforce rules is 
embodied in substantially different phenomena, and often in separate agreements, any  
  
Figure 3: A Stylized Spectrum of Jurisdictional 
Integration 
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Box 1: A Taxonomy of the Depth of International Economic Policy Cooperation 
 
The taxonomy in Figure 3 is intended to enhance the framework developed by Banting,  
Hoberg, and Simeon to differentiate policy convergence from the effects of international 
economic integration (Banting et. al., 1997, as cited in Hoberg, 2001, p. 127). Banting et. al.’s 
framework identifies four major forces behind international policy convergence:  
1. Parallel domestic pressures. 
2. Emulation. 
3. International legal constraints - “when countries enter into international 
agreements that involve some (voluntary) giving up of national sovereignty” 
(Hoberg 2001, p. 127). 
4. International economic integration.  
 
The taxonomy put forward here fleshes out the third category, in view of the increasing 
variety and depth of policy constraints embodied in international economic agreements. It 
distinguishes at the first level between unilateralism and cooperation, the former not being 
defined as a form of jurisdictional integration. Unilateralism includes all forms of non-
cooperative policy convergence, such as common responses to parallel domestic pressures, 
and policy emulation, as identified by Banting et. al. It also includes unilateral recognition or 
adoption of a foreign regulatory standard, and developing domestic policy on the basis of an 
appreciation of the policy settings in other countries or as advocated by international 
organisations. Finally, unilateralism incorporates traditional comity, the passive deference 
accorded by one state to the acts of another state unless the state judges such deference to be 
not in its own interests (Slaughter 2004, p. 250). 
 
International cooperation is then divided into sub-categories, comprising simple cooperation; 
coordination; horizontal integration; and vertical integration. There are no hard boundaries 
between these categories, and they require tailoring to any particular policy domain.  
 
In general, however, simple cooperation connotes information sharing and discussion, 
whereas coordination connotes working together, and in particular that some aspect of the 
ordering or timing of activities or elements is jointly discussed, planned, or implemented.  
 
Integration adds the further dimension that some elements or parts of separate systems are 
combined, at least for some purposes, into a single system.  
 
Integration is divided into two categories. Horizontal integration occurs when two states agree 
to unify their otherwise separate national jurisdictions in some dimension of policy or 
practice. Vertical integration, on the other hand, occurs when state jurisdictions cooperate to 
create an entity with supra-national authority of some form. That is, states cede some measure 
of formal authority to an international entity. Vertical integration comprises analytically 
distinct sub-categories, depending on the nature of the inter-face between the national and 
supranational jurisdictions. For instance, in international cooperation in enforcing competition 
policies, vertical integration may comprise concurrent jurisdiction between the two levels, or 
exclusive jurisdiction for the supranational level (see Chapter 10.1).  
 
The distinction between horizontal and vertical jurisdictional integration is similar in concept 
to Slaughter’s distinction between horizontal and vertical international networks – except that 
Slaughter’s horizontal networks are disaggregated here into networks that cooperate, 
coordinate, or are horizontally integrated; and vertical networks can also be disaggregated 
into analytically distinct sub-groups. 
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in-depth analysis of jurisdictional integration requires a focus on a specific instrument 
type or policy domain.141 This allows a more precise identification of discrete points of 
increasing jurisdictional integration, and the development of ordinal scales to measure 
the depth of international policy cooperation. This in turn provides a more robust basis 
for research, using the depth of international policy cooperation as a dependent or 
independent variable. 
 
This is the approach taken by Smith in his impressive analysis of the design of dispute 
settlement mechanisms in RTAs. Smith developed a five point ordinal scale of 
“legalism,” or the depth of dispute settlement mechanisms, which he used in statistical 
analysis of the factors “predicting” shallow or deep legalism.142 
 
For these reasons, Part 3 of the thesis, starting at Chapter 7, contains in-depth, 
instrument-specific and domain-specific analyses of jurisdictional integration, first in 
RTAs, and then, more extensively, in international competition policy cooperation. 
 
6.3 POPULATING THE JURISDICTIONAL INTEGRATION SPECTRUM 
 
To illustrate the discrete points as one moves from simple cooperation, through 
coordination, to horizontal and vertical integration, examples will be drawn from a 
range of international economic agreements and arrangements. The examples represent 
all the dimensions of state jurisdiction discussed in Chapter 5.2 viz. prescriptive 
jurisdiction, enforcement jurisdiction, jurisdiction to adjudicate, and executive 
implementation jurisdiction. In general, the discussion within each sub-section (simple 
cooperation, coordination, integration) proceeds from shallower to deeper cooperation. 
 
6.3.1 Simple Cooperation 
Starting with simple cooperation, there is a diverse range of arrangements for 
information exchange. For instance, there is what Chayes and Chayes have termed 
“regime participation” i.e. agreements to participate in international meetings (such as 
the annual members’ meeting of an official international organisation), and to respond 
                                                           
141 Instrument type would include both different types of international agreements (such as RTAs, 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, multilateral conventions and so on), and different government functions 
(such as regulation, taxation, monetary policy, and service delivery).  
 
142 Smith 2000. pp. 155-159. 
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to ad hoc requests for information from other governments or from international 
organisations.  
 
Also included here is the regular reporting of information on current policies, either to 
an international organisation, or to counterpart agencies in other governments. Such 
reporting may or may not be on the basis of internationally agreed standard definitions 
of policy or enforcement terms and concepts – for example, the World Customs 
Organisation’s Harmonized System of Customs Classification, and the IMF’s Manual 
on Government Finance Statistics. 
 
In an adjudicative setting, simple cooperation consists of international agreements 
providing for consultations in the event of a dispute between the parties. 
 
Simple cooperation also consists of bilateral, regional, or multilateral networks of 
government agencies or officials that discuss policy, service delivery, or enforcement 
issues. These networks fall short of permanent organisations with a standing secretariat 
(which constitute either coordination or integration, depending on their functions and 
mandate). Examples include networks of regulators and enforcement officials, in which 
norms of acceptable policies and enforcement behaviour are discussed and inculcated – 
for example, the International Competition Network established in 2001 to promote 
convergence amongst anti-trust agencies, and the networks of officials established under 
the auspices of various OECD Committees. Discussion of enforcement issues in these 
fora is confined to non-case specific issues. Sharing information between regulators on 
cases under investigation represents coordination rather than simple cooperation, and is 
discussed further below. 
 
Simple cooperation is designed to provide foreign governments, government agencies, 
and international organisations with the minimum information on domestic policies and 
practices to enable common policy discussion and debate. Many international 
agreements go well beyond this, and contain provisions that are defined here as 
constitution coordination or integration. 
 
6.3.2 Coordination 
The first generic form of coordination is technical cooperation intended to help 
recipients meet international standards and norms. Technical cooperation is provided to 
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states by technical specialists from government agencies in other states, or from 
international organisations. Examples include cross-border technical cooperation 
between regulatory agencies, technical assistance provided by the International 
Financial Institutions, the WTO and UNCTAD, and the committees established to 
promote economic and technical cooperation in the Asia Pacific Economic Community 
(APEC). 
 
A second generic form of coordination is jurisdictional inter-face rules. These include 
agreements on trans-border interconnection standards e.g. for transport, 
communications or energy infrastructure, or conventions on international transactions 
formulated by the United Nations Convention on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL). Conceptually similar are agreed interface rules for the taxation of 
income subject to two national tax jurisdictions, and for the payment of social security 
pensions of persons who migrate from one country to another. These are found in a 
large number of bilateral tax treaties and bilateral social security agreements. 
 
Further examples of jurisdictional interface rules arise in the field of enforcement. For 
example, agreements to allocate regulatory responsibility between jurisdictions, such as 
those devised by the Bank for International Settlements allocating responsibility for 
banking supervision between the authorities of a bank’s home country and the countries 
where the bank operates.143 
 
Finally, jurisdictional interface rules also arise with respect to the jurisdiction to 
adjudicate. The Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA), which is an RTA 
between the EC and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), provides that the European 
Court of Justice, not the EFTA Court, will decide cases involving both EFTA and EC 
parties. The International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
provides for international arbitration as the exclusive remedy unless otherwise provided 
between the parties in the event of disputes between an investor and a host state. 
 
                                                           
143 See http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs100.htm  A further example of allocation of enforcement jurisdiction, 
but from outside the economic sphere, is that of “complementarity”, in which the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court is triggered only if the national legal system is unwilling or unable to 
exercise jurisdiction. See R. Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 2005, 
cited in Howse, 2008, p. 66. 
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A third generic form of coordination is institutionalised mechanisms for policy 
development. At the shallowest level, these include regular agency-to-agency forums 
for discussion of policy, service delivery, or enforcement issues. They also include 
permanent international organisations with a range of functions. At the shallowest level 
are organisations such as APEC that have only limited secretariat and coordination 
roles. Beyond this are international organisations with a mandate to conduct policy 
studies and research, to advocate particular policy or enforcement approaches, to draft 
policy guidelines or model laws, and at times to develop proposals for legally binding 
conventions e.g. the OECD, the International Labor Organization.144 A further 
important example is the WTO, which has the authority to coordinate large-scale 
binding international trade policy negotiations amongst member countries.  
 
A fourth generic form of coordination is agreed policy or enforcement guidelines. These 
may be non-binding (shallower), or binding (deeper) obligations. They include 
statements of policy objectives, voluntary guidelines, statements of agreed policy 
principles,145 standard operating procedures, codes of conduct, and model laws. 
Examples include UNCTAD’s Model Law on Competition Policy, the OECD’s Model 
Double Tax Treaty, and non-binding policy principles promulgated by APEC. 
 
A further example of a non-binding policy principle at this level of coordination is 
Slaughter’s suggested norm of “legitimate difference.” She suggests that state agencies 
and officials working in transgovernmental networks should defer to foreign laws or 
regulations unless they violate values of constitutional significance. “Note that, thus 
formulated, the principle of legitimate difference lies midway on the spectrum from 
comity to mutual recognition.”146 
 
Binding policy obligations may be either general or specific. General obligations 
impose a broad measure of discipline over domestic policy, but either lack specificity or 
provide for significant escape clauses or opt-outs. In general, and as noted in the 
                                                           
144 See Egeberg, 2006, for a discussion of the impact that different features of international organisations, 
such as the existence and structure of a secretariat, have on the degree of political integration among 
states. 
 
145 Braithwaite and Drahos have observed that “principles are the infrastructure of global regulation – 
they pattern the complex regulatory superstructures that follow them.” Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000,  
p. 9. 
 
146 Slaughter, 2004, pp. 247-249. 
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legalization literature, they therefore leave a margin for state discretion compared to 
more specific obligations. Examples include the obligation to comply with the principle 
of “least restrictive measure” in the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
and the requirement in the NAFTA side agreements to enact “high labor standards.”  
 
More specific policy obligations representing increasing impact on state autonomy 
include commitments to enforce existing domestic legislation e.g. in NAFTA; 
commitments not to take specific measures, such as general prohibitions on non-tariff 
border measures in Article XI of the WTO Agreement; and legally binding international 
instruments requiring the adoption and maintenance of specific policies, such as 
obligations in IMF Article VIII(2)(a) to keep current account transactions free from 
exchange restrictions, and commitments in the WTO or in RTAs to bind tariffs at 
specific (maximum) levels.  
 
Also included here are arrangements that make the receipt of financial assistance 
conditional on the adoption of particular policies by recipient member states. Examples 
include conditional lending by the IMF, the World Bank, and the regional multilateral 
development banks. The actual depth of coordination here will vary widely according to 
the nature and duration of the particular financial arrangement concerned.147 
 
This level of integration also includes what Chayes and Chayes have termed the 
“authoritative” interpretation by a treaty organisation of the level of conduct required to 
comply with a treaty.148 A typical example of this is determinations over assessed 
membership contributions and other internal administrative arrangements. 
 
A fifth generic form of coordination is coordinated enforcement. This goes beyond 
discussion or sharing of information on general enforcement issues, and includes 
sharing of information on individual cases under investigation. For example, in the field 
of competition policy, there are a number of international agreements providing for 
notification by one Competition Authority to another Authority of enforcement action it 
is taking that may impact on the other country’s interests (see Chapter 12). 
 
                                                           
147 See Brimsmead, undated, who discusses the varying degrees of intrusiveness of different types of IMF 
conditionality, pp. 11-14. 
 
148 Chayes and Chayes 1995, p. 24. 
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Coordinated enforcement also includes self-enforcement measures that are specifically 
legitimated by a treaty body. An agreement may identify specific circumstances in 
which a member state may take proportionate action to protect its interests in response 
to failure by another member state to bring measures into compliance with its 
obligations under a treaty. For example, the WTO 1994 sanctions proportional cross-
retaliation by a member state, if authorised by a WTO Dispute Resolution Body. 
 
The final generic form of coordination considered here is third party monitoring and 
review. These measures have the effect of bringing increased international attention to 
bear on individual state conduct. This generally takes the form of monitoring and 
review by an official international organisation, taking a variety of forms. Examples, in 
increasing levels of intrusion, include self-reporting by states to an international body; 
peer review mechanisms, such as that established in the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development, and the open method of coordination in the EC; and dissemination 
amongst member states of monitoring reports produced by a Treaty body. An example 
of the latter is the regular IMF Article IV surveillance report on individual member 
countries. 
 
Traditionally third party review was conducted on a confidential basis. However, some 
organisations, such as the OECD and the WTO, publish their monitoring reports, and 
others, such as the IMF, are moving increasingly in this direction.149 A further step is 
the explicit “naming and shaming” of non-complying states, which was the approach 
adopted by the OECD’s Financial Action Task Force with respect to states considered 
to be not cooperating over anti-money laundering measures.150 
 
Third party monitoring is generally undertaken by official entities, but in some instances 
non-government entities are given standing to inject information into formal monitoring 
processes. An example is the formal role accorded to Transparency International and 
                                                           
149 The OECD’s annual Economic Surveys are published (at 
http://www.oecd.org/findDocument/0,3354,en_2649_37443_1_119663_1_1_37443,00.html), as are the 
WTO’s Trade Policy Reviews (at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tpr_e.html). IMF Article IV 
reports were traditionally confidential. They are now published with the consent of the member state 
concerned, and an increasing number of countries are consenting to publication (see 
http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=51) 
 
150 See the 2005 Annual and Overall Review of Non-cooperative countries or territories, at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/26/34988035.pdf 
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other NGOs to provide information on compliance by signatories to the committee 
monitoring implementation of the OECD Anti-bribery Convention.151 
 
All the examples of coordination cited above can be characterised as representing forms 
of cooperation between either the separate jurisdictions of two or more states, or the 
separate jurisdictions of states and international organisations. Some international 
agreements go further, and establish, to varying degrees, a unified jurisdiction. It is to 
these forms of jurisdictional integration - defined here as constituting integration rather 
than cooperation or coordination - that we now turn. 
 
6.3.3 Horizontal and Vertical Integration 
The first generic form of integration, mutual recognition, comprises agreements 
between two or more countries to recognise each other’s policies or enforcement 
practices as equivalent to their domestic policies or practices. For instance, with respect 
to regulation, mutual recognition arrangements entail the acceptance by one country of 
the conformity assessment and/or regulatory standards of another country(s) as 
equivalent to its own e.g. the 1998 US-EU Mutual Recognition Agreement Umbrella 
Agreement. Mutual recognition of standards effectively creates an integrated 
jurisdiction over the scope of the agreement. 
 
Procedural mutual recognition, on the other hand, comprises agreements in which two 
(or more) states agree to recognise, for example, the rules of evidence and the 
procedural rules of each other’s courts.152 For instance, Australia and New Zealand 
permit certain evidential rules and legal procedures to be recognised in each other’s 
domestic courts for certain competition actions.153 The same two countries have agreed 
to what might be described as an arrangement for overlapping jurisdiction, or the 
mutual extension of the jurisdiction of courts into the legal systems of signatories, by 
agreeing to allow courts to sit in each other’s territories to hear competition cases. 
 
                                                           
151 See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/15/40896091.pdf, p. 32. 
 
152 Taylor, 2006, p. 381, uses the term procedural mutual recognition. 
 
153  Taylor, 2006, p. 119. 
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Unification of policies represents a second generic form of integration.154 This includes 
regulatory unification i.e. identical standards implemented by separate national 
regulatory institutions. It also includes the establishment of a common external tariff in 
a Customs Union. At this level, regulatory unification still provides states with some 
discretion over how to translate the unified policy or standard into national legislation.  
 
In practice, unification may be combined with mutual recognition, so that some 
minimum standards are harmonized, and mutual recognition applies to standards 
beyond the minimum.  
 
Mutual recognition and unification can be characterised as horizontal integration 
between two separate national systems. The remaining forms of integration are better 
characterised as vertical integration between a national level policy and enforcement 
system, and a regional system. 
 
A third generic form of integration, then, comprises an international or trans-national 
organisation possessing an element of delegated rule-making, implementation, or 
enforcement authority. Perhaps the most common example is regional central banks, 
which are entrusted with the conduct of monetary policy across a monetary union.155  
 
Outside monetary unions, the outstanding examples of delegated rule making and 
enforcement in economic policy are provided by the EC. For example, the authority of 
the EC Commission to: 
• Promulgate regulations in specific fields that are binding on all member 
states. 
• Initiate proposals for regional expenditure programs designed to redistribute 
from wealthier to poorer regions within member states. 
• Initiate financial sanctions on member states in breach of the fiscal deficit 
and debt limits in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
                                                           
154 The term unification is used here to avoid the ambiguity inherent in the term “harmonisation.” 
Harmonisation is at times used to refer to a process of convergence towards uniform policies or practices, 
and at times it is used to refer to the end point of such a process i.e. a situation where policies or practices 
are identical. 
 
155 See Cohen, Chapter 6 in Kahler and Lake (Ed.s) 2003, for a description of monetary unions in 
different regions.  
 
 85  
• Sign treaties with third countries on behalf of member states with respect to 
some functions or policy domains.  
 
In addition, the European Parliament, a directly elected trans-national legislative body, 
plays a formal role in decisions that are binding on member states e.g. it has the formal 
right to be consulted by the European Council prior to some decisions, and the right of 
co-decision with respect to the EC budget.  
 
At the highest level of integration are arrangements where a single trans-national or 
regional body has the power to issue rules or regulations that have direct effect in 
member states, and/or where decisions on new policies in some areas are subject to a 
majority vote among member states with no (or very limited) provision for opt-out or 
national veto. Direct effect eliminates, or at least sharply reduces the scope for national 
discretion because decisions require no translation into national law.156 Majority voting 
occurs in the EC Council of Ministers, while direct effect is also a feature of EC law. 
 
At this level also are mechanisms that can be described as effecting the vertical 
integration of the legal systems of member states and an international court. These 
mechanisms include the provision of standing to non-state parties (Treaty bodies and/or 
private individuals or firms) to file complaints against states for failure to comply with 
their treaty obligations; the mandate to issue preliminary rulings to national courts on 
request; and the rulings of courts having direct effect in the domestic law of member 
states. All of these features are found in the dispute settlement mechanisms in four 
RTAs (the EC, EFTA, the ANDEAN Group, and the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM)).  
 
Finally, the EC provides the only current instance of a regional arrangement in which 
supranational law has supremacy over domestic law in the event of conflict. This is 
associated with the European Court of Justice claiming a doctrine of implied powers 
where treaties are not definitive as to whether a particular power has been devolved to 
the EU level. 
 
                                                           
156 Although a member state may still be entitled to request a review of a regulation promulgated by a 
trans-national regulatory body prior to its coming into effect, or may have the authority to unilaterally 
modify or (temporarily) exclude its application under specified circumstances e.g. exceptional health or 
safety concerns.  
 86  
 
6.4 POLICY TRADE-OFFS IN MOVING ALONG THE SPECTRUM 
 
The spectrums serve to highlight some critical trade-offs between competing public 
policy objectives.  
 
First is the trade-off between flexibility, on the one hand, and efficiency and 
commitment on the other. Efficiency gains from jurisdictional integration can arise from 
a reduction in transactions costs for businesses due to differences in behind the border 
policies; from the reduction of trans-national ‘market failures;’ from the provision of 
trans-national public goods; or from reduction in the power of domestic cartels. Box 2 
in Chapter 7 contains a more extended discussion of the potential economic benefits 
from jurisdictional integration. 
 
Credibly committing to a sustained reduction in these costs can yield additional 
efficiency gains. Time consistency problems come into play here in the same way they 
do with respect to domestic policies, creating an international relations equivalent of the 
rules versus discretion trade-off in domestic policy. Smith has labelled this a trade-off 
between treaty compliance and policy discretion.157  
 
On the other hand, uncertainty is pervasive, and policy flexibility in the face of 
changing circumstances and preferences is therefore of real value to states - as 
emphasized by a number of writers e.g. Kahler 1995, Rosendorff and Milner 2001.  
Extricating a country from an international agreement is not necessarily straightforward. 
There may be requirements for prior consultation stipulated in the original agreement, 
required notice periods, or provision for procedures to determine matters requiring 
settlement in the event of withdrawal e.g. financial implications. For agreements 
covering a wide range of issues, such as many RTAs, it may also be the case that 
withdrawing from the agreement in order to reclaim autonomy or flexibility in one 
policy domain may entail the loss of major benefits in other domains covered by the 
agreement.  
 
                                                           
157 Smith, 2000, pp. 143-150. See also Majone 1996, pp. 2-6 for discussion of the application of the rules 
versus discretion trade-off to the design of international institutions.   
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As Yarbrough and Yarbrough have observed: “…flexibility, the capacity to credibly 
commit oneself, and the ability to recognize whether flexibility or commitment is 
needed in a particular situation, are all essential elements of state capacity.”158 
 
On the other hand, international cooperation can also reduce uncertainty. “The 
framework [for EU-US cooperation in competition policy] emphasizes dispute 
prevention as a corrective to the uncertainty and political tensions arising from dispute 
resolution through extraterritoriality and retaliatory countermeasures.”159 
 
The second key policy trade-off in moving along the spectrum is between the adoption 
of foreign or internationally recognized standards, and the possibility of tailoring 
standards and policies more finely to an individual country’s particular circumstances. 
This can be thought of as a trade-off between commitment and “policy fit.” This trade-
off is illustrated by the distinction that is drawn between international regulatory 
harmonization and regulatory competition. Full harmonization of regulations reduces 
the ability of each country to tailor regulations to distinctive national circumstances or 
preferences, whereas mutual recognition provides some scope for competition between 
different regulatory regimes – albeit often on the basis of some minimum level of 
harmonization. The theory is that a country whose regulations are more cost effective 
will reduce compliance costs for businesses subject to, or choosing to meet its 
standards, creating an incentive for other countries to make their regulations more cost 
effective. 
 
Related to this is the constraint that jurisdictional integration can place on the use of the 
first-best policy intervention. For example, lack of monetary policy autonomy in a 
monetary union removes the possibility of autonomous changes in interest rates for 
macroeconomic management at the national level. In addition, the constraints on fiscal 
policy that are associated with a monetary union – because of concerns about the 
external effects of excessive fiscal deficits, or the difficulty of achieving a coordinated 
fiscal expansion – may also restrict somewhat the ability to use the instrument of fiscal 
policy for macroeconomic management. 
 
                                                           
158 Yarbrough and Yarbrough, 1990, p. 258. 
 
159 Damro, 2005, p. 63.  
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Finally, unwillingness to cede taxing authority to the regional level may result in 
regulatory instruments being used when fiscal instruments, such as taxes and transfers, 
may be more effective and efficient. This is arguably the case with respect to the EC’s 
Common Agricultural Policy, which uses regulations but which could in principle be 
replicated by a tax and transfer system. Whether fiscal instruments would achieve the 
policy objectives at lower economic and social cost to the EC, and to the rest of the 
world, is a moot point given the EC’s lack of authority to employ them. This factor may 
also help to explain Alesina and Spolaore’s finding that the EU has been very active in 
policy domains where international spill-overs are low and heterogeneity of preferences 
is high, such as agriculture.160 
 
Third is the impact of increasing jurisdictional integration at the higher ends of the 
spectrums on legitimacy. Two aspects of legitimacy are important here, 
representativeness legitimacy and performance legitimacy. Jurisdictional integration can 
reduce or constrain opportunities for citizens to make direct representations to decision 
makers on the content of the rules and standards, or to hold decision makers and 
enforcement agencies directly accountable because of the lack of institutional 
safeguards often found at the national level, such as parliamentary oversight, judicial 
review, and transparency.161 These concerns underlie the principle of subsidiarity, that 
government functions should be undertaken by the lowest possible level of government. 
 
This can be thought of as a trade-off between commitment and representativeness 
legitimacy. This trade-off might, however, be reduced by any efficiency improvements 
associated with higher levels of jurisdictional integration. A government's perceived 
success in economic management can result in improvements in performance 
legitimacy. 
 
As one moves along the jurisdictional integration spectrum from left to right, a country 
increasingly constrains its flexibility to change policies, constrains its ability to tailor 
policies, rules, and enforcement practices to distinctive national circumstances, and may 
                                                           
160 Alesina and Spolaore 2003, Chapter 12. 
 
161 Petersmann has observed that: ‘Discretionary regulatory powers at the international level require no 
less constitutional safeguards than at the national level in order to limit abuses of national and 
international bureaucracies.’ Petersmann, 1996-97, p. 457. See also Alvarez, 2005, Chapter 4.3 for 
discussion of accountability in the “emerging global administrative law” of standard-setting activities of 
international organisations. 
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risk diminishing the legitimacy of decision-making and enforcement in the eyes of its 
citizens. On the other hand, an increase in jurisdictional integration can reduce the costs 
of doing business across national borders, reduce trans-national ‘market failures’, lower 
the costs of designing and supplying public goods such as regulatory regimes and 
economic infrastructure, and increase the credibility of a country’s commitment to 
particular policies and rules. 
 
Central questions in contemporary international relations are the nature of these trade-
offs, the reasons different countries choose different degrees and forms of policy 
cooperation, and the impacts these different forms have on international economic 
integration. Of interest also is how the different dimensions of jurisdictional integration 
e.g. of prescriptive, enforcement, and adjudicative jurisdiction, should or do co-vary, 
and whether in practice particular clusters or patterns of points across the different 
dimensions are common. 
 
The concept of jurisdictional integration and the spectrums of integration developed in 
this thesis are intended to contribute to progress in answering these questions. As noted 
by Summers, economic integration is critical to economic welfare, but requires both a 
larger role for government and more constraints on state sovereignty, and there are 
reasons in general to prefer less government intervention in the economy and fewer 
constraints on sovereignty. “The profoundly important question is how to reconcile the 
three legs of the trilemma [economic integration, management, and national 
sovereignty].”162 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
162 Summers, 1999, pp. 3, 7, 9-10, and 17. 
 90  
PART   3 
_________________________________________ 
       
    
 
Empirical Analysis of Jurisdictional Integration: 
Measuring the Depth  
of International Policy Cooperation 
 91  
  
OVERVIEW 
 
Part 3 of the thesis will apply the concept of jurisdictional integration to specific policy 
domains and international agreements, to demonstrate the practicality of the concept, 
and its potential contribution to more accurate measurement of and research on 
international policy cooperation. 
 
The next chapter discusses competing theories of the causes of international economic 
policy cooperation, and identifies general hypotheses of the key variables influencing 
decisions by states over the extent to which they will constrain or relinquish their 
jurisdiction. 
 
Chapter 8 then analyses the changing depth of jurisdictional integration in RTAs. It 
does so by applying the concept of jurisdictional integration to existing WTO data on 
non-tariff provisions in RTAs, which allows some testing of competing hypotheses 
about whether the depth of policy cooperation in RTAs increases or decreases with 
multilateral trade liberalization. WTO data also allows some limited testing of the 
hypothesis put forward here that jurisdictional integration is a complement to the 
increase in the number of countries. 
 
Existing datasets have severe limitations, however, in terms of measuring the depth of 
international economic policy cooperation. They were primarily compiled, not to 
measure the depth of cooperation, but to measure phenomena such as the legal form of 
an agreement, the simple presence or absence of specific agreement features, or the 
extent to which provisions are compatible with the multilateral trading system. 
Measuring jurisdictional integration satisfactorily therefore requires construction of a 
purpose-built dataset.  
 
To that end, the remaining chapters in Part 3 apply the concept of jurisdictional 
integration to international cooperation in competition policy, as follows: 
• Chapter 9 provides an overview of the evolution of international 
cooperation in competition policy, the instruments through which it is 
effected, and existing taxonomies of international competition policy 
cooperation.  
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• In Chapter 10, ordinal indices of jurisdictional integration of competition 
policy are then derived, that measure increasing depth of international 
policy cooperation in its various dimensions.  
• Chapter 11 sets out research questions specific to international competition 
policy cooperation, to be tested along with the general hypotheses of the 
causes of international economic cooperation in Chapter 7. 
• In Chapter 12 a dataset of international competition policy agreements is 
compiled, comprising both stand-alone competition enforcement 
agreements, and competition policy chapters in RTAs.  
• Agreements are then ranked on the jurisdictional integration indices, 
allowing the generation in Chapter 13 of summary statistics on the depth of 
international cooperation in enforcing competition policies. 
• In Chapter 14, statistical analysis is conducted of variables that may or may 
not predict the depth of international cooperation in enforcing competition 
policies.  
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Chapter 7 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
THE DETERMINANTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
 
 
7.1 COMPETING THEORIES  
At the outset it is useful to identify two broad categories of factors that need to be 
addressed by theories of the causes of international policy cooperation. Theories need to 
address: 
1. Both the demand from various interests for governments to enter international 
policy cooperation arrangements, and the supply of policy cooperation by 
governments (Mattli, 1999) 
2. Both the determination of preferences within each state, and the outcome of 
bargaining between states (the so-called two level game, after Putnam, 1988) 
 
From the literature, nine broad determinants of international economic policy 
cooperation can be identified. These are: 
1. Economic integration 
2. Security and foreign policy considerations 
3. Domestic political factors 
4. Domestic “cultural” factors 
5. Strategic inter-state bargaining 
6. Geographic proximity 
7. Regulatory competition 
8. Elite norm diffusion 
9. System-level drivers 
 
Turning first to economic integration, the theoretical framework in which this research 
is embedded is that there is a two-way interaction between international economic 
integration and international policy cooperation. Policy-makers focus on the expected 
impact of policy cooperation on economic integration. For instance, discussions of 
policy with respect to membership of RTAs, or on international regulatory coordination, 
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are typically framed around the possibilities that such agreements will increase levels of 
trade and economic exchange. The few empirical studies in this area find some support 
for an impact of policy cooperation on economic integration (Dorrucci et al 2002, 2004, 
Vlachos 2004). Appendix 1 contains a summary table of selected empirical studies of 
international economic policy cooperation. 
 
On the other hand, it is also possible that, in some circumstances at least, economic 
integration creates a demand for increased policy cooperation. This is in line with the 
perspective of Lawrence who observed that: “Free trade areas may well be an 
endogenous variable – that is, a response to, rather than a cause of large trade 
flows….Presumably [governments] are more likely to form free trade areas, since the 
benefits outweigh the costs.”163 Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff note that many 
observers have argued that increasing economic exchange between states promotes 
domestic political support for international agreements that act to promote further 
integration and provide protection for private interests against opportunistic behaviour 
by foreign governments.164 This is a form of “economic functionalism” analogous to 
Haas’ (1958) functionalist perspective on European integration.  
 
Consistent with the overall focus of the thesis on re-conceptualizing the impact of 
economic integration on state sovereignty, the perspective that will be adopted here will 
be to treat jurisdictional integration primarily as the dependent variable, and to begin to 
explore the conditions influencing states to sign up to international economic 
cooperation arrangements entailing varying depths of cooperation. 
 
This will contribute to the small empirical literature on the causes of international policy 
cooperation, which at present is largely confined to studies looking at a binary choice of 
cooperation versus no cooperation e.g. Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2002, Baier 
and Bergstrand 2002, or studies that use a combined measure of economic and policy 
integration (the stage of economic integration) as the dependent variable e.g. Wu 2004. 
 
Why does increasing economic integration create a demand for deeper international 
policy cooperation? As firms become more extensively and intensively involved in 
                                                           
163 Lawrence, 1998, cited in Baier and Bergstand, 2002, p. 1. 
 
164 Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2003, p. 32 
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transacting across national borders, there is an increasing mismatch between the domain 
of their activities and the jurisdiction of their home states. They are therefore 
increasingly subject to the jurisdiction of foreign governments, which creates both new 
risks and new opportunities for them. This creates a demand for their governments to 
enter cooperative arrangements with foreign jurisdictions to manage these risks and to 
realise opportunities.  
 
This is based on a theory of policy cooperation in which absolute increases in economic 
integration are the driving force, not relative increases. That is, if Country A increases 
trade with Country B by 20% in a particular period, and its trade with the rest of the 
world increases by 50% over the same period, there will still be a demand for policy 
cooperation with Country B, even though A’s exports to B have declined relative to the 
rest of the world. This is in contrast to the theory of relative integration propounded by 
Deutsch and others, which measures economic integration on a relative trade shares 
basis.165 
 
Box 2 sets out the specific sources of potential economic gains from international policy 
cooperation. 
 
Once economic integration associated with the removal of border restrictions e.g. quotas 
and tariffs, has reached a certain stage, impediments to exchange due to differences in 
“behind the border” policies come into focus, and result in a demand for deeper 
integration.166 Governments may indulge in “policy shifting” (Kahler),167 for example 
using non-tariff barriers, as they are increasingly constrained from using tariff barriers. 
Trachtman has referred to this as “…the first law of trade dynamics: the law of 
conservation of protection….It thus appears that domestic regulation may be the next 
frontier of protection.”168 
 
 
                                                           
165 See Caporaso 1971, p. 249, for discussion. 
 
166 Baldwin has likened this to “draining a swamp – the lower water level has revealed all the snags and 
stumps of non-tariff barriers that still have to be cleared away.” Baldwin, 1970, p. 2. 
 
167 Kahler 1995. 
 
168 Trachtman, 2007, pp. 632-633. 
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Box 2: The Potential Economic Gains from International Economic Policy 
Cooperation 
 
What economic factors lead to demands that governments sign up to arrangements entailing 
international economic policy cooperation? The following discrete factors can be identified: 
1. Transactions cost economies – for example, trade facilitation (such as cooperation 
between customs agencies) can reduce costs for exporters of moving goods across 
borders; and regulatory cooperation can reduce costs by reducing the need for multiple 
product testing and certification. 
2. Economies of scale – mutual recognition and/or harmonization can increase economies 
of scale by allowing larger production runs through eliminating the need to tailor 
products slightly differently for different national markets (Kobrin, 1997). 
3. Safeguards for specific assets (Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1990) – foreign direct 
investment is exposed to the risk of loss from the capricious actions of host 
governments, creating a demand for mechanisms to constrain host governments e.g. 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, investment, competition policy and dispute resolution 
mechanisms in RTAs. Firms are argued to have limited ability to manage these risks 
through other means such as insurance or hedging (Schiff and Winters 2003).  
4. Reduction in policy risk – by increasing the transparency and predictability of the 
overall policy environment in partner countries e.g. through establishing monitoring 
mechanisms including regional institutions, policy cooperation increases the expected 
profitability of future investments in export capacity and foreign direct investment.  
5. Trade insurance – by creating a more secure “regional” market, policy cooperation 
reduces the losses that would occur if exporters were to be squeezed out of wider 
export markets, for example by a trade war between rival trade blocs. This suggests 
smaller countries would seek insurance by cooperating with bigger countries, not other 
small countries. 
6. Reduction in business cycle uncertainty – to the extent that the business cycles of 
regional economies are not closely synchronized, increased regional integration 
fostered by greater policy cooperation can help to reduce demand volatility (Wu, 2004, 
p. 10). 
7. Increased competition in domestic markets – lower barriers to entry from cooperative 
liberalization, and regulatory cooperation e.g. with respect to enforcement of 
competition policy on businesses operating in multiple national markets, may create 
price, quality and variety benefits for domestic consumers. 
8. Increased cost-effectiveness of public goods – international economic integration has 
seen an increase in the number of policy issues beyond the effective control of 
individual states, and a demand from the private sector for governments to ensure their 
activities are cost-effective by allocating some regulatory public goods production to 
the supranational level (in line with the theory of fiscal federalism). Given increased 
factor mobility, governments perceive a need for taxation to be competitive in order to 
compete for financial and human capital. 
9. Facilitating or locking in domestic policy reforms – jurisdictional integration provides 
a mechanism for governments to make credible commitments both to domestic and 
foreign interests with respect to a range of behind the border policies that can impede 
trade and economic integration - as argued by Whalley (1996), pp. 15-16, with respect 
to Mexico and NAFTA). Attempts to entrench unilateral commitments e.g. through 
constitutional amendments, or the creation of independent institutions, may be less 
credible or feasible, in part because of the high cost of exit from an RTA.  
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A different form of “spill-over” (Haas) occurs where the effects of previous policy 
integration measures increase the attractiveness of further policy integration steps – for 
example, a monetary union can create pressure for some convergence of fiscal 
policies.169 The increasing intensity of economic integration – in the form of foreign 
direct investment, intra-industry trade, and the activities of multinational enterprises 
forming themselves into transnational networks – can also be expected to result in 
greater awareness of behind the border impediments to trade and exchange, and more 
scope for trans-national anti-competitive activity.  
 
This suggests a possible change in the direction of causality running from economic 
integration to jurisdictional integration over time. Shallow jurisdictional integration 
(focused on removal of impediments at the border) generates economic integration in 
the initial phase, but at some point deeper jurisdictional integration may be a 
precondition for further economic integration.  
 
This is in contrast to two alternative hypotheses advanced on the relationship between 
economic integration and policy cooperation. Smith hypothesized that the depth of 
intended economic integration would influence states to agree to deeper - more 
legalized - forms of dispute resolution mechanisms in RTAs.170 He did not use measures 
of actual economic integration.  
 
Secondly, Kahler hypothesized that there is a curvilinear relationship between 
the level of international economic integration, and the degree of centralization of  
institutions. When economic integration is shallow and information about government 
policy preferences is scarce, substantial information gathering is required before 
stronger and more centralized institutions can emerge. Decentralization can re-emerge 
at the other end of the “arc of information,” when information about preferences is 
plentiful and cheap, and decentralized, reputation-based systems may again be 
sufficient. Centralized institutions with greater monitoring and enforcement capabilities 
might be expected in intermediate situations where transparency has increased but  
 
                                                           
169 Haas 1976. 
 
170 Smith 2000, pp. 161-163. That is, his dependent variable (legalism), which as previously noted is a 
form of jurisdictional integration, was hypothesized to depend on the form of an RTA i.e. whether it is 
“shallow” (FTA, Customs Union) or “deep” (Common Market or Economic Union). His independent 
variable therefore included both economic integration and policy integration. 
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uncertainty remains about government preferences.171 
 
Some empirical support for an impact of economic integration on policy cooperation is 
provided by Simmons 2000, and Wu 2004 (see Appendix 1). 
 
The gains from international policy cooperation identified in Box 2 come at a cost, 
however. For instance, depending on the depth of policy cooperation, international 
agreements can restrict the ability of governments to use the best policy instrument, to 
tailor a particular policy to unique national circumstances, or to change policies as 
circumstances change. They also expose the government to the risk that partner 
governments will replace border protection with disguised protectionism in the form of 
domestic regulations, or that private restraints of trade will replace government 
protection. There are often also adjustment costs for domestic groups e.g. workers in, 
and owners of firms exposed to increased competition, and losses of government tariff 
revenues, that lead to domestic opposition to international policy cooperation. The 
adjustment costs are often immediate and concentrated, while benefits are more 
dispersed and longer term. And international agreements that constrain the autonomy of 
domestic authorities can challenge notions of political legitimacy by attenuating the 
links between citizens and those who make and/or implement and enforce policies.  
 
Why do governments nevertheless sign up to international economic policy 
cooperation? First, the expected economic gains - which will often (although not 
necessarily) be more than sufficient to compensate losers (whether or not compensation 
is actually paid) - are a potential source of electoral support. A government’s perceived 
success in managing the economy and delivering economic growth helps its prospects 
of re-election. The increasing difficulty of governments in unilaterally influencing 
economic outcomes also means they are likely to respond to pressure to be seen to be 
taking action to achieve policy goals. Economic performance is believed to be an 
important influence on median voter behaviour, and hence on government behaviour. 
  
Secondly, by requiring reciprocity from partner countries (as opposed to liberalizing 
unilaterally), a government may both reduce the economic costs of liberalization – 
                                                           
171 Kahler 1995, suggests that the shift from regulatory harmonization to mutual recognition within the 
EC, and the Closer Economic Relations Agreement between Australia and New Zealand (which has not 
created any centralised institution or secretariat), are evidence that decentralized institutions may appear 
at high levels of economic integration. 
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because export markets are opening at the same time that import restrictions are being 
lowered – and at the same time help to build support for economic liberalization from 
domestic exporters. 
 
Thirdly, an international trade agreement may signal to domestic and foreign businesses 
that a government will pursue and maintain liberal economic policies. The signal could 
arise from the fact that entering an RTA is politically costly up-front.172 In addition, an 
international trade agreement typically results in foreign governments and/or 
international organizations monitoring the trade policy performance of each signatory 
government. This improves the ability of governments to signal to voters what their 
trade policy choices are, by lowering voter information costs compared to unilateral 
trade policies that can be quietly made more protectionist without arousing foreign 
public comment.173 
 
Fourthly, certain features of international agreements e.g. monitoring and dispute 
resolution provisions, and competition policy provisions, reduce the risk that foreign 
governments will renege on their commitments. This reduces the government’s political 
risk from signing up to the agreement (a type of specific asset for the government).  
 
Fifthly, a liberal government may want to tie the hands of an alternative future 
protectionist government.174 
 
Returning to the broad determinants of international economic cooperation, the second 
broad theory of the determinants is security and foreign policy considerations. States 
may enter economic policy cooperation agreements with the main intention of achieving 
non-economic objectives, such as reducing regional tensions, building regional stability, 
cementing political alliances, spreading democracy, and reducing the risk of negative 
spill-overs from neighbouring countries e.g. large-scale illegal immigration. Security 
considerations were clearly a key motivation for the formation of the EC in 1957, and 
have also been a factor in other regions e.g. in South East Asia, Latin America, 
Australasia. US interest in NAFTA was in part due to its non-economic interests in a 
                                                           
172 Fernandez and Portes 1998, p. 204. 
 
173 Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2002, p. 8. 
 
174 Fernandez and Portes 1998, p. 207. 
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stable southern neighbour. The EC’s more recent expansions have also been motivated 
in part by security concerns, and the objective of building democracies in the former 
Soviet Union. These considerations have been incorporated in empirical studies through 
the inclusion of variables measuring whether countries are allies, former colonies, 
geographic neighbours, and the number of military disputes between them. 
 
A third hypothesized determinant of international economic policy cooperation is 
domestic political factors. Regime type e.g. democracy, authoritarian, may influence the 
proclivity to enter international economic cooperation agreements – although a priori it 
is not clear what the direction of influence would be. For instance, democratic 
governments may be more likely to respond to the electoral pay-offs from the economic 
benefits of international cooperation. On the other hand, democracies may be more 
concerned about the distributional implications i.e. groups who lose, and the legitimacy 
costs of constraining their policy autonomy. Empirically, Mansfield, Milner and 
Rosendorff found that democratic countries are twice as likely to form a Preferential 
Trading Agreement (PTA) than autocratic countries, and that pairs of democratic 
countries are around four times as likely to form a PTA.175 On the other hand, Simmons 
found that democracy had a negative effect on compliance by states with their IMF 
Article VIII obligations to maintain current account convertibility.176  
 
It does seem plausible, however, as suggested by Stein, that states with the same or 
comparable political systems are more likely to accept higher levels of integration than 
states with substantially different systems of governance.177 This is because 
international cooperation, especially deeper cooperation, requires a degree of trust in the 
ability and willingness of the other parties to abide by their commitments, and in the 
ability of their systems of governance to deal with foreign nationals (exporters, 
investors) on an acceptable basis. This would also suggest that deeper cooperation is 
more likely amongst countries with higher quality governance. 
 
The strength of the domestic rule of law is a further domestic political variable that may 
impact on international economic cooperation. Authoritarian regimes may be sceptical 
                                                           
175 Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002. They defined a PTA as an FTA, Customs Union, Common 
Market or other commercial agreement. 
 
176 Simmons 2000. 
 
177 Stein 2001, p. 494. 
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of international cooperation involving deeper (more ‘legalized”) forms of 
cooperation.178 Simmons found that compliance with IMF obligations was more likely 
amongst countries that placed a high value on the domestic rule of law.179 Other 
domestic political indicators that have been used in empirical studies are corruption, and 
the index of economic freedom.180  
 
A fourth hypothesized determinant of international economic policy cooperation is 
domestic cultural factors, specifically domestic legal cultures. A distinction has been 
drawn between “Western-style” legal cultures and “the Asian way.” The former are 
considered to rely on formal commitments and adversarial forms of dispute resolution, 
while the latter rely on informal, non-binding commitments, consensus, and negotiated 
dispute resolution. These domestic legal cultures may influence the degree to which 
states are willing to enter international arrangements entailing formal, more binding 
policy commitments, and formal (especially binding third party) dispute resolution.181 
Other cultural factors incorporated in empirical studies are language, religious beliefs, 
and ethnicity. 
 
Geographic proximity has long been regarded as an important contributor to 
international cooperation. “Spill-overs” between countries are, in some policy domains, 
likely to be greater amongst geographic neighbours. For example, the risk of trade 
diversion to take advantage of different customs duties on third country imports, which 
is greater amongst countries sharing a land border, can create an incentive to harmonize 
external tariffs in a Customs Union. Similarly, adoption of a common currency in a 
currency union is more common amongst neighbouring countries than in countries that 
are geographically distant. More generally, there is greater scope for aligning the 
territorial scope of state jurisdiction with the territorial scope of policy effects amongst 
countries in the same region. In addition, proximity is associated with common 
language, which reduces the costs of cooperation. The widespread phenomenon of 
Regional Trade Agreements reflects these effects of geography on international 
                                                           
178 Kahler 1995, pp. 26-28. 
 
179 Simmons 2000. 
 
180 Wu 2004, p. 9. 
 
181 See Kahler 2000 for a detailed discussion and analysis of the theory in relation to APEC, the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. 
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economic cooperation. However, the more recent wave of RTAs includes many that are 
between countries that are geographically distant.182   
 
Regulatory competition constitutes a sixth hypothesis. Major economies with large 
domestic markets have scope to influence the regulatory laws and standards of their 
trading partners, and it is to the advantage of their firms that they do so. They can also 
hope to establish their specific regulatory regimes as the de facto or de jure 
international/multilateral standard. The US and the EC pursue a strategy of regulatory 
export to varying degrees across different economic policy domains, and even smaller 
developed countries pursue this in their region.183 The EC, through agreements with 
countries seeking to join the EU, and to a lesser extent with other neighbouring 
countries, includes provisions for convergence or harmonization with EC standards. 
 
The seventh broad hypothesized determinant of international economic policy 
cooperation is elite norm diffusion. Participation in trans-national policy communities, 
such as those facilitated by the OECD, can promote a broad convergence of views in 
specific policy domains. For instance, Kahler points to a knowledge-based model of 
national preference formation. Ideas and shared beliefs amongst policy makers and 
trans-national epistemic communities may provide focal points for international 
cooperation.184 Slaughter discusses the ways in which government networks, such as the 
Basel Committee of central bankers, can induce adherence to collective norms through 
socialisation arising from repeated interactions in small groups.185 Waller has pointed 
out that cooperation among competition agencies creates a community of officials who 
have been trained and socialised to speak, write and think about competition issues in a 
similar way.186 
 
The eighth broad theory of the determinants of international economic policy 
cooperation is strategic inter-state bargaining. International cooperation is a two-level 
game. What factors determine outcomes at the second level of the game, inter-state 
                                                           
182 See Crawford and Fiorientino 2005, p. 2.  
 
183 See the discussion generally in Raustiala 2002. 
 
184 Kahler 1995. 
 
185 Slaughter 2004, pp. 198-199. 
 
186 Waller, 1999, p. 1125, cited in Slaughter 2004, p. 253. 
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bargaining? The outcome of international negotiations based on unanimity is assumed 
to be determined by the larger economies, who have more unilateral policy options, are 
less dependent on international economic exchange, are more heterogeneous and 
therefore suffer more “policy fit” costs (Alesina and Spolaore 2003), and who therefore 
have less to lose from failing to reach agreement. This perspective suggests that a key 
factor at this level of the game in determining the level of policy cooperation is the 
degree of economic asymmetry between parties to international agreements.   
 
The level of asymmetry per se is hypothesized to have an ambiguous impact on 
cooperation. On the one hand, a large economy may successfully impose a high level of 
policy integration on a small economy e.g. require adoption of the large country’s 
regulatory standards, as has occurred in bilateral agreements between the EC and 
neighbouring countries. This may be particularly true in a bilateral relationship, where 
power leverage is greatest. It has also been suggested that successful regional 
integration requires that a group is led by a country able to serve as an institutional focal 
point and regional pay-master.187 
 
On the other hand, a large economy is likely to successfully resist constraints on its 
enforcement authority, preferring to retain unconstrained capacity for unilateral 
action.188 It may be hypothesized, therefore, that asymmetry will impact positively on 
the depth of enforcement cooperation when cooperation is measured as integration of 
prescriptive jurisdiction, and that this effect will be stronger in bilateral agreements than 
in agreements involving larger numbers of states. It may also be hypothesized that 
asymmetry will impact negatively on cooperation when cooperation is measured as 
integration of enforcement jurisdiction.189 
 
The ninth and final hypothesized determinant of international economic policy 
cooperation is system-level drivers. Four separate elements can be identified: 
                                                           
187 Mattli 1999, p. 64. 
 
188 Smith 2000, p. 149. 
 
189 The hypothesized negative impact of asymmetry on integration of enforcement jurisdiction is 
consistent with the findings of Smith, who found, in an analysis of the dispute settlement provisions in 
RTAs, a strongly negative relationship between economic asymmetry and the level of legalism. Smith 
2000, pp. 163-170. 
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1. The number of countries: demand for international cooperation is hypothesized 
to be higher the larger the number of countries. This is because when there are 
more countries, there are more and longer international borders, and therefore a 
greater number of “behind the border” policies impacting on trade and 
investment. In addition, average country size has fallen with the large increase in 
the number of countries in the post-World War II period, and smaller countries 
are likely to seek deeper international agreements because they are more 
economically integrated, have less scope for exploiting economies of scale,190 
have fewer unilateral options, and are more in need of “trade insurance.” The 
hypothesis therefore is that the large increase in the number of countries in 
recent decades will lead both to a larger number of international economic 
agreements, and a demand for deeper levels of international policy cooperation. 
2. The global hegemonic system: the existence of a bi-polar or uni-polar hegemonic 
system is theorized to be an influence on the behaviour of states in the economic 
realm. For instance, the end of the Cold War has clearly had an influence on the 
behaviour of states in eastern and central Europe, many of which have joined the 
EU since the fall of the Berlin wall. Wu hypothesized that the end of the Cold 
War resulted in a change in the structure of global trading alliances, and created 
an incentive for countries to increase their participation in regional and 
multilateral integration arrangements to alleviate augmented risks.191 To test for 
this she disaggregated her analysis into pre-1987 and post-1987 sub-periods. A 
different concept of hegemony – economic hegemony – was used by Mansfield, 
Milner and Rosendorff who included, as an independent variable, the percentage 
of global trade accounted for by the largest trader.192 
3. The rise of the “regulatory state:” on this view, government regulation has 
become more pervasive in many countries over the course of the twentieth 
century as governments intervene in markets more extensively in pursuit of 
policy goals. Step increases in the pervasiveness of economic regulation are seen 
to have occurred at various points, such as the 1930s depression, and more 
recently with the need to regulate formerly state-owned enterprises after 
privatisation in the 1980s and 1990s.  Raustiala has argued that, as a result, 
                                                           
190 Alesina and Spolaore, 2003. 
 
191 Wu, 2004, p. 7. 
 
192 Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002, p. 33. 
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“…modern states look functionally similar…regulators in State A usually have a 
functional counterpart in State B….”193 This has also resulted in an increase in 
the potential for “behind the border” barriers or impediments to trade, and 
therefore an incentive for governments to seek means of reducing the negative 
effects of such regulations, when imposed by foreign governments, on their 
exporters and investors. 
4. The relationship between multilateral and bilateral economic cooperation: 
While multilateral agreements, such as the WTO, are a type of international 
economic cooperation, the WTO is, to an important extent, part of the wider 
context in which regional and bilateral economic cooperation takes place. To 
that extent it can be considered a system-level effect. Ethier developed a theory 
in which multilateral trade liberalization leads to more RTAs, because lower 
tariff levels create an incentive for developing countries to compete for foreign 
direct investment, and therefore to enter into an RTA with a developed 
country.194 On the other hand, it has been theorized that multilateral and regional 
agreements are to some extent substitutes. For instance, Kahler suggested that 
there will be less demand for regional policy integration if the same type of 
integration has been achieved at the multilateral level.195 Drawing on Ethier, and 
on the unrelated hypothesis of Alesina and Spolaore 2003 that multilateral trade 
liberalization results in an increase in the number of countries (political 
disintegration), Schiff hypothesized that multilateral trade liberalization will 
result in more, but less politically integrated RTAs.196 Schiff did not set out a 
theory on which this hypothesis was based. 
 
7.2 HYPOTHESES OF THE CAUSES OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 
COOPERATION 
 
The above discussion has pointed to or suggested a number of hypotheses about the 
general causes of international economic policy cooperation. Testing the above 
hypotheses requires confronting them with data on international economic policy 
                                                           
193 Raustiala 2002, p. 4. 
 
194 Ethier 1998. 
 
195 Kahler argued that the introduction of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism in 1995 meant that 
APEC members saw less need for such a mechanism within APEC. Kahler 2000, p. 39. 
 
196 Schiff 2000, p. 9. 
 106  
cooperation from specific policy domains. This, in turn, requires some adaptation of the 
general hypotheses to fit the particular circumstances of each application. Some policy 
domains and datasets will be suitable for testing some hypotheses, but not others. 
 
This section gathers together the general hypotheses from section 7.1 that it is proposed 
to test empirically in this thesis. The primary dataset that will be used is a specially 
constructed dataset of international competition policy cooperation agreements 
described in Chapter 12. With this data in mind, it is proposed to test the following 
general hypotheses of the causes of international economic policy cooperation: 
1. There will be a strong positive relationship between countries’ depth of 
international economic policy cooperation and their level of international 
economic integration.  
2. The depth of policy cooperation in RTAs increases over time, measured both 
in aggregate terms and per agreement, due to increases in international 
economic integration, the shift in focus to behind the border issues as 
impediments at the border are removed, and the rise of the regulatory state. 
This is in contrast to Schiff’s hypothesis that multilateral policy integration 
will result in less politically integrated RTAs i.e. RTAs with less policy 
integration (Schiff 2000). 
3. International economic policy cooperation is a complement to the increase in 
the number of countries; that is, there is a positive relationship between the 
number of countries and both the number and average depth of international 
economic agreements.197 An increase in the number of countries results in an 
increase in the number of international borders, and a concomitant increase 
in behind the border costs. An increase in behind the border costs suggests, 
in turn, a greater demand for jurisdictional integration to reduce them.  
4. There will be a strong positive relationship between countries’ depth of 
international economic policy cooperation and their quality of governance. 
5. The effect of economic asymmetry on the depth of enforcement cooperation 
will be strongly negative. 
6. Enforcement cooperation between two countries will be much deeper the 
more similar are their substantive laws in the policy domain concerned. 
7. There will be a strong positive relationship between countries’ depth of 
international economic policy cooperation and their geographic proximity. 
                                                           
197 This is an extension of Alesina and Spolaore 2003. 
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The hypotheses are expressed as a “strong relationship” because a weak relationship has 
almost no information content, given the likely margin of error. 
 
Chapter 11 describes some additional propositions and hypotheses specific to 
international competition policy cooperation, derived from a review of that literature in 
Chapter 9. These, together with the general hypotheses above, will then be tested using 
the dataset of international competition policy agreements. 
 
First, however, there is one existing dataset that allows testing of Hypothesis 2, and a 
limited testing of Hypothesis 3. This is a WTO dataset on the presence of selected non-
tariff provisions in RTAs. This is the subject of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 8 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
MEASURING THE CHANGING DEPTH OF POLICY COOPERATION  
IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
 
This chapter utilises existing data to measure the depth of jurisdictional integration in 
RTAs. This allows testing of competing hypotheses about the depth of policy 
cooperation in RTAs. First is hypothesis 2 in the previous chapter, suggesting that the 
number and average depth of policy cooperation in RTAs increases over time. The rival 
hypothesis is that of Schiff, suggesting that multilateral trade liberalization will result in 
less policy integration in RTAs.198 
 
8.1 MEASURING BY PROXY: SIMPLE RATIO ANALYSIS BY RTA-TYPE 
 
Historically, the legal focus of trade policy with respect to RTAs has been on the 
distinction between an FTA and a Customs Union. And in terms of trade policies at the 
border, the distinction between FTAs and Customs Union remains an important 
indicator of the level of policy and institutional integration. A Customs Union 
represents a higher level of goods trade policy integration because, in contrast to an 
FTA, member countries agree to the objective of harmonizing their tariffs with non-
member countries - although in practice many Customs Union remain well short of a 
common external tariff in practice, and the EC did not achieve a unified external tariff 
until 1968. In addition to deeper prescriptive jurisdictional integration, tariff 
harmonization also entails institutional cooperation with respect to the collection of 
tariff revenues.  
 
However, in a world in which RTAs are increasingly covering behind the border 
policies, and the overwhelming majority of RTAs are FTAs, the FTA/ Customs Union  
                                                           
198 Schiff 2000, p. 9. 
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distinction fails to capture other, non-border dimensions of policy integration.199 Failure 
to measure and recognize this can result in incorrect conclusions about trends in 
international economic policy cooperation. 
 
For instance, as noted in Chapter 7, Schiff drew on the implications of two unrelated 
hypotheses to suggest that multilateral trade liberalization will result in more, but less 
politically integrated RTAs. The two hypotheses were, first, Alesina and Spolaore’s 
political disintegration hypothesis – the equilibrium size of countries falls and the 
number increases as international economic integration proceeds - and secondly, 
Ethier’s hypothesis that multilateral trade liberalization results in more RTAs.200 Schiff 
did not define political integration, but from his discussion it is clear he is referring to 
policy and institutional integration, or to forms of jurisdictional integration as defined 
here.201 
 
Schiff’s hypothesis was under-theorized, however, in that he did not present any 
suggested channels or mechanisms through which the hypothesized outcome would be 
brought about. And while his empirical work found support for his hypothesis, there are 
serious weaknesses in his approach. 
 
Schiff tested his hypothesis by simply assigning all FTAs to a low level of political 
integration, and all Customs Union to a high level, based on the persistent traditional 
trade view that Customs Unions are deeper. Crawford and Fiorentino appear to make a 
similar assumption in stating: “The predominance of FTAs over customs unions is 
probably due to the fact that they are faster to conclude and require a lower degree of 
policy coordination…harmonization of external trade policies implying a greater loss of 
autonomy over the parties’ commercial policies…”202 However, many FTAs contain 
provisions entailing a loss of policy autonomy in areas outside tariff policy. In a world 
of progressively lower tariffs as a result of successive GATT Rounds, the increasing 
preponderance of FTAs seems more likely to be due to the fact that the net benefits 
                                                           
199 Crawford and Fiorentino 2005, pp. 3-4, state that, of the 131 RTAs in force notified to the WTO as at 
February 2005, 109 (84%) are FTAs, and only 11 (8%) are Customs Unions. The dominance of FTAs 
over Customs Unions was even more pronounced amongst RTAs signed but not yet in force at that time – 
96% were FTAs and there were no Customs Unions not yet in force.  
 
200 Alesina et. al. 1997, Alesina and Spolaore 2003, and Ethier 1998, pp. 1149-1161. 
 
201 See Schiff 2000, pp. 9-11. 
 
202 Crawford and Fiorentino 2005, pp. 3-4. 
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from moving to harmonize third party tariffs are less than the net benefits from 
cooperation with respect to non-tariff policies.  
 
Schiff measured the level of political integration in RTAs by whether they were a 
Customs Union, or were an FTA but not a Customs Union. He measured international 
economic integration by the openness ratio (the ratio of world exports to GDP). 
 
Schiff found that the ratio of FTAs to Customs Unions had increased in recent decades 
– see Table 1a – but concluded incorrectly that this supported his hypothesis. What his 
methodology missed is the variation in the depth of policy cooperation across different 
FTAs, together with the significant increase in the average level of jurisdictional 
integration in FTAs in the last 15 years or so. 
 
 
Table 1: Alternative Measures of the Depth of Regional Trade Agreements 
 
1a: Ratio of Customs Unions to Free Trade Areas (Reproduced from Schiff 2000) 
Period Openness 
(X:GDP in %) 
Customs 
Unions 
FTAs FTAs/Customs 
Unions 
1949-59 9.03 2 2 1.00 
1960-69 9.73 5 7 1.40 
1970-79 16.7 2 3 1.50 
1980-89 15.5 3 4 1.33 
1990-98 18.8 8 76 9.50 
 
1b: Ratio of Customs Unions plus Economic Integration Agreements to FTAs 
Period Openness 
(X:GDP in %) 
Customs 
Unions+ EIAs 
Remaining 
FTAs 
 
FTAs/ Customs 
Unions+EIAs 
1949-59 9.03 2 0 0 
1960-69 9.73 1 1 1.00 
1970-79 16.7 2 8 4.00 
1980-89 15.5 3 2 0.66 
1990-98 18.8 13 36 2.77 
 
1c: as for b, but different time periods 
Period Customs 
Unions+ EIAs 
Remaining 
FTAs 
FTAs/ Customs 
Unions+EIAs 
1955-64 3 1 0.33 
1965-74 2 5 2.50 
1975-84 1 4 4.00 
1985-94 6 14 2.33 
1995-04 29 91 3.14 
 
One simple way to use the database of RTAs notified to the WTO to illustrate this is to 
assign all FTAs that cover trade in services to a higher level of integration than  
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FTAs that cover trade in goods only. The justification for this is that trade in services 
brings into play a wide range of often-sensitive domestic regulatory settings.  
 
For instance, agreements covering services trade - classified by the WTO as Economic 
Integration Agreements - contain, at the least, specific conditional commitments to 
national treatment in schedules to the agreements. Many Economic Integration 
Agreements go well beyond this, however, and provide for unconditional national 
treatment, and guaranteed right of establishment. Many agreements contain provisions 
designed to encourage the development of mutual recognition of regulatory regimes, 
and a few contain explicit Mutual Recognition Agreements. Some Economic Integration 
Agreements also contain disciplines on government procurement, and the temporary 
entry of business people. The most comprehensive treatment of services occurs in a 
number of FTAs e.g. the EEA, CER, NAFTA, and western hemisphere agreements 
modeled on NAFTA, whereas some Customs Unions have covered services in a less 
comprehensive manner e.g. MERCOSUR.203 
 
A more accurate measure of the level of “political integration” hypothesized by Schiff - 
that is, of jurisdictional integration as developed in this thesis - would therefore be the 
ratio of Customs Unions plus Economic Integration Agreements to remaining FTAs. 
 
Table 1b shows the different results this approach produces.204 The ratio still increases 
in the period 1990-98 over 1980-89, but much less so. And in contrast to 1a, the ratio is 
lower in 1990-98 than for the period 1970-79.  
 
Up-dating the analysis to include more recent RTAs, and redefining the periods to 
reduce the small numbers problem, produces still more contrasting results. For instance, 
when the periods are redefined to mid-decade intervals and data is included up to 2004 
– see Table 1c – the above pattern is repeated, a lower ratio in the most recent decade 
than for two decades earlier. Now, however, there is an even smaller increase 1995-04 
over the previous decade, and the average ratio over the last four decades (3.00) is little 
different from the ratio in the most recent decade (3.14).  
                                                           
203 See Stephenson 1999. See also Crawford and Fiorentino 2005, pp. 5-6. 
 
204 The data in Tables 1(b) and 1(c) are based on notified RTAs in force as at 22/11/05. These numbers 
are substantially lower than the numbers that Schiff used. Schiff may have used total RTAs notified to the 
WTO, whether currently in force or not, but he does not explain his RTA data.  
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These results do not support Schiff’s hypothesis that economic integration – which, with 
the exception of a dip 1980-89 over 1970-79, was increasing throughout the period – 
leads to less politically integrated RTAs. Indeed, they would appear to refute the 
hypothesis, by suggesting that RTAs have not in fact become less “politically 
integrated” since 1975-1984.  
 
However, using broad categories of RTAs as proxies for the depth of international 
policy cooperation has serious limitations. For instance, FTAs not covering services 
may themselves have exhibited an increasing or declining level of policy integration 
over the period; and some FTAs are deeper in some respects than some Customs 
Unions. This needs to be investigated directly by looking at the substantive content of 
individual RTAs to assess the depth of policy cooperation in each agreement.  
 
8.2 A DIRECT MEASURE OF THE DEPTH OF POLICY COOPERATION IN RTAS 
 
An inventory of non-tariff provisions in a large number of RTAs, compiled by WTO 
staff in 1998, makes such an analysis possible.205 The inventory contains detailed 
information on a number of parameters, and allows estimation of a direct measure of the 
changing depth of policy cooperation in RTAs. 
 
The inventory was based on information extracted from a total of 69 RTAs notified to 
the GATT/WTO that were in force in 1998. It is described as covering all main types of 
non-tariff provisions found in the texts of the agreements and, where possible, in 
annexes, protocols or other related legal texts.206 A database was developed by the 
WTO that categorized each agreement by whether it: 
• Was a Customs Union or an FTA. 
• Was signed before or after 1990 (as a rough indication of whether it was 
 contemporary to the GATT or the WTO 1994). 
• Pertained to a particular geographical region. 
• Had two or more parties. 
 
                                                           
205 Available on the WTO web site http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm. 
 
206 With the exception of best-endeavour or unspecific provisions.  Instances of where the status of some 
provisions was unclear were signalled in the text of the note. 
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In addition, non-tariff provisions were organized under eight categories: 
• Scope. 
• Institutional and procedural provisions. 
• General and security exceptions. 
• Rules on quantitative restrictions. 
• Rules on subsidies/state aids. 
• Contingency instruments. 
• Standards. 
• Other provisions related to trade in goods. 
 
To make additional comparisons between RTAs possible, the inventory also created 
sub-categories of these eight categories. Results were presented in the form of statistical 
frequency tables. 
 
An important feature of the inventory for current purposes is that, in a number of cases, 
the underlying criterion used to organise the categories and sub-categories appears to be 
some concept of the depth of policy cooperation. 
 
For instance, the category “Institutional and Procedural Provisions” contained three sub-
categories directly relevant to measuring the depth of policy cooperation: Institutional 
Structure; Dispute Settlement Provisions; and Approximation of Laws.  
 
Institutional Structure focuses on the authorities delegated to the new body created in 
nearly all RTAs to facilitate implementation of the agreement. These authorities are 
generally arrayed in increasing depth of delegation, as follows: 
• Whether the body is charged with largely procedural functions e.g. convening 
 meetings.  
• Whether it can grant a slow-down in liberalization e.g. authorizing safeguards.  
• Whether it can mandate further liberalization e.g. deciding to increase 
 harmonization. 
•  Whether it is endowed with separate legal personality. 
 
Similarly, Dispute Settlement Provisions are arrayed according to whether the 
agreement provides merely for consultations between the parties, or for a generally 
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consultative process for authorizing retaliation, or also provides for an optional binding 
process.  
 
Finally, the sub-category Approximation of Laws arrays agreements by whether they 
contain provisions for the approximation of legislation relating only to trade-related 
matters, or go beyond trade legislation to include a broader range of economic policies. 
 
Other categories and sub-categories that are designed in a way that enables estimation 
of the depth of policy cooperation are: rules of origin; rules on subsidies and state aid; 
countervailing duties; standards; and rules on state monopolies.  
 
In order to provide an initial measure of the changing depth of policy cooperation over 
time in this sample of 69 RTAs, each of these categories/sub-categories is divided here 
into two levels, labelled for convenience shallow cooperation and deep cooperation. The 
dividing line in most cases corresponds to that used by WTO staff, who for many sub-
categories identified just two “levels.”207 In some cases there are three or four discrete 
“levels” identified by WTO staff, and the binary division selected here is in terms of a 
natural or qualitative break point.208 
 
Table 2 presents a frequency count of the number of RTAs containing the selected 
provisions corresponding to deep cooperation, categorized by whether the RTA was 
signed before 1990 or in the period 1990-1998. The table shows that the aggregate level 
of policy cooperation in RTAs signed between 1990-1998 was over six times higher 
than in pre-1990 RTAs. For only one of the categories (rules on state aid) is the total 
frequency higher in pre-1990 RTAs than 1990-1998 RTAs (and here the sample size is 
small). 
 
An alternative measure is the average frequency of occurrence of the deep cooperation 
provisions per RTA. This again shows a large increase in the depth of policy 
cooperation, from an average frequency of 1.7 occurrences per RTA prior to 1990, to 
3.7 occurrences per RTA 1990-1998 (a 118 per cent increase). 
                                                           
207 There were just two levels for the following categories: approximation of laws; countervailing duties; 
and whether there were provisions restricting policy flexibility with respect to standards, state 
monopolies, and state aids respectively.  
 
208 “Deep” was defined as whether the authority of the “secretariat” was more than just procedural; and 
whether the dispute settlement mechanism offers an optional binding process. 
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The results in Table 2 constitute evidence that appear to refute the hypothesis that trade 
liberalization leads to less politically integrated RTAs. RTAs in fact became more 
“politically integrated” in the period 1990-1998 compared to the decades prior to 1990, 
when measured in terms of the concept of jurisdictional integration. This lends support 
for hypothesis 2 in Chapter 7. 
 
Table 2: Increasing Depth of Jurisdictional Integration in RTAs 
 
Provision in RTA No. of  pre-1990 
RTAs  
in which present 
No. of 1990-1998 
RTAs 
 in which present 
Authority of RTA body: more than just 
procedural 
10 42 
Dispute settlement: optional binding 
process 
6 26 
Approximation of laws: beyond just trade-
related 
1 7 
Countervailing duties: only after 
consultations/referral 
4 42 
Standards: provisions covering TBT and 
SPS 209 
1 20 
State monopolies: provisions to prevent 
discrimination 
5 44 
Rules of origin: bilateral and diagonal 
cumulation 
3 40 
Rules of state aid: prohibition on export 
subsidies 
5 3 
Total 35 224 
Average frequency of occurrence per RTA 1.7 3.7 
 
The results in Table 2, combined with WTO data on the growth in the number of RTAs, 
also provide limited support for the hypothesis that international economic policy 
cooperation is a complement to the increase in the number of countries (hypothesis 3 in 
Chapter 7). That is, there is a positive correlation between the number of countries and 
both the number and average depth of international economic cooperation 
agreements.210 The large growth in the number of RTAs in recent decades occurred at 
the same time as an increase in the number of countries, driven by decolonisation and 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union. There were 74 countries in 1948, 89 in 1950, and 
                                                           
209 Technical Barriers to Trade, and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
 
210 This is an extension of Alesina and Spolaore 2003. 
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by 2001 the number had increased to 193. 211 However, the limited nature of the WTO 
data on non-tariff provisions in RTAs - restricted to just two time periods (pre-1990 and 
1990-1998) - does not provide a full test of the hypothesized relationship. 
 
Unfortunately, WTO staff are not able to locate the detailed information that 
presumably underpinned the summary statistics contained in their 1998 inventory - such 
as the staff's ranking of non-tariff provisions in each individual RTA.212 This would 
have enabled testing of further hypotheses in Chapter 7, through statistical analysis of 
the relationship between predictor variables and each participating country's level of 
jurisdictional integration. Nor is there, to the author’s knowledge, any other existing 
dataset of the provisions of a substantial number of international economic agreements 
that would allow ranking countries or agreements by the depth of policy cooperation. 
 
Therefore, to test additional hypotheses from Chapter 7, and to provide further evidence 
of the practicality and utility of the concept of jurisdictional integration, a new dataset is 
constructed by applying the concept of jurisdictional integration to international 
cooperation in competition policy. This is the subject of the next six chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
211 Alesina and Spolaore, 2003, p. 197. 
 
212 Source: email communications with, and a meeting on 15 August 2006 at the WTO between the author 
and staff in the Regional Trade Agreements Section of the WTO (Jo-Ann Crawford and Roberto 
Fiorentino).  
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Chapter 9 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COMPETITION 
POLICY 
 
 
“…negative externalities arise because at the same time that markets 
become more internationalised market governance remains in the scope 
of national competition authorities having limited territorial 
jurisdiction.”  
Jenny, 2003. 
 
 
 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Competition (or anti-trust) policy is a good domain in which to measure levels of 
international cooperation.213 The number of international agreements has grown rapidly 
in the last two decades. This reflects both the rapid expansion in the number of 
countries that have domestic competition laws, and the need, in the face of increasing 
economic globalisation, to manage jurisdictional conflict and close gaps between 
territorially based regulatory regimes. The international agreements are of diverse types, 
including bilateral, regional, and multilateral instruments covering all the main 
dimensions of state jurisdiction. There is substantial variability in the depth of 
provisions in the agreements. Furthermore, the texts of the agreements are in the public 
domain and available to researchers. 
 
                                                           
213 The term competition policy is used here in the narrow sense of competition law, or in US-parlance, 
anti-trust law. While the term is also used to refer to a broader set of policies that promote competitive 
markets – including trade policies and market de-regulation – the focus here is solely on generic, 
economy-wide laws that directly regulate the structure of markets and the behaviour of firms in the 
market. 
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In the following six chapters, the concept of jurisdictional integration will be applied to 
international competition policy cooperation. In this chapter, a brief overview is 
presented of the spread of domestic competition laws, the practice of extra-territorial 
enforcement of domestic laws, and the evolution of international cooperation. The main 
international instruments are briefly outlined, and previous studies of international 
cooperation in competition policy summarised.  
 
In Chapter 9, ordinal indices of the different dimensions of jurisdictional integration of 
competition policy are then derived. Chapter 10 sets out research questions and 
hypotheses specific to international competition policy cooperation, identified in the 
course of reviewing this literature, to be tested together with the general hypotheses of 
the causes of international economic policy cooperation in Chapter 7. They are tested 
using a dataset of international agreements compiled in Chapter 12. Selected agreements 
are then ranked on the jurisdictional integration indices, focusing in particular on 
agreements covering cooperation in enforcing competition laws. In Chapter 12, 
statistical analysis is conducted of the relationship between levels of enforcement 
jurisdictional integration (as the dependent variable), and predictor variables. Chapter 
14 also considers the relationship between depth of jurisdictional integration and the 
form of bilateral agreement – specifically whether the level of jurisdictional integration 
is a good predictor of whether an agreement is a transgovernmental or an 
“intergovernmental” agreement. 
 
9.2 ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION AND UNILATERAL EXTRATERRITORIAL 
ENFORCEMENT  
 
While laws regulating competition are many centuries old, the modern era of 
competition laws is regarded as commencing with the US Sherman Act in 1890, and the 
similar Canadian law that preceded it in 1889.214 It is perhaps surprising, however, that 
the expansion of such laws to other developed economies has been relatively recent. 
The United Kingdom only supplemented its long-standing reliance on the common law 
to regulate monopolies, with the passage of the Monopolies Act 1948 and the Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act 1956. At the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which 
introduced supranational competition policies and enforcement amongst the original six 
                                                           
214 This and the next two sentences are based on Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, pp. 186-187. 
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member countries of the European Community, most of the member states had no 
domestic competition law.215 In Germany’s case, the existence of a national competition 
law was the result of pressure from the USA in the post-World War II reconstruction to 
promulgate laws regulating industrial concentrations (the same occurred in Japan).  
 
By 1980 approximately thirty countries had domestic competition laws. There then 
followed a rapid expansion in the last two decades of the twentieth century, and by 2005 
there were approximately one hundred countries that had such laws (around two-thirds 
of WTO members).216 For instance, starting in the early 1990s, all twelve members of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) enacted competition laws as an 
important part of the transition to a market economy.217 Note, however, that there can be 
a lag of years between passage of a competition law and the establishment of the 
institutions to enforce it.218 
 
In addition to increased international economic integration, other reasons for the spread 
of competition laws include an increased focus on the welfare benefits of competitive 
markets, economic transition following the end of the Cold War, privatisation and 
deregulation, regulatory competition between the US and the EC, the rapid growth in 
the number of RTAs, EU expansion, and pressure by the International Financial 
Institutions on borrowing countries. 
 
It has long been recognised that anti-competitive activities that span national borders 
create problems for national competition authorities. Firms increasingly operate in 
multiple national markets, and are able to conduct anti-competitive activities in one 
country that have effects in another country. For instance, an international cartel, or a 
multinational firm indulging in anti-competitive practices, may operate from country A, 
and affect consumers in country B.219 Because the jurisdiction of competition 
authorities is territorially-based, the Competition Authority in country B cannot use its 
                                                           
215 Jenny, 2005, p. 284. 
 
216 Bloom,  2005,  p. 2, cited in Ewing, 2006, p. 1. 
 
217 Yacheivstova 2000, p.1. 
 
218 See Mehta, Agarwal and Singh 2007. 
 
219 Or a multinational enterprise may conduct business in multiple jurisdictions through legally distinct 
business units in each jurisdiction.  
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investigative powers to obtain evidence in country A. And if the anti-competitive 
practice does not have an impact in country A, that country’s Competition Authority 
lacks jurisdiction to investigate.220 Jenny has characterised the result as being one in 
which Competition Authorities are unable “to exercise their operational sovereignty.”221 
 
A further type of economic activity that creates difficulties for Competition Authorities 
is a merger involving firms from more than one country. The increasing volume and 
complexity of international mergers and acquisitions means that, in some cases, the 
same transaction needs to be notified in many countries, because it impacts on 
competition in many national markets.222 Multiple filings create the possibility that the 
same merger will be approved in one jurisdiction and prohibited in another. This may be 
for entirely legitimate reasons, reflecting the fact that the relevant market conditions are 
different in the two countries. However, it creates the potential for jurisdictional 
conflict, because one Competition Authority’s decision to approve a merger can be 
undone by another Competition Authority’s decision to prohibit it. Depending on the 
economic interests involved, suspicion may be aroused that one Competition Authority 
is “over-enforcing” its laws while another is “under-enforcing” its laws in order to 
protect the commercial interests of their respective national firms. The significance of 
this sort of tension was seen in the fall-out from the diverging views the US and EC 
competition authorities took to the merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas.223 
 
Historically, the first response of Competition Authorities to foreign practices that 
impact on their domestic markets has been to try to extend their “jurisdictional reach” 
through extra-territorial enforcement of their domestic laws. The US led the way in this 
approach following the decision in the 1945 Alcoa case, through the development of the 
“effects doctrine.” Braithwaite and Drahos assert that “antitrust has been the main 
                                                           
220 The Competition Authority in country A may also lack the incentive to investigate its own firms 
(indeed in some cases governments have encouraged the formation of export cartels operating from their 
territory). See Jenny, 2003, pp. 611-613, on the US government’s encouragement of an aluminium cartel 
in the 1990s; and the encouragement of the uranium cartel by a number of governments in the 1970s 
(Zanettin, 2002, pp. 35-36). 
 
221 Jenny 2003, p. 617. 
 
222 Zanettin 2002, p. 15 notes that: “In the late 1970s, the FTC [US Federal Trade Commission] reviewed 
only one transaction with an international dimension. By contrast, from 1987 to 1997, merger filings in 
the United States involving a foreign acquiring person or a foreign acquired one ranged from 15.5 per 
cent to 51 per cent. In 1999, there were no fewer than 849 such notifications…” 
 
223 See Taylor 206, p. 51. 
. 
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battleground of the post-war extraterritorial reach of US law…”224 In that case, the US 
Department of Justice prosecuted foreign companies involved in an aluminium cartel 
affecting the US market.225 The effects doctrine is based on subject matter jurisdiction 
being satisfied by the fact that the activities have substantial consequences in the 
country asserting jurisdiction, and personal jurisdiction being satisfied by the existence 
of some minimum level of contact between the foreign firm and that country.226 
 
More recently, the EC has also taken enforcement action against foreign anti-
competitive practices that are implemented within the EC.227 While states such as the 
United Kingdom and Canada were initially hostile to the effects doctrine as being 
contrary to international law, they too have subsequently acted to investigate practices 
conducted in other countries that have an effect on their domestic markets. Zanettin 
argues that the effects doctrine is now “widely, if not universally recognised as a 
legitimate extension of the jurisdictional scope of national competition laws.”228 
Braithwaite and Drahos, however, note that weaker states tend to be opposed to the 
effects doctrine, and have not attempted to take action extra-territorially.229 
 
There are two main problems with extra-territorial action. First, it means that two or 
more states have jurisdiction over the same conduct or transaction. This is compounded 
by the fact that each state may well have different policies or attitudes towards the 
conduct or transaction. Inconsistent standards create the possibility that even though a 
number of Competition Authorities conclude that a transaction is not anticompetitive, a 
single jurisdiction with sufficient connection to the transaction can block it (Muris has 
termed this the “most restrictive enforcer” problem). 230 In addition to creating an 
uncertain regulatory environment and additional transactions costs for firms, it has 
                                                           
224 Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, p. 188 
 
225 US v Aluminium Co. of America 148 F2d 416 (1945).  
 
226 As noted by Zanettin 2002, pp. 9-10.  
 
227 Zanettin (p. 19) argues that the EU approach is widely regarded as a version of the effects doctrine, 
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228 Zanettin, p. 7. He argues this with respect to action to remedy foreign practices that affect domestic 
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access cases (what Zanettin calls outbound extraterritoriality). 
 
229 Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, p. 188. 
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resulted in a number of international disputes in which the “home” state has resisted 
(usually) US assertions of extra-territoriality. In some instances states have enacted 
blocking legislation to frustrate US anti-trust enforcement action in their country e.g. by 
preventing the discovery of documents by foreign authorities and the enforcement of 
foreign antitrust judgments by their national courts. Zanettin argues that, in recognition 
of the legitimate tensions involved, US courts and Competition Authorities have also at 
times exercised restraint in asserting extra-territorial jurisdiction.231 
 
The second problem with extra-territorial enforcement is a practical one: the evidence 
required by a Competition Authority in such cases is typically located in another 
country, and it is also difficult to apply penalties to non-resident companies. Under 
international law, state jurisdiction to take enforcement action is strictly territorial. The 
Permanent Court of International Justice has stated that “the first and foremost 
restriction imposed by international law upon a state is that, failing the existence of 
permissive rule to the contrary, it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory 
of another state.”232 Even those states having domestic legislation that enables the 
Competition Authority to serve notice abroad and to impose remedies abroad (such as 
the US and EC), are not able to compel compliance, which is a serious restriction on 
their ability to investigate anti-competitive conduct.  
 
These inherent limitations on the unilateral assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction have 
resulted in a long-standing interest in cooperative approaches to addressing trans-
national anti-competitive conduct.  
 
9.3 THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COMPETITION POLICY 
 
International cooperation in competition policy emerged in the second half of the 
twentieth century, although there were earlier unsuccessful attempts at cooperation. The 
deepest form of cooperation to date was also amongst the earliest, the competition 
policy provisions in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The next important developments took 
place at a plurilateral level with a series of OECD Recommendations on Restrictive 
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Business Practices, starting in 1967. Bilateral agreements providing for enforcement 
cooperation between Competition Authorities first emerged in 1959, grew in the 1980s, 
and then expanded rapidly in number from the 1990s, as did regional arrangements on 
competition in the context of the burgeoning growth of RTAs in the same decade. In the 
following paragraphs, the evolution of cooperation is briefly discussed through analysis 
by instrument type.  
 
9.3.1 Plurilateral and Multilateral Instruments 233 
The first attempt at global regulation of Restrictive Business Practices was at the 1927 
League of Nations Economic Conference. The US wanted action to break down cartels, 
but was unsuccessful due to opposition from European states.234 US interest in a 
multilateral approach to competition was again reflected during the negotiations in 1944 
to establish an International Trade Organisation as the third Bretton Woods Institution. 
The initial US proposal was in fact for a very deep level of cooperation, providing for 
common international competition rules and an international organisation with authority 
to investigate cases and issue binding rulings.235 Opposition within the US led to a more 
modest set of proposals in the 1948 Havana Charter, but which involved obligatory 
international competition rules. Although ratified by over fifty countries, the Havana 
Charter was abandoned in 1950 principally due to the failure of the US Congress to 
ratify it.236 To date, there remains no binding multilateral instrument on competition 
policy. 
 
The next important developments took place through the OECD and its Competition 
Law and Policy Committee, which is widely regarded as having played a critical role in 
                                                           
233 Bilateral agreements generally involve just two states, but there are a small number of agreements 
between Competition Authorities from three or more countries, that are not in the same region, that are 
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countries spanning more than one geographic region e.g. the OECD Recommendations, and the APEC 
Principles on Competition. Finally, multilateral agreements are essentially global in scope, such as the 
WTO, and the agreements establishing the IMF, and the World Bank. In practice, the boundaries between 
these categories may be somewhat blurred, rather than hard and fast. 
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the promotion of international cooperation in this field. Concerns about US extra-
territorial enforcement, in a context of increasing economic integration, rekindled 
interest in the 1960s in international cooperation, culminating in the 1967 OECD 
Council Recommendation.237 This recommendation introduced the central concept of 
notification – that a member state should notify another member when enforcement 
action it is taking may impact on the important interests of the other state, and should 
take account of the views expressed by the other state.238 The Recommendation also 
called for basic case coordination and information sharing to the extent permitted by 
existing laws. Compliance with this and subsequent OECD Recommendations is 
voluntary. 
 
A further Recommendation in 1973 added the important provision that where 
companies are engaging in Restrictive Business Practices that harm the interests of a 
state, that state should request consultations with other member states; and the state so 
addressed is recommended to take whatever remedial action it deems appropriate. The 
1973 Recommendation also introduced an arbitration procedure involving an OECD 
Committee of Experts. 
 
These two Recommendations were supplemented in 1986 by the addition of principles 
to guide when and how notification should take place, the ways in which information 
could be requested, and how the arbitration procedure should be implemented.239 
 
A further Recommendation in 1995 added detailed articles on case coordination and 
assistance with case investigation.240 For instance, it provided for sharing information 
on investigation timetables, and factual and analytical information; and it provided for 
Competition Authorities to request the subjects of investigation to voluntarily permit 
information sharing, and coordination of discussions or negotiations on remedies. Two 
                                                           
237 OECD Council Recommendation Concerning Cooperation between Member Countries on Restrictive 
Business Practices Affecting International Trade, 5 October 1967.  
 
238 Notification may also be with respect to requests for documents or attempts to obtain information from 
potential witnesses located in another jurisdiction.  
 
239 OECD Council Recommendation Concerning Cooperation between Member Countries on Restrictive 
Business Practices Affecting International Trade, C(86)44(Final). The main body of the 1986 
Recommendation is identical to the 1967 and 1973 Recommendations, with the new guiding principles 
being added in an annex. 
 
240 Revised recommendation of the OECD Council concerning cooperation between member countries on 
anti-competitive practices affecting international trade (27-28 July 1995 (C(95)130/FINAL). 
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deeper forms of cooperation were also covered. First, a member state may use its 
coercive powers to obtain information on behalf of another member. Secondly, it 
recommended that, when a member learns of an anticompetitive practice occurring in 
the territory of another state that could violate the laws of the latter, the former should 
consider informing the latter. 
 
Finally, a 1998 Recommendation on Hard-Core Cartels encourages cooperation and 
comity specifically in respect of enforcement against cartels.241 The 1998 
Recommendation provides that members should ensure that their competition laws 
provide effective sanctions against cartels, and improve international cooperation by 
positive comity. Positive comity and negative (or traditional) comity are key principles 
in international competition policy. In a 1999 OECD publication, negative comity was 
defined as “a country’s consideration of how it may prevent its law enforcement actions 
from harming another country’s important interests.” Notification is an instance of 
negative comity. Positive comity, on the other hand, “…involves a country’s 
consideration of another country’s request that it open or expand a law enforcement 
proceeding in order to remedy conduct that is substantially and adversely affecting 
another country’s interests.”242 
 
Reflecting international concern in the 1970s over the activities of multi-national 
corporations, the main multilateral agreement to date on competition was enacted in 
1980. Referred as the “UNCTAD Set”,243 it recommends competition norms of a 
general nature to be applied by member states, and enforcement cooperation in the form 
of consultations and information exchange. It also established an Intergovernmental 
Group of Experts that has met every five years since to review implementation of the 
Set. 
 
There has been no comprehensive agreement on competition within the GATT or WTO. 
The GATT did adopt a Resolution in 1960 recommending that each contracting party 
                                                           
241 Recommendation of the OECD Council concerning effective action against hard-core cartels. There 
was a also a revised set of Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises adopted by OECD member 
governments in 2000, Section IX of which urges enterprises to refrain from specified anticompetitive 
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242 See OECD 1999. 
 
243 The full title is the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of 
Restrictive Business Practices 1980, adopted by General Assembly resolution 35/63 of 5 December 1980. 
 
 126  
should, on request, enter bilateral negotiations on the harmful effects of any Restrictive 
Business Practices to which its residents were a party.244 However, the Resolution did 
not define Restrictive Business Practices, nor provide any basis for investigation or 
dispute resolution. Taylor concludes that the Resolution had little legal weight. It is in 
fact seldom referred to.245 
 
Some limited competition provisions have been incorporated into the GATT/WTO 
system, particularly in the Uruguay Round that established the WTO e.g. in the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, and the Agreement on Financial Services.246 However, 
the provisions apply to behaviour by governments rather than firms, and most apply 
only to limited sectors e.g. telecommunications. Taylor concludes that these “…are 
relatively ad hoc and limited in nature….There is no generic obligation [in the WTO] 
regulating cross-border anticompetitive conduct.”247 
 
The Uruguay Round did, however, result in agreement that a WTO Working Party must 
consider whether the agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures should be 
complemented by an agreement on competition policy.248 Subsequently, competition 
policy was one of the so-called “Singapore issues”, on which it was agreed to explore 
the possible modalities of an agreement in the current Doha Round of Multilateral Tariff 
Negotiations. A substantial amount of effort was devoted to this in a Working Group on 
the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy. Among the proposals by 
member governments was an agreement providing for commitment to a core set of 
broad principles (including transparency, non-discrimination, and due process); 
measures against hardcore cartels; modalities for voluntary cooperation on policy and 
enforcement; a commitment to technical assistance; and the establishment of a Standing 
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WTO Committee on Competition Policy.249 However, a possible agreement on 
competition policy in the WTO was taken off the agenda following the Cancun 
Ministerial Meeting in 2003, with much of the opposition coming from developing 
countries that feared overly intrusive antitrust enforcement.250 
 
In parallel with the post-Uruguay Round discussions on competition policy in the WTO, 
a less legalistic approach was initiated within APEC. This has focused on discussion 
and information exchange, a training programme, and the promulgation of non-binding 
APEC Principles to Enhance Competition Policy and Regulatory Reform.251 The 
Principles call for countries to introduce or maintain effective and transparent 
competition laws and enforcement. 
 
Finally, an International Competition Network (ICN) was established in 2001. This is a 
network of Competition Authorities, not an international organisation or an international 
agreement. Its functions are to help build capacity amongst Competition Authorities 
through the exchange of information and experience, brokering of Technical Assistance, 
and development of non-binding good practice guidelines. By 2008 Competition 
Authorities from around 80 countries were members of the ICN.252 
 
9.3.2 Regional Trade Agreements 
An increasing number of RTAs contain a chapter on competition policy. The overriding 
motivation for this is to prevent the trade liberalization benefits of the RTA being 
eroded by anti-competitive behaviour. That is, the focus is on the trade-limiting effects 
of anti-competitive behaviour, rather than on the broader objectives of competition 
policy (competitive markets to promote consumer welfare). RTAs that incorporate 
competition policy focus mainly on policy cooperation although a number also contain 
provisions on enforcement cooperation (see Chapter 13). 
 
                                                           
249 See Jenny 2003, pp. 621-623. There was a lack of support for requiring the exchange of confidential 
information, or compulsory positive comity. There was also debate over whether the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System should apply in some limited manner to competition, or whether instead a system of 
voluntary peer reviews might provide a less intrusive approach to compliance.  
 
250 Elhauge and Geradin 2007, pp. 1107-1108. 
 
251 The Principles can be found at http://www.apec.org/apec/leaders__declarations/1999/attachment_-
_apec.html 
 
252 See www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org 
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The treatment of competition in RTAs can be divided into two broad groups. First, the 
large majority of RTAs containing competition provisions provide for horizontal 
cooperation between national jurisdictions through a variety of forms. Secondly, a small 
number of RTAs give effect to vertical integration through the creation of supranational 
competition law and supranational enforcement institutions e.g. the EC, the EEA, 
WAEMU, and CARICOM. The competition provisions in RTAs are discussed in detail 
in Chapters 10 - 14. 
 
9.3.3 Stand-alone Competition Enforcement Agreements 253 
In contrast to RTAs, these agreements only cover competition policy, and focus on 
cooperation in enforcing competition laws, not the substantive laws themselves. They 
are often referred to as bilateral agreements because many of them are between two 
parties.  The first of these agreements dates from 1959, when the US Attorney General 
and the Canadian Minister of Justice agreed to some principles to guide cooperation 
between their antitrust agencies, including notification of enforcement action.254 
Zanettin describes this as the forerunner to the first (1967) OECD Recommendation. 
Following a 1976 agreement between the US and Germany, there was a further gradual 
spread in the number of agreements in the 1980s, many still involving the US as one 
partner, before a very rapid growth in the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century.  
 
These competition enforcement agreements are heavily based on the concepts 
developed in OECD Recommendations, and draw explicitly on the structure, provisions, 
and language in the Recommendations - although the 1991 and 1998 EC-US bilateral 
agreements went beyond what was in the Recommendations at that time. 
 
As with competition chapters in RTAs, there is variety of provisions across the different 
agreements. Again, these agreements will be considered in detail in Chapters 10 - 14. 
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254 Zanettin, 2002, FN 3, p. 53. 
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9.3.4 Other Instruments of International Cooperation 
A small number of countries have enacted general domestic legislation authorizing the 
exchange of confidential information in international antitrust enforcement cases. For 
instance, the US International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act 1994 (IAEAA), 
which allows the US competition authorities to sign reciprocal international agreements 
authorizing the sharing of private sector confidential information, but only where the 
US is confident of the other party’s ability to maintain confidentiality. Taylor suggests 
that the stringency of the confidentiality protection provisions is in part responsible for 
their being only one agreement to date under the IAEAA, the 1999 Agreement with 
Australia.255 Australia has amended its domestic laws to allow the sharing of 
confidential information, as have Denmark, Iceland and Norway.256 New Zealand 
introduced legislation to Parliament in September 2008 to enable sharing of confidential 
information (see Chapter 9.4 for further discussion). 
 
There are also Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, which provide for cooperation 
between states in the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences. Following a 
request from one central executive authority e.g. a Minister of Justice to their 
counterpart, the judiciary is asked to provide assistance through the use of coercive 
instruments such as subpoenas and search warrants. However, in the majority of states 
with competition laws, offences are treated as civil rather than criminal offences. A 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty cannot be invoked by such states. Furthermore, very 
few Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties explicitly cover competition policy (those that do 
include Canada-US 1985, and UK-US since an amendment in 2001),257 while some 
explicitly exclude competition policy. In general, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties are 
motivated by objectives other than competition policy enforcement. While they have 
proved very useful to a small number of Competition Authorities – especially in 
facilitating cooperation between the US and Canada – they are likely to be relevant to 
international cooperation in competition policy only in a limited number of cases. 
 
A further instrument that may be used to facilitate international cooperation is letters of 
request (or letters rogatory). This is a request from one court to another, requesting the 
                                                           
255 Taylor, 2006, p. 115. 
 
256 On Australia, see Holmes et. al., undated, pp. 71 -73; on the Nordic countries, see Marsden 2005,  
p. 26. 
 
257 See Holmes et. al. 2005, p. 69. 
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performance of a judicial act, such as taking evidence or serving a subpoena. Like 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, they are not specific to antitrust enforcement. Letters 
of request are honoured or not on the basis of international judicial comity, not on the 
basis of treaty. While they have on occasion been of practical use in international 
antitrust cases (mainly to the benefit of the US authorities), restrictions imposed by 
most nations on the assistance they will provide in response to a request mean the 
instrument has little value in facilitating international cooperation in antitrust 
enforcement.258 
 
Finally, the Hague Evidence Convention is also potentially relevant to international 
competition cooperation. This Convention covers letters of request. However, after a 
careful assessment of its possible application to antitrust cases, Zanettin concludes that 
it is “…wholly inadequate for international assistance in the field of antitrust 
enforcement.”259 
 
9.4 PREVIOUS STUDIES OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION COOPERATION  
 
There is a considerable literature on international cooperation in competition policy, 
with agencies such as the OECD and UNCTAD in particular having devoted substantial 
resources to the field. The large increase in the number of international agreements has 
prompted growing interest in clearer identification of what they contain, as a precursor 
to studying their possible causes and effects.  
 
To that end, various classifications have been produced of the competition provisions in 
international agreements. These taxonomies have, in the main, been produced to enable 
an initial “mapping” of the provisions in selected international agreements. Motivations 
include assessing the extent to which the agreements are compatible with each other, 
whether they are “WTO-plus”, and the relationship between competition provisions and 
other provisions such as anti-dumping measures and subsidies.260 Empirical work in this 
area, in terms of measuring levels of cooperation and using this as an input to statistical 
analysis, is at an early stage.  
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This section will briefly describe existing taxonomies of competition provisions in 
international agreements, starting with those that apply to a single type of international 
agreement, and moving on to those that are intended to apply across two or more 
instruments. 
 
Some observers have categorised Competition Enforcement Agreements into two broad 
types: soft cooperation, and hard cooperation, adopting a similar binary approach to that 
in the international law and international relations literatures (where the terms used are 
soft and hard international law). For instance, the OECD Global Forum on Competition 
defines soft cooperation as constituting information sharing that is confined to 
information not subject to confidentiality restrictions.261  
 
A similar binary approach is adopted by observers who identify first and second 
generation agreements, the latter providing for the sharing of confidential information, 
and the use of compulsory powers to obtain evidence for another jurisdiction e.g. 
Schaub.262 Holmes et. al., on the other hand, define second-generation agreements both 
in terms of their substantive provisions (whether they contain “hard law” binding 
obligations) and whether the agreement was preceded by an earlier agreement.263  
 
Zanettin identifies three generations of agreements. The first are what he calls soft 
cooperation, confining information exchange to publicly available information, and 
operating solely within the confines of existing law.264 Zanettin defines second-
generation agreements as providing for positive comity, and for the exchange of 
confidential information via the courts as intermediary i.e. through letters of request or 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. Third-generation agreements, on the other hand, 
provide for direct exchange of confidential information between Competition 
Authorities, using their own discovery instruments on behalf of a foreign agency, or 
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264 Within first generation agreements, Zanettin identifies two distinct sub-types: “defensive agreements” 
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sharing the confidential information they have on file. He identifies the 1994 
Cooperation and Coordination Agreement between the Australian and New Zealand 
Competition Authorities – since replaced by a 2007 Agreement which does not contain 
these features - as the first third generation Agreement, and the 1999 US-Australia 
Agreement as a further example. 
 
The demise of the 1994 Australia-New Zealand Agreement is interesting because it 
illustrates the practical difficulties entailed in sharing confidential information. 
Experience with the 1994 Agreement was that the sharing of confidential information, 
including that obtained through the use of compulsory powers, had to be facilitated by 
legislative change. The New Zealand government introduced a Bill to Parliament in 
September 2008 (The Commerce Commission (International Cooperation and Fees Bill) 
which proposes to allow the Commerce Commission to use its statutory powers to 
provide investigative assistance to overseas competition regulators, and to share 
compulsorily acquired information with them, subject to certain conditions. The 2007 
Cooperation Agreement between the Australian and New Zealand Competition 
Authorities provides for further protocols to be appended, and it is anticipated that, 
following passage of the Bill, a protocol to this effect will be added to the Agreement.265 
 
In similar vein to Zanettin, Taylor identifies four distinct evolutionary phases of 
agreements over the past thirty years: “passive cooperation” agreements from 1976; 
“negative comity” agreements from 1988; “positive comity” agreements from 1995; and 
“extension of jurisdiction” agreements, which are rare (see Chapter 10.2 for a 
description of the arrangement between Australia and New Zealand).266 
 
Three further single-instrument taxonomies of competition provisions, this time in 
RTAs, have been published by OECD 2006, Cernat 2005, and UNCTAD 2005. In 
OECD 2006, a taxonomy was created and applied to the competition provisions in 86 
selected RTAs.267 The study did not attempt to cover all types of RTAs. While it 
included some deep regional integration agreements for reference purposes (such as 
CARICOM, WAEMU, and the Andean Community), it noted that: “the institutional and 
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legal complexities of these organisations goes beyond the general categorization 
adopted here, and requires more detailed analysis.” The taxonomy comprised three 
categories: 
1. Adopting, maintaining and applying competition measures. This is a broad 
catchall category, picking up the presence of general provisions, with more 
specific cooperation provisions being captured under the following two 
categories. 
2. Coordination and cooperation provisions. This covers the presence of a 
range of elements, including notification, information exchange, 
consultation, negative comity, and positive comity. 
3. Provisions addressing anti-competitive behaviour. This covers the horizontal 
policy scope of the agreements, capturing the presence of provisions 
prohibiting specific types of anti-competitive conduct, general policy 
commitments such as transparency and non-discrimination, recourse to trade 
measures, and anti-dumping. It also covers dispute settlement (with three 
sub-categories: exclusion of competition policy from the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism; consultation; and arbitration). 
 
This OECD taxonomy creates a checklist of whether elements are present or absent in 
selected agreements. It does not provide a basis for measuring the depth of cooperation 
given the presence of an element. In general, no attempt is made to order the elements 
within the categories according to any particular metric. While the second category 
resembles enforcement jurisdictional integration, and the third contains elements of 
prescriptive jurisdictional integration, the latter also contains dispute resolution 
mechanisms, resulting in a category that lacks conceptual coherence. Sokol used a 
similar taxonomy in analysing the competition policy chapter provisions in Latin 
American RTAs (see Sokol 2007a). 
 
A second taxonomy of competition provisions in RTAs was created by Cernat. 
Focusing on the linkages between trade, competition, and economic development, 
Cernat categorized RTAs containing competition provisions into three groups: 
1. The trade dimension: whether the RTA is a bilateral FTA; a plurilateral 
FTA; a Customs Union; an EU Association Agreement; or a Common 
Market/Economic Union. 
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2. The level of development of RTA members. Here Cernat recorded whether 
agreements were between developed countries (North-North agreements), or 
were South-South, North-South, East-East (between transition economies), 
East-North, or East-South agreements. 
3. The competition dimension. The presence of key competition provisions, 
such as “general provisions against anti-competitive practices, adoption of 
national competition law requirements, harmonization of national 
competition rules, consultation provisions, comity principles, sectoral 
exemptions, dispute settlement and so on.”268  
 
Like the OECD taxonomy, Cernat’s taxonomy is capable of measuring only the 
presence or absence of selected provisions, not the varying depth of cooperation.  
 
The third taxonomy of competition provisions in RTAs is in a 2005 UNCTAD 
publication, which identifies a spectrum of provisions, from shallow obligations to deep 
obligations. The points on the spectrum, representing increasing depth, are: 
• Best endeavours in cooperation.  
• Legally binding cooperation.  
• Positive and negative comity.  
• Resort to dispute resolution.  
• Supra-national authority acting on private entities. 
• Limitations to trade remedies.   
 
A diagram representing this spectrum, reproduced from UNCTAD 2005, is in Figure 4. 
 
The UNCTAD spectrum appears to combine the different types of jurisdictional 
integration: integration of prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction, and inter-state 
adjudication jurisdiction. This is because all these types are found to some extent in 
RTAs – although, as we shall see in Chapter 13, enforcement cooperation in RTAs is 
usually limited compared to that found in stand-alone Competition Enforcement 
Agreements.  
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From UNCTAD 2005, p. viii. 
 
However, the UNCTAD spectrum is very limited in its coverage of policy cooperation, 
and does not differentiate between different types of dispute resolution. Furthermore, 
the ordering principle is not clear. Positive comity is regarded as significantly deeper 
than negative comity (as discussed in Chapter 10), and neither is legally binding. 
Dispute resolution provisions come in many forms, many of which are not legally 
binding. The placement of limitations to trade remedies at the deepest end of the 
spectrum seems to reflect a focus on trade policy, rather than a more general focus on 
the depth of cooperation. Limitations to trade remedies are hardly as intrusive of policy 
autonomy as EC-style supranational institutions involving majority voting on new 
competition laws, binding third party adjudication, or direct effect of the actions of 
supranational legislative or enforcement bodies in national legal systems. 
 
The fourth taxonomy of competition provisions in RTAs is by Holmes et al.269 The 
authors usefully distinguish between competition-related provisions relating to policy 
harmonization, enforcement cooperation, and dispute settlement mechanisms. For each 
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of these categories they classify sub-categories. Harmonization provisions are classified 
in three levels: no provisions; very loose harmonization; and firm/hard harmonization. 
Cooperation provisions are classified in two levels: soft but symmetrical rules providing 
for cooperation, including any procedures for consultations, notification, or comity at 
all; and asymmetric de facto obligation of the “junior” partner to cooperate, which 
essentially applies to EC candidate countries. Dispute settlement mechanisms are 
classified simply by whether there are any rules on dispute settlement mechanisms or 
not.  
 
In each of the three categories, the sub-categories are arrayed in order of degree of 
intrusion on state autonomy – although the two enforcement cooperation levels mix de 
jure obligations and de facto obligations. The other two categories involve only two or 
three levels.  
 
An alternative approach to classification is taken by studies that span more than one 
instrument-type. For instance, the International Competition Network Cartel’s Working 
Group classifies cooperation between competition agencies in cartel investigations into 
the following categories:  
• “informal co-operation (based inter alia on the 1995 OECD 
Recommendation on Restrictive Business Practices);  
• co-operation based on competition-specific provisions in agreements 
covering other subjects too (FTAs);  
• co-operation based on competition-specific agreements between 
jurisdictions; 
• “co-operation within the European Competition Network;  
• co-operation based on waivers;270  
• co-operation based on MLATs [Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties]; and  
• co-operation based on letters rogatory.”271 
 
This classification is based primarily on the type of instrument containing a provision 
on cooperation. It does not attempt to differentiate between similar types of cooperation 
                                                           
270 This is presumed to refer to agreements to seek a waiver of confidentiality from the subject who 
provided confidential information, so as to enable the exchange of confidential information between 
Competition Authorities. 
 
271 International Competition Network, 2006, p. 32. 
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irrespective of the instrument in which they appear, nor does it order cooperation 
activities within each type according to any metric. 
 
A second multi-instrument study, in which the same classification is applied to the 
competition provisions in RTAs, stand-alone agreements, and Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaties, is that by Holmes et al.272 The authors develop a series of questions covering 
policy cooperation, enforcement cooperation, and dispute resolution. In addition to 
horizontal scope, some questions explore depth of cooperation e.g. soft/hard law; 
substantive agreements on policy principles, or rules on specific Restrictive Business 
Practices or policy harmonization; and whether dispute resolution is of a binding 
character. The taxonomy is intended to enable completion of checklists of the 
presence/absence of features, as a starting point for research. The authors do not attempt 
to identify increasing levels of cooperation, and the checklist is in the form of a series of 
questions by topic rather than being classified into categories representing conceptually 
distinct cooperation types. 
 
One attempt to apply a taxonomy on international competition cooperation across all 
instrument types is that in an earlier UNCTAD paper, which identifies three broad 
categories of international competition cooperation.273 The categories are: 
A. Case-specific cooperation. 
B. Substantive provisions. 
C. Technical assistance and dispute avoidance or resolution. 
 
The fourteen different elements the paper identifies under case-specific cooperation are 
not described as being arranged in any particular order. In some instances the ordering 
appears to be by depth of cooperation e.g. exchange of non-confidential information 
appears before exchange of confidential information; notification is listed first, 
supranational enforcement is listed 12th. In other instances, however, no particular 
ordering is apparent. For instance, the 13th and 14th elements are grounds for non-
cooperation, and preferential or differential treatment for developing countries, 
respectively; and coordination of merger notifications (11th) is listed after coordinated 
enforcement (6th). The latter would seem to be a more intrusive form of cooperation. 
                                                           
272 Holmes et. al. undated.  
 
273 UNCTAD, 2003. 
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The second broad category, substantive provisions, does appear to be ordered somewhat 
from less intrusive to more intrusive, running from having an effective competition law, 
through having laws proscribing specific identified Restrictive Business Practices, to 
alignment of rules, and finally to common regional rules. However, the final two 
categories are exclusions, and preferential treatment for developing countries, 
respectively, which do not fit the same ordering logic. Furthermore, some substantive 
policy provisions – such as transparency, due process, and non-discrimination – are 
included in category C, raising the question of how category B is defined. 
 
The final category – technical assistance and dispute resolution – is a curious mixture of 
policy rules, technical assistance, and elements relating to dispute resolution. While the 
three categories of dispute resolution provisions are related to the degree of 
intrusiveness (consultations; good offices/conciliation/mediation; arbitration or 
adjudication), this category lacks coherence. 
 
In summary, this 2003 UNCTAD taxonomy is interesting in that it is intended to apply 
to competition provisions in all types of instruments. However, while the categories 
bear some resemblance to a prescriptive/ enforcement/adjudication jurisdiction split, 
and there is to some extent an ordering of elements according to degree of intrusiveness, 
ultimately the taxonomy resembles a simple list of provisions, organized into categories 
lacking in coherence. 
 
Finally, Taylor sets out a continuum of approaches to the cross-border regulation of 
international competition, from non-cooperative to fully cooperative approaches. The 
points on Taylor’s continuum are unilateral extra-territorial application; 1st generation 
bilateral agreements; 2nd generation bilateral agreements; regional plurilateral 
agreements; and finally, global multilateral agreements. Taylor’s continuum is 
reproduced in Figure 5.  
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From Taylor 2006, p. 107. 
 
While covering all instrument types, Taylor’s continuum is based on the geographic 
scope of cooperation, not the depth of cooperation. The deepest competition cooperation 
agreements in existence to date are those regional agreements entailing vertical 
integration. The type of multilateral agreement that Taylor advocates is not as deep as 
this – and indeed it is extremely difficult to envisage a global agreement of the depth of 
the EC Competition Articles being feasible. Only in the sense of number of signatories, 
therefore, does a progression from bilateral, through regional to global multilateral 
agreements represent successively higher levels of international cooperation. 
 
9.5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Existing taxonomies of competition provisions in international agreements suffer from a 
number of shortcomings as coherent measures of the depth of international cooperation 
– although it must be recognised that none of the taxonomies appear to have been 
developed with this purpose in mind. The shortcomings can be summarised as follows: 
• Taxonomies relating to a single instrument, such as Zanettin’s relating to 
enforcement cooperation in CEAs, are coherent within their scope. However, 
they do not attempt to cover the full spectrum of enforcement cooperation 
features, nor to incorporate the substantive policy and dispute resolution 
dimensions of international competition cooperation.  
• The taxonomy developed in UNCTAD 2005 with respect to the depth of 
cooperation in RTAs does not contain a coherent ordering of elements by depth 
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of cooperation. It is also very limited in its coverage of substantive policy 
cooperation, and does not differentiate between different types of dispute 
resolution. 
• Taxonomies such as those developed in UNCTAD 2003 are intended to apply to 
cooperation across all instrument types. However, the categories of cooperation 
lack coherence, nor is there a coherent ordering of elements within each 
category.  
• Taylor’s continuum of cooperation types uses geographic scope as the unit of 
measure, not depth of cooperation.  
• The taxonomies all leave out the vertical integration arrangements found in 
some RTAs. No taxonomy attempts to incorporate the full range of cooperation 
types, from shallow to deepest. 
 
In a few cases, the taxonomies are used to provide an initial mapping of the territory, 
enabling checklists to be developed of the presence/absence of features. In a few cases, 
the extra step is taken of qualitative discussion of the range of provisions within each 
element (OECD 2006), and to identify broad “families” of agreements by comparing the 
checklists across all the elements (UNCTAD 2005, OECD 2006, Teh, Prusa and 
Budetta 2007).  
 
As yet, the classifications have been used as the starting point for research, rather than 
to enable a more or less precise measurement of the depth of cooperation, for use in 
description and statistical analysis. The empirical literature is at an early stage. There is 
a range of approaches to classification, and a lack of quantitative measures of the depth 
of cooperation to enable measurement and statistical research.  
 
In the next chapter, measures of jurisdictional integration in competition policy in each 
of the dimensions of state jurisdiction are developed. These ordinal indices are intended 
to provide coherent measures of the depth of international competition policy 
cooperation, for use in measurement and research. 
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Chapter 10 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
MEASURING THE DEPTH OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: 
INDICES OF JURISDICTIONAL INTEGRATION IN COMPETITION POLICY 
 
 
This chapter derives ordinal indices of the depth of international cooperation in 
competition policy. It does so through applying the concept of jurisdictional integration 
to competition policy cooperation, and classifying the elements of international 
agreements into different dimensions of state jurisdiction: the jurisdiction to make rules 
(prescriptive jurisdiction); jurisdiction to enforce rules through non-judicial and judicial 
action respectively (enforcement jurisdiction); and jurisdiction to adjudicate inter-state 
disputes.  
 
The focus will be on international cooperation between Competition Authorities in 
enforcing competition laws. As a result of the influence of the OECD 
Recommendations, and of key stand-alone Competition Enforcement Agreements (such 
as those between the US and the EC), there is a high degree of clarity around the 
concepts and terminology in this area, and a high degree of uniformity of substantive 
provisions across different international agreements containing provisions on 
enforcement cooperation. This facilitates the identification of discrete levels of 
jurisdictional integration and the reliable coding of agreements against the indices.  
 
The index of enforcement jurisdictional integration derived in this chapter will then be 
used to rank the agreements in the dataset of international agreements compiled in 
Chapter 12. Summary measures are presented in Chapter 13 of the level of jurisdictional 
integration in those agreements, and the level of jurisdictional integration is used as a 
variable in statistical analysis in Chapter 14. 
 
Ordinal indices are also developed of integration of prescriptive jurisdiction, and of 
inter-state adjudication jurisdiction with respect to competition policy. Selected 
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international agreements are also ranked informally against these indices in Chapter 13, 
and a vector approach is used to identify and describe families of agreements. 
 
10.1 AN INDEX OF NON-JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION IN COMPETITION 
POLICY 
 
Turning first to cooperation between Competition Authorities in enforcing competition 
laws, recall that the baseline against which jurisdictional integration is assessed is that 
of state autonomy, reflecting the fundamental international system norm of non-
interference in the affairs of other states. For instance, as noted in Chapter 5, under 
international law a state’s law enforcement officials may only exercise their functions in 
another state with the consent of the other state.274 Departures from this baseline occur 
through formal agreements between states or state agencies that introduce expectations, 
of increasing strength, that states will cooperate in enforcing competition laws. These 
expectations intrude progressively on de jure state autonomy. 
 
Box 3 contains the index of non-judicial enforcement cooperation. 
 
Level 1 on the index, informal cooperation, is the default in the absence of any formal 
agreement. A lot of cooperation occurs at this level between Competition Authorities, 
but it takes place outside any formal instrument (although it may be “in the shadow” of 
the OECD Recommendations on Restrictive Business Practices, or of the International 
Competition Network). 
 
The second level on the index, cooperation short of notification, represents formal 
agreements to cooperate through discussing general enforcement issues or enforcement 
research, or exchanging experience, or engaging in technical cooperation, exchanging 
staff, or similar activities unrelated to individual cases. At its simplest, level 2 includes 
an agreement that provides no more than that the parties will cooperate with each other 
in enforcing their competition laws.  
 
 
 
 
                                                           
274 American Law Institute, 1987, p. 329. 
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Box 3: The Index of Non-Judicial Enforcement Cooperation in 
Competition Policy 
 
Level 1: Informal cooperation: cooperation between Competition Authorities in the absence 
of any formal agreement between them. 
 
Level 2:Cooperation short of notification: agreements to exchange views on general 
enforcement issues, to engage in technical cooperation, the development of model 
enforcement practices, and similar activities unrelated to individual cases.  
 
Level 3: Basic notification: the existence of a basic agreement on the part of a Competition 
Authority that it should notify or inform another Competition Authority when some aspect of 
its competition policy enforcement activities may affect the other party’s interests.  
 
Level 4: Detailed mutual enforcement cooperation: in addition to a brief reference to 
notification of enforcement action (level 3), at least some specification of the circumstances 
surrounding when or how notification should take place e.g. circumstances in which 
notification would normally occur, its timing, the information to be provided; or assistance 
with gathering of voluntary evidence on behalf of a foreign Competition Authority, and with 
seeking waivers for the release of confidential information; or a reference to possible 
coordination of parallel investigations, with at least some fleshing out of what this might 
entail; or provision that one Authority will notify the other of information it is aware of 
concerning anti-competitive activities relevant to the other party’s interests.  
 
Level 5: Positive comity: the existence of a provision that an affected Competition Authority 
may request another Authority to open or expand an investigation, and an obligation that the 
requested Authority should (carefully) consider such a request.  
 
Level 6: Advanced jurisdictional interface rules: in addition to basic positive comity (level 5), 
identification of the circumstances when an Authority requesting another to initiate an 
investigation may defer or suspend its own investigation in the meantime; or 
the use of compulsory powers to obtain evidence for a foreign Competition Authority; or 
sharing of confidential information without waiver; or an agreement to provide assistance 
whether or not the conduct being investigated is an offence under the laws of the requesting 
Authority.  
 
Level 7: Third party enforcement (vertical integration): the establishment of a supra-national 
enforcement authority with jurisdiction of any kind to enforce area-wide laws on competition 
policy. 
 
 
Level 2 also includes the development of “model enforcement practices”, such as the 
“Framework for a Notification and Report Form for Concentrations” developed by the 
OECD Competition Committee in 1999 in an attempt to promote harmonization in 
trans-national merger notification requirements; and the Best Practices for the Formal 
Exchange of Information Between Competition Authorities in Hard Core Cartel 
Investigations, developed by the ICN. 
 
Level 2 excludes cooperation on specific cases that are, or may come under 
investigation – with only a small number of limited exceptions, discussed in Box 9, that 
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do not involve case notification. Case-specific cooperation is considered to represent a 
clear threshold in international enforcement cooperation. 
 
For instance, Melamed (1999) discusses three levels of international regulatory 
cooperation in competition policy: exchange of ideas including technical assistance; 
case-specific cooperation, including detailed mutual enforcement cooperation; and 
agreed principles and positive comity.275 The inclusion of technical assistance in level 2 
of the enforcement cooperation index, and basic notification starting at level 3, is 
consistent with Melamed’s approach. UNCTAD 2003 also separates technical 
assistance from case-specific cooperation. A 2002 WTO paper states: “…cooperation in 
a WTO setting would be essentially incremental in nature, and would be achieved in a 
step-by-step manner. The first phase of the exercise would be largely educational, 
concentrating on the development of enforcement capacity [technical cooperation]. The 
second phase would have as its primary feature the development and implementation of 
notification procedures….More meaningful steps towards enhancing international 
cooperation would be the coordination of enforcement actions against international 
cartels and the development of a common approach with respect to procedural issues in 
merger review.”276 
 
Level 3 on the index of non-judicial enforcement cooperation is basic notification.  
There is a bright line between agreements that provide in any way for notification of 
enforcement action, and those that do not.  Basic notification may simply comprise a 
one-word reference in an agreement along the following lines: “…the parties shall 
cooperate, including through the exchange of information, notification…” It may also 
comprise just a sentence providing for notification when the enforcement actions of one 
Competition Authority may impact on the interests of another. Any provisions that go 
beyond the above and that set out any details with respect to how notification should 
operate would be at least level 4 on the index. 
 
Level 4 comprises agreements providing for detailed mutual enforcement cooperation.  
In addition to basic notification (level 3), these agreements contain one or more of the 
following provisions: 
                                                           
275 Melamed 1999, p. 424. 
 
276 See WTO 2002, p. 7. 
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• Some specification of the circumstances surrounding when or how notification 
should take place e.g. circumstances in which notification would normally 
occur, or its timing, or the information to be provided. 
• Assistance with gathering of voluntary evidence on behalf of a foreign 
Competition Authority. 
• Seeking waivers for the release of confidential information. 
• A reference to possible coordination of parallel investigations, with at least some 
fleshing out of what this might entail, such as the factors relevant to deciding 
whether to coordinate, or the modalities of coordination i.e. more than just a 
sentence saying the parties may coordinate enforcement activities which, 
because it is generally accompanied by a notification clause, would be level 3. 
 
Notification sometimes goes beyond the standard provision for notification of 
enforcement action by a Competition Authority that may affect the interests of another 
state, to include notification when one authority becomes aware that anticompetitive 
activities themselves are taking place that may affect the other party’s interests. This 
could involve reporting conduct by firms resident in the notifying country, and an 
agreement containing this more active form of notification should therefore be regarded 
as level 4 (as argued for instance by Mathis, 2005). 
 
Level 5, positive comity, represents another key international cooperation threshold. 
Positive comity refers to an agreement that a Competition Authority affected by anti-
competitive conduct may request another Competition Authority to open or expand an 
investigation, and an obligation that the requested Authority should consider such a 
request. There is a bright line between negative or traditional comity, which is included 
in levels 3 or 4, and positive comity at level 5 (see for instance OECD 1999, Zanettin 
2002, Mathis 2005). Traditional comity refers to a country considering avoiding taking 
an action because it may harm another country’s interests, while positive comity entails 
a country being asked to take action it might not otherwise take. 
 
At level 6 is a small number of more recent agreements that contain advanced 
jurisdictional interface rules. An agreement at this level will include one or more of the 
following: 
• In addition to the basic positive comity clause, identification of the 
circumstances when an authority requesting another Competition Authority to 
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initiate an investigation may defer or suspend its own investigation in the 
meantime. Taylor refers to this as “allocative positive comity.”277 
• The use of compulsory powers to obtain evidence for a foreign Competition 
Authority. 
• Sharing of confidential information without waiver for its release from those 
who provided it. 
• An agreement to provide assistance whether or not the conduct being 
investigated is an offence under the laws of the requesting Authority. This 
amounts to using another jurisdiction’s laws to attack conduct that is not covered 
by domestic laws. 
 
In the recent literature these are viewed as clearly representing a deeper level of 
cooperation. For example, the new positive comity provisions introduced in the 1995 
EC-US agreement are referred to as “advanced positive comity” by some,278 while a 
number of other analysts e.g. Taylor 2006, distinguish between “second generation” 
agreements and “third generation” agreements, the latter including sharing of 
confidential information, and the use of compulsory powers to obtain evidence. 
 
From a slightly different perspective, Zanettin (2002) identifies agreements that provide 
for the exchange of confidential information directly between Competition Authorities 
i.e. not involving the courts through the use of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties or 
letters of request, as being “third generation” agreements. He regards this as a deep form 
of cooperation because Competition Authorities have generally taken a very restrictive 
view of their authority to exchange non-public information on their files, even if the 
information is not explicitly confidential. An agency-to-agency agreement to this effect 
is likely to significantly increase the exchange of information, and to that extent 
increases expectations of cooperation. Any agreement providing for this type of 
cooperation is therefore also included at level 6 on the index. 
 
Level 7 includes agreements that establish third party non-judicial enforcement 
(vertical integration). There is a clear threshold between the previous levels, entailing 
horizontal cooperation between country-level Competition Authorities, and agreements 
                                                           
277 Taylor, 2006, p. 117. He contrasts this with “cooperative positive comity”, in which the requesting 
agency may participate in the enforcement action. 
 
278 Holmes et. al. 2005, p. 60. 
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that establish a supra-national Competition Authority to enforce competition law. This 
category includes distinct sub-categories, but because there are only a small number of 
agreements at this level, they are combined in one level on the index. Drawing on Jenny 
and Horna (2005), the following distinct types of vertical integration of enforcement 
jurisdiction can be identified, arranged below in order of increasing jurisdictional 
integration:  
a. “Invited or negotiated jurisdiction:” where the regional enforcement authority 
may only exercise jurisdiction where it has been requested to do so by a member 
state or a firm with standing e.g. ANDEAN Group, or after a negotiated 
agreement has been reached with member state(s) e.g. in CARICOM.  
b. Concurrent jurisdiction: where both the regional enforcement authority and 
member state enforcement authorities have jurisdiction e.g. the EC with respect 
to anti-competitive practices. This involves rules for allocating jurisdiction; 
provisions for the exchange of information; and the right of the EC Commission 
to pre-empt jurisdiction if it so wishes.279 
c. Exclusive jurisdiction: where only the regional enforcement body has 
jurisdiction over regional rules e.g. the EC Commission with respect to merger 
control; the WAEMU Commission with respect to the WAEMU Treaty 
provisions on competition law. 
d. “Delegated jurisdiction:” where enforcement of the regional competition laws 
is delegated down in some circumstances by the regional enforcement authority 
to the Competition Authorities of member states. The only example of delegated 
jurisdiction is the EC since the “Modernization Package” in Council Regulation 
1/2003, creating the European Competition Network (ECN) with effect from 
May 2004. This includes provisions that compel member states to enforce EC 
law; to notify the EC Commission when they commence action; to provide 
investigatory assistance; and that provide for sharing of confidential information 
notwithstanding anything to the contrary in domestic law. The EC Commission 
can remove the delegation of competence. 
 
Compared to the binary (soft/hard cooperation) distinction, and the taxonomies 
described in the previous chapter, this seven-level index attempts to provide a clear 
                                                           
279 A further example of rules allocating jurisdiction, this time involving two RTAs, is found in the EEA, 
which has rules on when the EC Commission or the EFTA Surveillance Authority has jurisdiction in 
competition policy cases involving both jurisdictions. 
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ordering of more or less distinct and increasing levels of enforcement cooperation. It 
also provides a comprehensive measure of the depth of enforcement cooperation across 
the two main types of international agreements e.g. stand-alone agreements and chapters 
in RTAs. The index is intended to allow more precise measurement, description, and 
statistical analysis of international competition policy enforcement cooperation 
applicable to whichever instruments such cooperation is contained in.  
 
In terms of the international cooperation taxonomy developed in Chapter 6, levels 1-3 
constitute simple cooperation, level 4 represents coordination, levels 5-6 constitute 
horizontal integration, and level 7 constitutes vertical integration.  
 
10.2 AN INDEX OF PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTIONAL INTEGRATION IN COMPETITION 
POLICY 
 
This index covers more or less discrete points of increasing restriction on state authority 
to make rules with respect to competition policy. Departures from a baseline of state 
autonomy are associated with progressive changes to the fora in which policy debates 
and decisions take place. Even an agreement to notify existing policies to another state 
or international organisation implies a subtle shift from complete state autonomy. At 
successively higher levels of integration, internationally-agreed principles may frame 
policy choices; domestic policies may be formally reviewed by international 
organisations; the introduction of new policies may be subject to prior notification; 
policies may be unified with those of another country; or, at the deepest level, a 
supranational institution may be authorized to promulgate binding rules.  
 
Box 4 contains the index of prescriptive jurisdictional integration in competition policy. 
 
Level one, general information exchange, covers the ad hoc or regular provision of 
information and/or discussion of current policy settings. A number of multilateral 
arrangements and instruments provide for general information exchange on current 
policies, including the OECD Global Forum on Competition, which provides for 
information exchange amongst both OECD members and non-members; and databases 
of competition policies and laws maintained by APEC and the Free Trade Agreement of 
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the Americas.280 Some RTAs and CEAs also provide for the general exchange of 
information on current policies e.g. NZ-Singapore, EC-Mexico.   
 
 
Box 4: The Index of Prescriptive Jurisdictional Integration in 
Competition Policy 
 
Level 1: General information exchange: the ad hoc or regular provision of information and/or 
discussion of current policies. 
 
Level 2: Common policy definitions: internationally greed definitions of key concepts, 
principles, and terms. 
 
Level 3: Agreed policy guidelines or non-specific policy undertakings: broad policy 
undertakings e.g. to maintain laws proscribing anti-competitive activities; non-binding policy 
obligations, such as agreements on policy objectives, or policy principles; and non-binding 
multilateral guidelines. 
 
Level 4: Institutionalised mechanisms to promote policy compatibility: a range of features, 
such as requirements to notify prospective policies, or regular consultations or standing 
bodies to discuss policies; peer review by multilateral organisations; resourcing an 
international organisation to produce a continuing stream of research and policy papers. 
 
Level 5: Specific policy obligations: in addition to broad undertakings proscribing anti-
competitive activities at level 3 above, a variety of further specific obligations, including 
obligations such as to provide national treatment and due process in competition policy, to 
enact a competition law by a specific date, or to ensure the independence of the Competition 
Authority.   
 
Level 6: Policy convergence: obligations to progressively adopt the competition policy 
settings of another jurisdiction; or arrangements to align specific aspects of competition 
policy between jurisdictions. 
 
Level 7: Policy unification: agreements that countries will adopt the same policies in some 
dimension(s) of competition policy. 
 
Level 8: Single trans-national rule-maker: a trans-national body with the authority to 
promulgate new competition policies to apply in member states. 
 
 
At level two are common policy definitions. These start to frame policy discourse, and 
the ways in which policy options are identified and assessed. Common definitions may 
cover concepts, terms, or classification systems, or put forward policy objectives or 
principles. For example, the UNCTAD Model Law on Competition,281 and the OECD 
Recommendations on Restrictive Business Practices define key terms in competition 
                                                           
280 The APEC Competition Policy and Law Database, maintained by Chinese Taipei, at  
www.epeccp.org.tw/about.html; the SICE which is an inventory of international competition agreements 
in the region compiled as part of the negotiations toward a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, at 
www.ftaa-alca.org/ngroups/NGCP/Publications/Treaty_e.asp. 
 
281 “Model Law on Competition”, UNCTAD Series on Issues in Competition Law and Policy, United 
Nations, New York and Geneva, 2004. 
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law and international cooperation (they also go beyond this, and are therefore referred to 
below in relation to subsequent levels of the index). The WTO Working Group on 
Competition worked on clarifying the core principles of transparency, non-
discrimination, and due process (which have since been incorporated in the Competition 
Policy Chapter some RTAs).  
 
Level 3 comprises agreed policy guidelines, or non-specific policy undertakings.  These 
include general non-specific policy undertakings, agreements on policy objectives, or 
commonly agreed policy principles; and non-binding multilateral guidelines on 
competition policy. The former are found in a number of RTAs, such as non-specific 
and brief obligations to enact or maintain laws that make anti-competitive acts illegal 
e.g. as found in a number of RTAs between countries of the Former Soviet Union. 
Multilateral guidelines include guidelines promulgated by multilateral institutions, such 
as the 1998 OECD Recommendation Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core 
Cartels, the UNCTAD Set, the UNCTAD Model Law on Competition, and the APEC 
non-binding Principles on Competition Policy and Regulatory Reform. A further 
example is the International Competition Network’s Eight Guiding Principles for 
Merger Notification and Review, which includes the principles of non-discrimination 
and procedural fairness.282 
 
Level 4 comprises institutionalised mechanisms to promote policy compatibility. This 
covers a range of phenomena, such as: 
• Requirements to notify prospective policies e.g. notification of designation of 
new monopolies in RTAs 
• The provision of technical assistance to help with drafting competition laws 
• Regular competition policy consultations established under RTAs or CEAs 
• Standing bodies to discuss competition policies e.g. the Association or 
Cooperation Councils established in a number of RTAs between the EC and 
neighbouring countries; the Committees or other standing bodies on 
competition policy established in a number of RTAs, such as the Chile-Mexico 
Agreement; the OECD Competition Policy and Law Committee, the UNCTAD 
Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, the WTO 
                                                           
282 See 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference_5th_capetown_2006/Impleme
ntationHandbookApril2006.pdf 
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Working Group on Competition Policy, and the APEC Competition Policy and 
Deregulation Group 
• Coordinated self-assessment by APEC members of the implementation of 
agreed competition policy principles 
• Peer review of current competition policies e.g. as conducted by the OECD 
Competition Policy and Law Committee (since 1998), and the UNCTAD 
Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy. 
 
At level 5 are specific policy obligations. This comprises a variety of more specific 
policy obligations found in RTAs going beyond the broad anti-competition provisions at 
level 2. Examples include providing national treatment and due process in competition 
policy; ensuring that state enterprises do not discriminate on the basis of nationality (in 
many RTAs involving the EC and neighbouring countries); enacting a competition law 
or establishing a Competition Authority (as in Article 12 of the Singapore-US RTA). 
The Competition Chapter of the 2005 EC-South Africa CEA provides that South Africa 
will develop competition laws within three years, publish laws within 60 days, provide 
the better of national treatment and Most Favoured Nation treatment, and provide the 
same treatment to the EC as it provides in any subsequent agreements.  
 
Level 6 comprises policy convergence. This includes obligations to progressively adopt 
the competition laws of another jurisdiction, as found in a relatively small number of 
RTAs between the EC and neighbouring countries.283 In addition, policy convergence 
would include softer agreements to progressively align specific aspects of competition 
policy, such as has taken place between New Zealand and Australia. Under a 1998 
Memorandum of Understanding, the two governments undertook to consult each other 
over changes to their competition regimes with a view to appropriate harmonization.284 
Subsequently, the anti-dumping remedy was abolished on trans-Tasman trade, and in 
1990 a “Trans-Tasman competition provision” was introduced into each national law. 
This established the concept of a “Trans-Tasman market” in respect of proscribed 
conduct by dominant firms i.e. the jurisdiction of each competition authority was 
                                                           
283 See Holmes et. al. undated, pp. 89-101, for a description of some of these agreements. 
 
284 The 1998 Memorandum of Understanding on Harmonisation of Business Law.  
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extended to take account of the effects of proscribed conduct on the combined 
Australian and New Zealand markets.285 
 
Level 7 is policy unification, defined as the mutually agreed adoption of identical 
policies to that of another jurisdiction.286 For example, agreements in RTAs that 
countries will adopt a uniform set of competition policies, as found in a relatively small 
number of agreements such as the EC Treaty of Rome, the European Economic Area 
(between the EFTA states minus Switzerland, and the EC), the ANDEAN Group 
(following the adoption of Decision 285 of 1991), CARICOM (following the adoption 
of Protocol VIII in 2000), and bilateral agreements between the EC and candidate 
countries for EC accession. The EEA agreement could be described as providing for 
dynamic policy unification, in the sense that new EC competition laws, or secondary 
competition rules are legally binding as integrated into the EEA by decision of the EEA 
Joint Committee. 
 
At level 8 is a single trans-national rule maker, that is, a trans-national body with the 
authority to promulgate new competition policies or rules to apply in member states 
upon adoption in domestic law. Such a supranational authority may also have the 
authority to introduce new rules on the basis of majority voting rather than unanimity, 
and/or whose rulings have direct effect in member states. While conceptually distinct 
and deeper forms of jurisdictional integration, they are included in level 8 because these 
features are found only in the EC.  
 
This ranking of elements in order of increasing intrusion on national autonomy is 
consistent with a number of previous experts on international policy cooperation. For 
instance, Cooper (1987), as previously noted in Chapter 4.6, identified the following 
levels of international policy cooperation: exchange of information on existing policies; 
agreed common definitions; agreed norms and objectives; and exchange of information 
on prospective actions. The ordering of levels 1 - 4 in the index in Box 2 is consistent 
with Cooper’s approach. Leebron’s (1996) levels of harmonization of general policy 
objectives, of policy principles, of specific rules, and of institutional structures and 
procedures is consistent with the ordering of levels 3, 5, and 8 (see earlier discussion in 
                                                           
285 See Bollard and Vautier 1998, pp. 143-155, on which this is drawn, for a fuller discussion. 
 
286 Note that this excludes unilateral adoption of the policies of another jurisdiction. Unilateral actions do 
not comprise jurisdictional integration as defined here. 
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chapter 4.6). Similarly, Abbot et. al. 2000 identify the degree of precision of rules as a 
key dimension of the “legalization of international relations.” More determinate rules 
with less room for interpretation are more legalised, and therefore impinge to a greater 
degree on state sovereignty. The same authors place non-binding norms and guidelines 
at an earlier point on their legalism spectrum than specific obligations and binding 
instruments. This is consistent with the ordering of levels 3 and 5. 
 
This index is used in Chapter 13 to broadly rank the level of prescriptive jurisdictional 
integration found in RTAs, CEAs, and multilateral instruments.  
 
In terms of the international cooperation taxonomy developed in Chapter 6, levels 1-2 
constitute simple cooperation, levels 3-5 represent coordination, levels 6-7 constitute 
horizontal integration, and level 8 constitutes vertical integration. 
 
10.3 AN INDEX OF JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION IN COMPETITION POLICY 
 
This is an ordinal index of increasing international intrusion on the autonomy of judicial 
authorities of a state in enforcing competition laws. A Competition Authority may 
undertake enforcement action within its jurisdiction, but may not be able to obtain 
evidence, enforce court orders, or enforce judgments against enterprises in another 
jurisdiction. In contrast to prescriptive jurisdiction – where international law allows a 
wide measure of discretion to states - the basis of enforcement jurisdiction in 
international law is strictly territorial, particularly where it involves the use of forcible 
restraint.287 
 
Box 5 contains the index of judicial enforcement cooperation in competition policy. 
 
Level 1 on the index, judicial comity, is the informal regard courts have for the judicial 
processes of other countries.288 It is the default in the absence of any formal agreement. 
Jurisdictional disputes may arise as to which law should apply to a particular activity, 
and procedural disputes may arise due to differences between the evidential and 
procedural rules of different jurisdictions.  The domestic court in which the case is 
                                                           
287 As argued by Zanettin, 2002, p. 41. 
 
288 See Slaughter 2000, pp. 1112-1115 for a discussion of judicial comity. 
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heard will attempt to resolve the dispute.289 A Court may also address a letter rogatory 
(or letter of request) to a court in another state requesting assistance e.g. to gather 
evidence. Compliance is voluntary. 
 
 
Box 5: The Index of Judicial Enforcement Cooperation in Competition 
Policy 
 
 
Level 1: Judicial comity 
 
Level 2: Serve process, take evidence, and enforce foreign judgments in civil or commercial 
matters. 
 
Level 3: Use of compulsory judicial powers to obtain evidence on behalf of another 
jurisdiction 
 
Level 4: Procedural mutual recognition 
 
Level 5: Overlapping jurisdiction  
 
Level 6: Vertical integration of legal systems 
 
 
At level 2 are formal international agreements to serve process, take evidence without 
compulsion, or to enforce foreign judgments in civil or commercial matters. A regional 
example is the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil Matters, while at the multilateral level, the Hague Service and Evidence 
Conventions fulfil some of these functions. While Zanettin has concluded that the 
Hague Evidence Convention is inadequate for international assistance in anti-trust 
enforcement, these conventions are included here for completeness, as they are at least 
potentially available for use. 
 
At level 3 are agreements that provide an expectation that the judiciary will use 
compulsory powers to obtain evidence on behalf of another jurisdiction. Examples of 
this level of cooperation are found in the few Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties between 
states that cover competition policy. Under a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, the 
judiciary undertakes to use coercive instruments such as subpoenas and search warrants 
to obtain evidence on behalf of another state. As discussed in Chapter 9.3.4, limitations 
on the use of this instrument mean that it is relevant to international cooperation in 
competition policy between relatively few countries. 
                                                           
289 The discussion in the last two sentences draws on Taylor, 2006, pp. 378-379. 
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Level 4, procedural mutual recognition, comprises agreements in which two (or more) 
states agree to recognise the rules of evidence and the procedural rules of each other’s 
courts with respect to competition policy.290 For example, Australia and New Zealand 
permit certain evidential rules and legal procedures to be recognised in each other’s 
domestic courts for certain competition actions.291 
 
Level 5, overlapping jurisdiction, refers to agreements that provide for the mutual 
extension of the jurisdiction of competition courts into the legal systems of signatories. 
For instance, in 1990 Australia and New Zealand amended their laws to allow courts to 
sit in each other’s territories to hear specific competition cases.292 
 
Level 6, vertical integration of legal systems, is found only in a small number of deep 
integration RTAs, such as the EC, EFTA, EEA, WAEMU, and the ANDEAN Group. 
These agreements provide standing to private parties, and direct effect of the rulings of 
regional judicial institutions in national law.  
 
The levels in this index are consistent with Trachtman 1996, whose options to promote 
international cooperation range from less binding to more binding, and include rules of 
jurisdiction, rules of recognition of foreign regulations, and institutions that will 
adjudicatively conduct these tasks in future. 
 
In terms of the international cooperation taxonomy developed in Chapter 6, levels 1-2 
constitute simple cooperation, level 3 represents coordination, levels 4-5 constitute 
horizontal integration, and level 6 constitutes vertical integration.  
 
10.4 AN INDEX OF COOPERATION IN INTER-STATE ADJUDICATION IN COMPETITION 
POLICY 
The final category of jurisdiction relevant to international competition policy 
cooperation is the jurisdiction to adjudicate inter-state disputes. Recall that the default 
position under international law is that a state is immune from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of another state when it is acting governmentally. The index in Box 6 draws on 
                                                           
290 Taylor, 2006, p. 381, uses the term procedural mutual recognition in this context. 
 
291 Taylor, 2006, p. 119. 
 
292 Bollard and Vautier 1998, p. 144. 
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Smith’s index of legalism in dispute settlement mechanisms in RTAs, although, unlike 
Smith’s index, the index in Box 6 is confined to inter-state disputes.  
 
 
Box 6: An Index of International Cooperation in Adjudicating Inter-State 
Competition Policy Disputes 
 
Level 1: Consultations: but no right to third party review - as applies with respect to many 
competition chapters in RTAs e.g. those signed by the US and Canada, and in many stand-
alone competition enforcement agreements.  
 
Level 2: Conciliation or mediation: for example, there is a provision for OECD arbitration in 
some EU-Euro-Med agreements.  
 
Level 3: Non-binding adjudication: a number of bilateral agreements involving the EC 
provide for arbitration of competition-related disputes if the political Council established 
under the RTA, comprising representatives from both parties, cannot reach agreement.293   
 
Level 4: Binding adjudication: as in the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. There are 
currently no international competition policy agreements containing this provision. 
 
Level 5: A standing regional court: with jurisdiction in competition policy to rule on the 
legality of the actions of states. This is found in the deepest RTAs such as the EC, EFTA, and 
WAEMU.  
 
 
In terms of the international cooperation taxonomy developed in Chapter 6, level 1 
constitutes simple cooperation, levels 2-3 represent coordination, level 4 constitutes 
horizontal integration, and level 5 constitutes vertical integration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
293 Holmes et. al. undated, pp. 35-36. 
 157  
Chapter 11 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS SPECIFIC TO INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 
POLICY COOPERATION 
 
 
Chapter 7 set out a number of general hypotheses about the causes of international 
economic policy cooperation. The literature on international cooperation in competition 
policy reviewed in Chapter 9 points to a number of more specific propositions about the 
nature and causes of international cooperation in this domain. This chapter sets out 
these additional propositions in a systematic manner. 
 
These competition policy-specific propositions have most often been derived from 
analysis of selected agreements, either of RTAs containing competition-related 
provisions e.g. Cernat 2005; Holmes et. al. 2005, or of selected stand-alone Competition 
Enforcement Agreement (CEAs) e.g. Zanettin 2002. In Chapter 12, a large dataset is 
compiled both of RTAs containing competition-related provisions, and of CEAs. While 
some previous studies have included a large number of RTAs with competition-related 
provisions, no previous study has included such a large number of CEAs, nor combined 
the competition-related provisions in RTAs and CEAs into a single dataset for statistical 
analysis. This expanded dataset provides a good opportunity to test the propositions on 
a more complete multi-instrument dataset. A combined dataset of RTAs and CEAs also 
suggests in some cases a modification of a hypothesis originally formulated with respect 
to RTAs only. 
 
Competition policy-specific propositions advanced in the literature can be divided into 
descriptive propositions and hypotheses.  
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11.1 DESCRIPTIVE PROPOSITIONS 
 
1 The proportion of enforcement cooperation agreements (CEAs) that are 
 between OECD member countries is declining.294  
2 The “vast majority of bilateral agreements signed so far have the US as 
one of the parties.”295  
3 RTAs with competition provisions signed by the EC focus on the 
adoption by partner countries of competition rules similar or identical to 
EC laws, but, with few exceptions, do not include detailed enforcement 
cooperation provisions.296 
4 Agreements signed by developed economies other than the EC mostly 
pursue enforcement cooperation rather than policy convergence.297  
5 It is “virtually impossible” for developing countries to sign a CEA with 
developed countries, there are “only a handful.”298 
6 There are no “hard cooperation” agreements involving developing 
countries.299 
7 Comity principles are rarely found in RTAs.300 
8 Some competition chapters in RTAs are as advanced, if not more 
advanced, in their provisions to foster cooperation between competition 
authorities on enforcement matters as second generation inter-agency 
agreements (CEAs) between competition authorities.301 
 
 
                                                           
294 UNCTAD 2003, p. 7, which stated: “The concentration of cooperation agreements among OECD 
countries is not quite as heavy as before…, virtually all observers and invitee jurisdictions at the Global 
Forum which were active in competition policy had entered into cooperation agreements with one or 
more jurisdictions (often with those which were geographically close and or close trading partners).  
 
295 Zanettin 2002, p. 57. Similarly Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, p. 189, state that bilateral MOUs [CEAs] 
are mainly between the US and other states. 
 
296 Holmes et. al. 2005, p. 72. 
 
297 Holmes et. al. 2005, p. 73. 
 
298 Jenny 2003, p. 620 
 
299 Holmes et. al. 2005, p. 64. 
 
300 Cernat 2005, p. 28. 
 
301 This is a finding put forward by Anderson and Evenett on the basis of analysis of Competition-related 
provisions in 11 RTAs and some CEAs. See Anderson and Evenett, 2006, p. 28. 
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11.2 HYPOTHESES 
 
1 A high proportion of North-South RTAs that contain enforcement 
cooperation provisions, and a high proportion of North-South CEAs, are 
likely to provide only for shallow cooperation, while North-North 
agreements will on average be deeper. The term North in this context 
refers to developed countries, and South to developing countries. Cernat 
hypothesized that developing countries would seek to include provisions 
in RTAs with developed countries on enforcement cooperation (“for 
example consultation, notification, and so on”) in an attempt to restrict 
anti-competitive practices by developed country firms in their markets.302 
This same logic would apply to CEAs between developed countries and 
developing countries. Cernat found that approximately 80% of North-
South RTAs contain consultation provisions, and 38% contained 
notification provisions, while only 31% of North-North agreements 
contained notification provisions. However, many competition 
enforcement cooperation agreements are in the form of stand-alone 
agreements (CEAs) rather than in RTAs, and this is especially true of 
agreements between developed economies. Testing the hypothesis only 
on RTAs may therefore produce incorrect results. A priori, it seems 
unlikely that developed countries would sign up to meaningful reciprocal 
enforcement cooperation with less developed countries i.e. going beyond 
consultation, when many of the latter countries lack credible 
enforcement capacity, and some lack a Competition Authority or even a 
competition law altogether. Furthermore, developed countries lack the 
incentive to enter such agreements when the provisions are more likely 
to be invoked by less developed countries with respect to the activities of 
developed country firms in their markets, than vice versa (as argued by 
Jenny).303 While less developed countries might seek to include such 
provisions, as Cernat hypothesized, it is not clear how they might induce 
developed countries to agree to them. Therefore it is hypothesized that a 
high proportion of North-South RTAs and North-South CEAs that 
                                                           
302 Cernat 2005, p. 13. 
 
303 Jenny, 2003, p. 614. 
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contain enforcement cooperation provisions are likely to provide only for 
shallow cooperation, while North-North agreements will on average be 
deeper.  
2 Competition policy enforcement cooperation agreements, whether in 
RTAs or CEAs, will be deeper between countries that are party to a 
Customs Union or more advanced stage of economic integration 
agreement, and shallower where “only” a Free Trade Agreement is in 
place; but this relationship will have weakened over time. Cernat 
hypothesized that RTAs characterized by a higher level of (intended) 
trade integration are more likely to contain competition-related 
provisions, because, as the level of ambition of an RTA increases, the 
more serious are the potential negative effects of anti-competitive 
conduct.304 Puri went one step further and suggested: “The expected 
level of trade integration intended for an RTA tends to dictate the 
existence and depth of its competition provisions.”305 The same logic 
suggests that CEAs will be deeper where the parties are also party to an 
RTA that is a Customs Union or deeper agreement. However, as noted in 
Part Two and Chapter 7, the traditional sharp distinction between 
shallow FTAs and deep Customs Unions has broken down, with FTAs 
increasingly containing relatively deep policy cooperation. This suggests 
the hypothesized relationship will be less strong in more recent periods.   
3 There is a positive relationship between the presence or depth of 
enforcement cooperation provisions, and the similarity of competition 
laws. It seems plausible, a priori, that enforcement officials will find it 
easier to cooperate where the legal regimes under which they operate are 
more similar e.g. where offences are similarly defined, where 
enforcement practices, particularly involving information sharing, are 
compatible - as suggested by Taylor.306 Jenny has commented 
that:“cooperation in specific cases can be successful only among 
countries which have relatively similar legal systems [and] common 
                                                           
304 Cernat 2005, p. 10. Cernat tested this with respect to the existence of competition-related provisions, 
but not with respect to their depth. 
 
305 Puri, in UNCTAD 2005, p. x. 
 
306 Taylor 2006, pp. 121-122. 
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economic experience and trust each other.”307 An alternative perspective 
is put forward by Papadopoulos, who suggests that enforcement 
cooperation has been used as an alternative/substitute for harmonisation 
of national competition laws.308 While this suggestion is not strictly 
antithetical, because it may be referring only to cooperative convergence 
of laws from a low base, rather than a high degree of similarity, the 
implication is that enforcement cooperation and similarity of laws are 
inversely related. 
4 Successful enforcement cooperation requires a progressive approach, 
such as starting with a simple cooperation agreement, and evolving more 
complex arrangements over time (drawing on UNCTAD 2003, p. 22) In 
similar vein, Cernat 2005 suggested that competition-related 
harmonization, policy transfer and convergence provisions contained in 
RTAs lead to increased cooperation among national competition 
agencies. While an assessment of the actual implementation of 
agreements is outside the scope of this thesis, it will be possible to 
examine how many instances there are of a cooperation agreement 
between two countries (whether in an RTA or a CEA) being replaced by 
a subsequent and deeper agreement. This would provide limited support 
for the hypothesis, on the basis that succeeding shallower with deeper 
enforcement cooperation agreements is more likely than not to be 
followed by more successful cooperation – because the subsequent 
agreement is itself evidence of goodwill, trust, and an expectation of an 
increase in cooperation, and/or due to the specific additional cooperation 
provisions it contains.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
307 Cited in Melamed 1999, p. 429. 
 
308 Cited in Holmes et. al. undated, FN 106.  
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Chapter 12 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
THE DATASET OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY AGREEMENTS 
 
 
12.1 DATASETS IN PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
The objectives of this research are to measure the depth of international economic 
policy cooperation at a point in time, to measures changes over time, and to undertake 
exploratory analysis of some of the factors influencing state decisions over whether to 
sign shallow or deep cooperation agreements. The unit of analysis will be both the 
international agreement, and the country that is signatory to an agreement. 
 
To test the hypotheses in Chapter 7, the ideal dataset would comprise: 
• Data on the depth of international policy cooperation in a specific policy 
domain(s) or of a specific type, for all or most states in the world 
• Within that policy domain, complete data on all forms of international policy 
cooperation e.g. bilateral, regional, or multilateral agreements, and whether 
embodied in government-to-government treaties, in agency-to-agency 
agreements, or in any other formal instrument.  
• The dataset would be sufficiently large, detailed, and representative, that 
multiple levels of jurisdictional integration could be robustly specified and used 
in statistical analysis to test relationships for a large number of countries. 
 
Unfortunately, currently available data falls far short of this ideal, for a number of 
reasons. First, and most importantly, there is no conceptually coherent basis for 
measuring the depth of international policy cooperation, which is an obvious obstacle to 
data collection.  
 
For instance, the World Bank’s Development Indicators includes a Chapter on 
“Globalization and Global Links,” in which the Bank notes that: “The growth of cross-
border economic activity has changed the structure of economies and the political and 
social organization of countries. Not all effects of globalization can be measured 
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directly.”309 The Bank monitors the scope and pace of change along four important 
channels: trade in goods and services; financial flows; the movement of people; and the 
diffusion of technology and knowledge. No attempt is made to directly measure changes 
to the “political organization” of countries - for instance, the depth of their international 
policy commitments.  
 
Policy and research in the field of international economic cooperation remains 
somewhat focused on the stages of economic integration e.g. Schiff 2000, Wu 2004, 
which is a combined measure of economic and policy integration, and, as discussed in 
Chapters 4.4 and 8, is less and less useful as a proxy measure of the depth of policy 
cooperation. Many researchers record whether selected economic provisions are present 
or not in a sample of agreements, but not the varying depth of the provisions e.g. OECD 
2006, Cernat 2005.  
 
Alternatively, a widely known measure of a country’s level of international policy 
cooperation - the A.T.Kearney/Foreign Policy measure of international political 
engagement – merely measures the number of selected Treaties signed, and membership 
of selected international organisations, irrespective of the varying depth of cooperation 
these engagements entail.310 The KOF Globalisation Index, and the Centre for the Study 
of Globalisation and Regionalisation’s Globalisation Index take a similar approach. 
Each proxies the degree of political globalization by counting the number of foreign 
embassies in a country, the number of international organisations of which the country 
is a member, and the number of UN Peace Missions a country participated in.311 
 
Secondly, international economic policy cooperation - even that confined to official 
cooperation - is effected by a large number of entities, using a wide range of 
instruments. There is typically no centralized repository of information on the extent of 
international policy cooperation, either within a single country across all agencies and 
policy domains, or - more importantly for current purposes - across countries by a single 
policy domain.  
 
                                                           
309 World Bank 2007, p. 313. 
 
310 See the A.T.Kearney Globalization Index at http://www.atkearney.com/main.taf?p=5,4,1,127 
 
311 See http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/; and http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/ 
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Thirdly, the increasing depth of policy integration within FTAs is a relatively recent 
(post-1990 or so) phenomenon, and data classification and research have not yet caught 
up with this. For instance, the WTO retains its primary, historical legal classification of 
RTAs as either FTAs or Customs Unions, making no distinctions within the 
increasingly large variety of FTAs. 
 
For these reasons, cross-country quantitative research on international economic policy 
cooperation has focused on RTAs as the source of information. RTAs, along with the 
WTO agreement itself, are probably the single most important vehicle for international 
economic policy cooperation. There has been a large increase in the number of RTAs in 
the last ten years. This has been well documented. Crawford and Fiorentino identify the 
following key stylized facts:312 
1 There was an unprecedented increase in the number of RTAs in the 
period 1995-2005, with 43 new RTAs being notified to the WTO 
between January 2004 and February 2005 alone. 
2 As at February 2005, all but one WTO member (Mongolia) was party to 
at least one RTA. 
3 RTAs are becoming increasingly complex, in many cases establishing 
regimes that go beyond WTO and other multilateral requirements.  
4 An increasing number of RTAs are between developing and developed 
countries - so-called North-South agreements – with over half of these 
involving either the EC or EFTA as one party - and between developed 
countries (North-North). 
5 An increasing number of RTAs are between non-contiguous countries, 
including cross-regional RTAs and RTAs where one of the parties is 
itself an RTA e.g. the EC, EFTA. 
6 There is an increasing preponderance of FTAs compared to Customs 
Unions, and of bilateral compared to plurilateral agreements. 
 
RTAs function as a coordinating and umbrella mechanism in a wide range of policy 
areas. More recent RTAs typically go well beyond trade issues to incorporate a range of 
provisions on behind the border issues such as investment, competition, domestic 
regulation, and so on. They therefore have some validity as a source of information on 
                                                           
312 Crawford and Fiorentino 2005, pp. 1-6. 
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signatory countries’ depth of international economic policy cooperation. Box 7 
describes the WTO’s dataset on RTAs.  
 
 
Box 7: The WTO’s Dataset on Regional Trade Agreements 
 
Member countries have been required to notify the GATT/WTO of RTAs that they enter, 
under Article XXIV, because RTAs constitute a sanctioned departure from the Most Favoured 
Nation principle in which trade concessions granted by one WTO member to another member 
must be available to all other member countries.  The WTO maintains a database of notified 
RTAs in force. “RTAs in force” includes accessions by new members to existing agreements. 
It excludes agreements that have been superseded by more recent agreements between the 
same signatories, or that have been consolidated into wider groupings.  
 
Historically, the focus has been on the distinction between an FTA and a Customs Union, 
reflecting the predominant focus of the GATT in reducing barriers to trade at the border. With 
the extension of the GATT to include trade in services, there has also been, since 1994, a 
requirement for members to notify the WTO of services agreements. A country entering a 
single RTA that covers both goods and services trade is required to lodge two separate 
notifications. 
 
The WTO’s main categorization of RTAs is according to whether the RTA is a Customs 
Union, a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), a Services Agreement – also referred to as an 
Economic Integration Agreement – or a Preferential Arrangement. A Preferential 
Arrangement is one involving the non-reciprocal exchange of obligations (typically between 
developed and developing countries).  
 
In addition, RTAs in force are categorized by date of entry into force, and by which legal 
provision they were notified under e.g. GATT Article XXIV, the “Enabling Clause” – which 
applies to less developed countries, or GATS Article V for agreements covering trade in 
services. 
 
Not all RTAs actually in operation have been notified to the WTO. For instance, as at January 
2005, 312 RTAs had been notified to the GATT/WTO - of which 170 were then in force - and 
WTO staff estimated there were a further 65 RTAs in operation, but not notified to the 
WTO.313 As at 1 March 2007 the WTO web site indicated there were 194 RTAs in force, 
comprising 114 FTAs and 7 Customs Unions notified under Article XXIV, 20 RTAs notified 
under the Enabling Clause, and 42 notified under GATS Article V. 
 
Links to just over half of the notified RTAs in force are on the WTO web site.   
 
 
However, RTAs by no means capture the full extent of any particular country’s level of 
international economic policy cooperation – nor the full extent in any particular policy 
domain covered in the agreement. In the field of competition policy cooperation, as 
outlined in Chapter 9, a key instrument, in addition to RTAs, is the stand-alone 
Competition Enforcement Agreement (CEA).  
 
                                                           
313 See Crawford and Fiorentino 2005, pp. 2-3. 
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To fully measure the depth of competition policy cooperation by country, therefore, it is 
necessary to assemble a dataset across all of the instruments in which international 
cooperation is embodied. This is taken up in the remaining sections of this chapter.   
 
12.2 COMPETITION POLICY CHAPTERS IN RTAS  
 
RTAs are often long and complex documents, and until relatively recently there had 
been little attempt to systematically extract and compile information on the detailed 
provisions in them. However, the recent upsurge in the number of, and interest in, RTAs 
has started to result in the extraction and classification of detailed information on their 
provisions. 
 
With respect to competition policy, there are two existing large-scale datasets on the 
competition-related provisions in RTAs: 
1. A dataset compiled by the OECD comprising 86 selected RTAs, covering 
approximately 130 countries.314 The RTAs include those that were notified 
to the WTO from 2001 - July 2005. Some earlier agreements, as well as 
some non-notified agreements, were also included by reason of their 
competition provisions, their importance to trade, or because they involve 
groups of developing countries. Of the 86 agreements, 59 (68%) are between 
developing or emerging countries, 23 (27%) are between developed and 
developing countries, and only 4 (5%) are between developed countries, 
reflecting the OECD’s interest in this particular exercise in the development 
aspects of trade and competition. “Because there are more than 200 RTAs 
currently in force, the Table is not exhaustive. It is hoped nevertheless that 
the Table both covers the recent agreements and gives a fair sampling of the 
range of competition-related provisions in RTAs.”315  
2. A dataset compiled by Cernat comprising 141 RTAs containing various 
competition-related provisions.316 The dataset was compiled from an 
analysis of more than 300 RTAs, drawing on the WTO database of notified 
                                                           
314 OECD 2006. 
 
315 OECD 2006, p. 6. 
 
316 Cernat 2005. 
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RTAs, supplemented with information from various sources on non-notified 
RTAs, as well as agreements between some non-WTO members.317 
 
In addition, Sokol (Sokol 2007a) has compiled a dataset of 24 Latin American RTAs 
containing competition policy chapters. 
 
There are a significant number of RTAs (43) in the OECD dataset that are not in the 
Cernat dataset. This means that the total number of RTAs containing competition-
related provisions in these two datasets is 184.  
 
In order to retrieve the relevant texts of these RTAs, the Tuck Trade Agreements 
Database was used.318 This database claims to be the most comprehensive collation of 
bilateral and regional FTAs and Customs Unions available on a single online site. It 
claims to contain the text of all RTAs notified to the WTO up to June 1, 2003, plus 
many that have not been notified to the WTO. However, it also contains a number of 
post-2003 RTAs, including a number that contain competition-related provisions. 
 
The database is text-searchable by keyword, or by seventy, indexed provision fields - 
including a field for “rules of competition” - defined as “provisions dealing with 
national laws, regulations etc related to anti-trust, anti-monopoly, anti-predatory 
practices etc.”  
 
The search methodology adopted, using the text search facility, was as follows: 
1. The database was searched by keyword “competition.” This retrieved 
192 RTAs.319  
2. For each of these RTAs, the search tool provided the text of every 
indexed provision field of the RTA that contained the word 
“competition.” Not all of the references to competition were relevant to 
competition law. For example, there were many references to 
competition or unfair competition in the context of anti-dumping or 
                                                           
317 Because EU enlargement led to the abrogation of a large number of RTAs with competition-related 
provisions signed by former Central and Eastern European countries prior to EU accession, Cernat’s 
subsequent analysis was based only on those RTAs that were currently in force. 
 
318 www.dartmouth.edu/~tradedb/ 
 
319 Web site last visited 26 March 2008.  
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safeguards provisions, government procurement, state-owned 
enterprises, or intellectual property, or relating only to a specific sector 
such as telecommunications. RTAs that contained only these types of 
provisions were excluded from further consideration. Excluding 
competition-related provisions that relate only to a specific sector is 
warranted because the focus here is on international cooperation with 
respect to general, economy-wide competition laws – and more 
specifically, on cooperation between Competition Authorities in 
enforcing such laws.320    
3. For RTAs in which the Competition Policy chapter covers both general 
competition/anti-trust law and other issues, such as state aid and 
dedicated monopolies (typical of US RTAs), or consumer protection or 
government procurement, only those provisions in the Sub-section on 
general competition law are incorporated. 
4. Some agreements involved one party that is not a fully independent state 
i.e. a member of the UN. These agreements include 8 in which one 
signatory was the Faroe Islands, the Palestinian Authority, or the OCT 
(Overseas Countries and Territories of the EC). These were excluded, as 
the definition of jurisdictional integration in this thesis is confined to 
state-to-state cooperation. 
5. The MERCSOUR Protocol of the Defence of Competition was excluded 
because it was not ratified.321  
6. For the purpose at hand, there is some duplication and redundancy in the 
192 RTAs retrieved. For instance, in a small number of cases, both the 
English and original language version of an RTA were retrieved, or both 
the original and up-dated version of an RTA were retrieved. Only the 
English language versions, and the most recent agreements were 
included for further analysis. 
 
                                                           
320 Although it should be noted that one or two competition policy chapters in RTAs limit some aspects of 
enforcement cooperation to specific sectors. For instance, Chapter 5 of the 2002 Implementing 
Agreement between Japan and Singapore unusually limits case notification and information exchange to 
the sectors of telecommunications, electricity and gas (Article 22). This agreement is included in the 
dataset. 
 
321 MERCOSUR is the Customs Union of the Southern Cone between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay. 
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Some RTAs are not available on the Tuck web site, but were located on the WTO web 
site, on the web site of the Organisation of American States, or on the web site of the 
EC’s Directorate General of Competition.322 
 
Finally, the EC has entered a number of bilateral agreements with countries in its region 
that contain competition provisions. Not all of these agreements are on the WTO or 
Tuck web sites. These agreements are with candidates or potential candidates for EC 
membership, or with neighbouring countries in Euro-Mediterranean Agreements. These 
agreements are primarily confined to provisions on substantive policies. For instance, 
candidate countries must demonstrate that they have national competition laws 
reflecting the principles of EC law, have a national competition authority to implement 
these laws, and have a credible enforcement record. There is generally no requirement 
for international enforcement cooperation, although there are enforcement cooperation 
provisions in one or two Euro-Mediterranean agreements e.g. EC-Algeria 2002. 
 
This search yielded information on the competition-related provisions in 174 RTAs. 
Analysis of these RTAs reveals that, while most of them are confined to provisions 
covering competition policy settings, a sub-set of them – nearly one quarter – contain 
provisions relating to enforcement cooperation. This will be elaborated in Chapter 13, 
but, because the focus of the statistical analysis will be on enforcement cooperation, the 
41 RTAs providing for enforcement cooperation are identified in Table 3. These will be 
combined with a dataset of Stand-alone Competition Enforcement Cooperation 
Agreements (CEAs) to produce a composite set of agreements providing for 
international enforcement cooperation (see 12.4 below).  
 
Appendix 2 contains a list of the remaining 133 RTAs that contain competition 
provisions other than enforcement cooperation, again indicating which of these are in 
the OECD and Cernat datasets. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
322 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm; http://www.sice.oas.org/tradee.asp;  
http://ec.europa/comm/competition/ 
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Table 3: The Dataset of RTAs Containing Enforcement Cooperation by Period 
 
 
12.3 ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION AGREEMENTS BETWEEN COMPETITION 
AUTHORITIES 
 
The only significant dataset of Competition Enforcement Agreements (CEAs) published 
to date is that compiled by Holmes et. al., who listed 22 agreements.323 These have been 
supplemented through targeted searches of the OECD, UNCTAD, and ICN web sites.324 
 
In addition, two regional initiatives have compiled information on the RTAs and CEAs 
containing competition provisions signed by member countries, and these yielded 
copies of and/or references to further agreements: 
1. The APEC Competition Policy and Law Database, which is maintained by 
Taiwan.325 One of the categories of information is “International and/or 
                                                           
323 Holmes et. al. undated,  Annex 2, pp. 89-91. 
 
324 See http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,3373,en_2649_37463_1_1_1_1_37463,00.html; 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/StartPage.asp?intItemID=2239&lang=1;www.internationalcompetition
network.org. 
 
325 See Introduction to the APEC Competition Policy and Law Database, at  
www.epeccp.org.tw/about.html  
 
Period Agreements Total 
1957-
1989 
EC 1958; EFTA 1960  2 
1990-
1994 
ANDEAN Community Decision 285 1991; EEA 1994; NAFTA 1994; 
WAEMU 1994 
4 
1995-
1999 
EC-Turkey 1996; Canada-Israel 1997; Canada-Chile 1997; Chile-Mexico 
1999; CEMAC 1/99 
5 
2000-
2004 
CARICOM Protocol VIII 2000; EC-Mexico 2000; Israel-Mexico 2000; 
EC-South Africa 2000; EFTA-Mexico 2001; NZ-Singapore 2001; Japan-
Singapore- 2002; Canada-Costa Rica 2002; SACU 2002; Algeria-EC 
2002; Chile-EC 2003; EFTA-Singapore 2003; Australia-Singapore 2003; 
Chile-EFTA 2004; Chile-Korea 2004; Chile-US 2004; Singapore-US 
2004; COMESA Regs 2004 
18 
2005-
2007 
Australia-US 2005; Japan-Mexico 2005; Australia-Thailand 2005; NZ-
Thailand 2005;Brunei-Chile-NZ-Singapore 2006; Korea-Singapore 2006; 
Panama-Singapore 2006; EFTA-Korea 2006; EFTA-Lebanon 2006; 
Japan-Philippines 2006; Japan-Thailand 2007; Chile-Japan 2007 
12 
  41 
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bilateral cooperation arrangements”, including “agreements, arrangements, 
memoranda, letters of understanding, and other relevant documents.” 
2. A Free Trade Agreement of the Americas Inventory of Competition 
Agreements in the Americas, dated March 22, 2002, submitted by the OAS 
Trade Unit to the FTAA Negotiating Group on Competition Policies.326  
 
In addition, publications describing competition policy in specific regions were drawn 
on. First were two publications by Yacheivstova (2000a, 2000b) on competition policy 
cooperation amongst members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Secondly, 
a recent book by Dabbar on competition law in the Middle East concluded that: “A 
noticeable absence from the Middle East competition law scene is specific bilateral 
cooperation agreements.”327 Dabbar states that Israel has only one bilateral agreement, 
the 1999 Agreement with the US, and that Turkey has no such agreements (p. 69 and 
107). The dataset compiled in this chapter includes the US-Israel agreement, and it 
seems unlikely, therefore, that there are additional CEAs in the Middle East that have 
been omitted.  
 
Finally, a search was conducted on the web sites of key node countries - the USA, EC, 
Canada, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Australia, Korea, and New Zealand - that yielded 
additional agreements. 
 
A small number of agreements were located that were not available to the author in 
English. These are virtually all amongst members of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, and include the 1993 CIS Treaty on the Implementation of a Coordinated 
Competition Policy, and the 1999 CIS Regulations on the Mechanism of Cooperation in 
Competition Policy. On the basis of descriptions in Yacheivstova 2000a and 2000b, the 
1999 Regulations have been included in the dataset. The 1993 Treaty appears to be 
primarily concerned with rapprochement of antimonopoly laws, and it is not clear 
whether it extends to enforcement cooperation; it has not, therefore, been included. 
 
With respect to bilateral agreements amongst CIS members, the APEC Competition 
Policy and Law Database, and the Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service refer to 21 
                                                           
326 See www.ftaa-alca.org/ngroups/NGCP/Publications/Treaty_e.asp 
 
327 Dabbar, 2007, p. 316. Dabbar states that Israel has only one bilateral agreement, the 1999 Agreement 
with the US (p. 69), and that Turkey has no such agreements (p. 107). 
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CEAs that Russia is party to, only 8 of which are available in English and have been 
included in the dataset. There are also a small number of other CEAs amongst CIS 
members referred to by Yacheivstova that are not part of this database.328 
 
In compiling a composite dataset from all these sources, one of the issues is a lack of 
independence among agreements. In a number of instances, more than one agreement is 
listed between the same pair of signatories (e.g. EC-US, Canada-US, Australia-New 
Zealand). In nearly all cases, the later agreement supplements rather than replaces the 
earlier agreement, so both are included. In a small number of cases, however, this is not 
the case. Following Smith (2000), in order not to increase the lack of independence, 
agreements that have subsequently been superseded or encompassed by later 
agreements have been excluded. These include two agreements signed by New Zealand 
– the 1994 Australia-New Zealand agreement, and the 1997 New Zealand-Taiwan 
agreement - that have been explicitly replaced by later agreements. In addition, three 
agreements amongst countries that later joined the EC have also been omitted. These are 
the 1996 agreements between Estonia-Lithuania-Latvia; Latvia-Lithuania; and 
Lithuania-Poland. It is presumed that the cooperation these agreements provided for – 
which was at level 3 and 4 – has been overtaken by these countries’ membership of the 
European Competition Network and the much deeper level of cooperation this entails.  
 
Finally, in a few cases, an RTA contains some basic references to competition 
enforcement cooperation, but details are contained in an Implementing Agreement 
promulgated at the same time e.g. the Economic Partnership Agreements between Japan 
and Mexico, and Japan and the Philippines. Only the Implementing Agreements have 
been included in the dataset.  
 
The final dataset compiled for this research comprises a total of 51 CEAs. These are 
listed in Table 4, grouped by five year time period (with the exception of the initial 
period, which covers 1970-1989 due to the paucity of agreements prior to 1990).  
They are also listed in Table 5 at the end of this chapter, which indicates which of the 
CEAs was included in the Holmes et. al. dataset.  
  
 
 
                                                           
328 Yacheivstova 2000b, p. 5. 
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Table 4: The Dataset of Competition Enforcement Agreements by Period 
 
 
12.4 A BLENDED DATASET OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT 
AGREEMENTS 
 
In order to measure the depth of cooperation by country, in the presence of more than 
one relevant type of international agreement, it is necessary to aggregate across 
instruments. Therefore, a combined dataset has been produced of agreements providing 
for international cooperation in enforcing competition policies – a simple combination 
of the agreements listed in Tables 3 and 4 above.  
 
A possible objection to combining enforcement cooperation provisions in RTAs with 
similar provisions in CEAs is the different status of RTAs and (some) CEAs in 
international law. For instance, Slaughter notes that there is a fundamental difference 
between intergovernmental cooperation - formal state-to-state Treaties that can create 
                                                           
329 Sweden joined the agreement in 2004. 
 
330 Supersedes the 1997 NZ-Taipei agreement. 
 
Period Agreements Total 
1970-
1989 
Germany-US 1976; Australia-US 1982 2 
1990-
1994 
EC-US 1991  1 
1995-
1999 
Canada-US 1995; Australia-Taipei 1996; China-Russia 1996; Lithuania-
Ukraine 1996;  Hungary-Russia 1997; EC-US 1998; Australia-US 1999; 
Brazil-US 1999; Israel-US 1999; Japan-US 1999; Canada-EC 1999; 
Australia-PNG 1999; China-Kazakhstan 1999; Korea-Russia 1999; CIS 
Regulations 1999 
15 
2000-
2004 
Mexico-US 2000; Australia-Canada-NZ 2000; Canada-Mexico 2001; 
Denmark-Iceland-Norway 2001;329 Canada-Chile 2001; Brazil-Russia 
2001; Australia-Korea 2002; Australia-NZ-Taiwan 2002;330 Australia-Fiji 
2002; ECA Mergers Guide 2002; Australia-NZ-UK 2003; Canada-UK 
2003; CIS-Korea-Latvia-Romania 2003; EC-Japan 2003; ECN (Reg 
1/2003); Mexico-Russia 2003; Bolivia-Russia 2003; Canada-US 2004; 
France-Taiwan 2004; Korea-Mexico 2004; EC-Korea 2004; Russia-
Sweden 2004; China-EC 2004  
23 
2005-
2007 
Canada-Japan 2005; Korea-Turkey 2005; Romania-Turkey 2005; 
Australia-NZ 2006; Canada -Korea 2006; Albania-Greece 2006; 
Armenia-Moldova 2007; Australia-New Zealand 2007; Mongolia-Taiwan 
2007; Portugal-Turkey 2008 
10 
  51 
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binding obligations - and transgovernmental cooperation - agreements between 
government agencies rather than between states themselves.331 Slaughter states that 
agency-to-agency agreements have no formal recognition in international law. RTAs are 
clearly intergovernmental agreements. CEAs, on the other hand, may or may not be. 
While it might be assumed that a CEA is an agency-to-agency agreement, in fact - as 
discussed in Chapter 14 (section 14.7) when analyzing the relationship between depth of 
cooperation and the legal form of the agreement - a number of CEAs appear to be 
government-to-government agreements. Clearly, from this perspective, it is valid to 
combine these CEAs with RTAs in a single dataset. 
 
Furthermore, in nearly all cases, the competition policy chapter of an RTA is 
specifically excluded from the dispute resolution provisions in that RTA. Even where 
this is not the case, such as in the EC-Turkey RTA, the positive comity clause in Article 
43 states that nothing in that Article limits the discretion of the parties.332 Some 
agreements provide for consultations in the event of disputes, but no binding 
mechanism. Only in the deepest agreements providing for vertical integration, are the 
competition provisions subject to resolution through a regional court e.g. the EC, EFTA, 
and WAEMU. This renders the competition provisions in nearly all RTAs of a non-
binding character. No CEA contains these types of deep cooperation. There is also the 
fact that Competition Authorities, at least, appear to take CEAs more seriously than 
competition chapters in RTAs.333 This is likely due to the fact that Competition 
Authorities are actively involved in negotiating CEAs, and in many or all cases will 
have initiated the agreement. Competition chapters in RTAs, on the other hand, are 
typically negotiated by trade officials, and Competition Authorities may at times have 
little involvement.  
 
Therefore, where enforcement cooperation in a CEA and in an RTA is described in 
similar terms, such as in a notification or a positive comity clause, it is valid to consider 
them to be an equivalent indication of the depth of cooperation. Both are typically soft-
                                                           
331 Slaughter 2004. International Competition Network 2006, p. 7, labels them as either “agency to agency 
agreements” or “jurisdiction to jurisdiction agreements.” 
 
332 The Japan-Mexico Implementing Agreement on Competition states in Article 12.3: “Nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prejudice the policy or legal position of either Party regarding any issue 
related to jurisdiction.” 
 
333 See for instance International Competition Network 2006, p.15; and UNCTAD 2005, p. xvi. 
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law, not hard law instruments. In recognition of the difference between soft and hard 
law instruments, in some of the statistical analysis in Chapter 14, level 7 agreements (as 
a proxy for hard law instruments) are both included and omitted to test the sensitivity of 
the results. 
 
Turning to the dating of agreements, for CEAs the date of the agreement is taken from 
the date of signature, and for RTAs it is the date the agreement entered into force. The 
date of signature can typically be found in the text of each CEA. This is not the case for 
RTAs, and the most readily available data is entry into force e.g. as found on the 
WTO’s web site. However, because CEAs generally enter into force on the date of 
signature, in practice the two treatments converge. For RTAs, the fact that there is 
generally a lag between date of signature and entry into force reflects the fact that in 
many countries RTAs can only enter into force following domestic legislative 
authorisation. 
 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties have not been incorporated directly in this dataset. As 
discussed in Chapter 9, many countries do not have criminal sanctions for anti-
competitive conduct, and few Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties explicitly cover 
competition policy. In general, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties are motivated by 
broader criminal justice objectives rather than competition policy enforcement, and it is 
appropriate therefore not to incorporate them as a generic category in this dataset. A 
small number of RTA Competition Chapters briefly refer to cooperation by means of 
mutual legal assistance.334 However, it is not clear from the text whether there is a 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in place between them, and these references have not 
influenced the rating of these agreements. 
 
The 92 agreements are considered likely to comprise a high proportion of all the 
agreements in existence. For RTAs, the visibility of these instruments, and the existence 
of multiple databases that attempt to compile complete inventories, provides confidence 
that few RTAs containing provisions on competition enforcement cooperation are not 
included in this dataset.  
 
The dataset of CEAs is not as complete. This is the first attempt the author is aware of 
to compile a complete inventory. As noted in the previous section, there are at least 13 
                                                           
334 For example, NAFTA, Canada-Israel 1997, Canada-Chile 1997, and Chile-Mexico 1999. 
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CEAs Russia is party to, and a small number of agreements involving other CIS 
members, that are omitted because the text is not available in English. However, 
because of the existence of regional inventories in Asia-Pacific and the Americas, of 
Competition Authority web sites, of the activities of the OECD, UNCTAD, and the 
ICN, and of a large literature on international competition policy cooperation, we can be 
reasonably confident that the dataset is fairly complete outside the CIS countries. It may 
not be unreasonable to suggest that the total number of RTAs and CEAs providing for 
competition enforcement cooperation is in the range of 125 - 150. This would mean the 
sample compiled here represents 61% - 74% of all agreements. 
 
This dataset will be used in the next two chapters both to measure international 
cooperation in this domain, and to conduct statistical analysis of the relationship 
between depth of enforcement cooperation and predictor variables, in order to test the 
propositions and hypotheses set out in Chapters 7 and 11. 
 
12.5 MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENTS 
 
As described in Chapter 9, there are a number of plurilateral and multilateral agreements 
and instruments providing for international cooperation in competition policy – 
although there is no multilateral agreement imposing general obligations in competition 
law. The term multilateral is used here as shorthand, and includes plurilateral 
agreements signed by countries outside the context of an RTA (or CEA).  
 
The multilateral instruments assembled here are not intended to be comprehensive, 
although they are intended to be representative of the complete set of such instruments. 
The purpose of including them is to provide a broad indication of the type and depth of 
cooperation they contain, and to allow a point of comparison with the depth of 
cooperation in RTAs and CEAs. More fine-grained analysis of these instruments is 
possible, but is left for a future exercise.  
The multilateral instruments comprise: 
1. Successive OECD Recommendations on Restrictive Business Practices and 
on Hard Core Cartels – specifically, the 1967, 1973, 1986, and 1995 
Recommendations on Restrictive Business Practices, the 1998 
Recommendation on Hard-Core Cartels, and the 2000 Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises. 
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2. The UNCTAD Set. 
3. The UNCTAD Model Competition Law.  
4. The 1960 GATT Decision on Arrangements for Consultations on Restrictive 
Business Practices. 
5. The OECD Competition Law and Policy Committee. 
6. The OECD’s “Competition Assessment Toolkit” which provides a general 
methodology for identifying unnecessary restraints and developing 
alternative, less restrictive policies that still achieve government objectives; 
and the APEC-OECD Integrated Checklist for self-assessment on 
competition (and regulatory and market openness) policies.335 
7. OECD and UNCTAD peer review of competition policies. 
8. The OECD Global Competition Forum. 
9. The APEC non-binding Principles to Enhance Competition Policy and 
Regulatory Reform.336 
10. The WTO Committee on Competition Policy.  
11. Good Practice Guidelines promulgated by the International Competition 
Network, such as those relating to merger notification and review.337  
 
In the next chapter, the competition-related provisions in RTAs and CEAs are ranked 
against the indices of jurisdictional integration with respect to competition policy 
described in Chapter 10. The focus is on measuring the depth of international 
cooperation in enforcing competition laws. In addition, some preliminary analysis is 
presented of the depth of integration of prescriptive jurisdiction in RTAs, and of the 
depth of the different dimensions of jurisdiction in multilateral instruments. 
 
                                                           
335 The toolkit is at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/38/0,3343,en_2649_40381664_39680550_1_1_1_37463,00.html The 
checklist is at APEC-OECD Integrated Checklist for self-assessment on regulatory, competition and market 
openness policies, to implement the APEC and OECD principles. 
 
336 See http://www.apec.org/apec/leaders__declarations/1999/attachment_-_apec.html 
 
337 See 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference_5th_capetown_2006/Impleme
ntationHandbookApril2006.pdf 
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Table 5: Comparison of Datasets of International Agreements Containing General 
Competition Law Provisions 
 
 
 
Agreement 
 
Year 338 
 
In 
Holmes 
et al 
undated 
 
In OECD 
2006 
 
In 
Cernat 
2005 
A. Competition Enforcement 
Agreements 
    
Germany-US 1976 √   
Australia-US 1982 √   
EC-US  1991 √   
Canada-US 1995 √   
Australia-Taipei 1996 √   
China-Russia 1996    
Lithuania-Ukraine 1996    
Hungary-Russian Federation  1997    
EC-US 1998 √   
Australia-US 1999 √   
Brazil-US 1999 √   
Israel-US 1999 √   
US-Japan 1999 √   
Canada-EC 1999 √   
Australia-Papua New Guinea 1999 √   
China-Kazakhstan 1999    
Korea-Russia 1999    
CIS Regulations 1999    
Mexico-US 2000    
Australia-Canada- NZ 2000    
Canada-Mexico 2001 √   
Denmark-Iceland-Norway  2001    
Canada-Chile 2001 √   
Brazil-Russia 2001 √   
Australia-Korea 2002 √   
Australia-NZ-Taiwan 2002    
Australia-Fiji 2002 √   
ECA Mergers Guide 2002    
Australia-NZ-UK 2003    
Canada-UK 2003 √   
CIS-Korea-Latvia-Romania 2003    
EC-Japan 2003 √   
European Competition Network 
(Regulation 1/2003) 
2003    
Mexico-Russian Federation 2003    
Bolivia- Russian Federation 2003    
Canada-US 2004 √   
France-Taiwan  2004    
Korea -Mexico 2004    
EC-Korea  2004    
                                                           
338 While CEAs are dated by their date of signature, for RTAs the date of entry into force is the more 
usual method of recording, and is more readily available e.g. on the WTO and Tuck web sites. 
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Agreement 
 
Year   
 
In 
Holmes 
et al 
undated 
 
In OECD 
2006 
 
In 
Cernat 
2005 
Russian Federation-Sweden 2004    
China-EC 2004    
Canada -Japan  2005    
Korea -Turkey 2005 √   
Romania-Turkey 2005    
Australia-NZ 2006    
Canada-Korea  2006    
Albania-Greece  2006    
Armenia-Moldova 2007    
Australia-New Zealand 2007    
Mongolia-Taiwan  2007    
Portugal-Turkey  2008    
     
TOTAL Competition Enforcement 
Agreements 
51 21339 - - 
     
B. RTAs Containing Provisions on 
Competition Enforcement 
Cooperation 
    
EC 1958   √ 
EFTA 1960  √  
ANDEAN Group 
(Decision 285) 
1991  √ √ 
EEA 1994  √  
NAFTA 1994  √  
WAEMU 1994  √  
EC-Turkey 1996   √ 
Canada-Israel 1997    
Canada-Chile 1997  √  
Chile-Mexico 1999  √ √ 
CEMAC Reg. 1/99 1999    
CARICOM Protocol VIII 2000   √ 
EC-Mexico 2000  √  
Israel-Mexico 2000  √ √ 
EC-South Africa 2000  √  
EFTA-Mexico 2001  √ √ 
NZ-Singapore 2001  √  
Japan-Singapore 2002  √ √ 
Canada-Costa Rica 2002  √ √ 
SACU 2002   √ 
Algeria-EC 2002   √ 
Chile-EC 2003  √  
EFTA-Singapore 2003  √ √ 
Australia-Singapore 2003  √ √ 
Chile-EFTA 2004   √ 
Chile-Korea 2004  √ √ 
Chile-US 2004  √  
Singapore-US 2004  √ √ 
                                                           
339 The twenty-second agreement in Holmes et al, NZ-Taipei 1996, was replaced by the 2002 Australia-
NZ-Taiwan agreement. 
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Agreement 
 
Year   
 
In 
Holmes 
et al 
undated 
 
In OECD 
2006 
 
In 
Cernat 
2005 
COMESA Regs 2004    
Australia-US 2005  √  
Japan-Mexico 2005  √ √ 
Australia-Thailand 2005  √ √ 
NZ-Thailand 2005    
Brunei-Chile-NZ-Singapore 2006  √  
Korea-Singapore 2006  √  
Panama-Singapore 2006    
EFTA-Korea 2006    
Japan-Philippines 2006    
EFTA-Lebanon 2007    
Japan-Thailand 2007    
Chile-Japan 2007    
     
TOTAL RTAs 41  25 18 
TOTAL CEAs and RTAs containing 
provisions on Competition 
Enforcement Cooperation 
 
92 
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Chapter 13 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
MEASURING THE DEPTH OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN 
COMPETITION POLICY 
 
 
In this chapter, international competition policy cooperation agreements are ranked 
against the indices of jurisdictional integration derived in chapter 10. This allows the 
generation of summary descriptive statistics on the depth of policy cooperation in 
international competition policy.  
 
The focus is on enforcement cooperation, utilizing the combined dataset of 92 CEAs 
and RTA Competition Policy Chapters compiled in Chapter 12. The texts of these 92 
agreements are ranked on an index of enforcement cooperation.  
 
In four instances, the texts of the agreements were unavailable in English, and 
publications by recognized competition policy experts were used to rate them. With 
respect to WAEMU, a detailed description of its provisions in Jenny and Horna 2005, 
which clearly indicates its vertically integrated character, was used to rate this 
agreement at level 7 on the index of enforcement cooperation. Similarly, for the 1999 
CEMAC Regulations, and the 2004 COMESA Regulations on competition, the 
descriptions in UNCTAD 2008 of the competencies of the regional enforcement bodies 
indicates these are level 7 agreements. For the 1999 CIS Regulations, descriptions of 
their provisions in Yacheivstova (2000a, 2000b) were drawn on. In addition, through 
email communication with the author, Yacheivstova indicated that in her view the 1999 
Regulations, while containing a clause resembling positive comity, fall short of OECD-
style positive comity, and the agreement should be rated at level 4 on the index – and it 
has been rated accordingly.340 
 
Summary descriptive statistics are presented in this chapter, and the dataset is used to  
test the descriptive propositions concerning international competition policy  
                                                           
340 Email communication with Nataliya Yacheivstova of 25 August 2008. 
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cooperation that were identified in Chapter 11. In Chapter 14, statistical analysis is 
conducted using depth of enforcement cooperation primarily as the dependent variable 
to test selected hypotheses about the causes of international economic policy 
cooperation. 
 
Limited measurements are also reported in this chapter of the depth of prescriptive 
jurisdictional integration in RTAs and CEAs, and the depth of cooperation in 
multilateral instruments, in order to illustrate how the concept of jurisdictional 
integration enables the identification and comparison of new “families” of agreements.   
 
13.1 RANKING AGREEMENTS BY DEPTH OF ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION 
 
Recall that Chapter 10 developed separate indices of non-judicial and judicial 
enforcement cooperation with respect to competition policy. Because in practice, the 
agreements are largely confined to non-judicial enforcement measures, for practical 
purposes it is easier to collapse the two indices into a single index of enforcement 
cooperation. The main examples of judicial enforcement cooperation are the RTAs that 
establish a regional court with jurisdiction in competition policy cases – these are 
included here in a redefined level 7 on the enforcement cooperation index. The blended 
enforcement cooperation index is reproduced in summary form in Box 8.   
 
 
Box 8: The Index of International Enforcement Cooperation in 
Competition Policy 
 
Level 1: Informal cooperation 
 
Level 2: Cooperation short of notification 
 
Level 3: Basic notification  
 
Level 4: Detailed mutual enforcement cooperation  
 
Level 5: Positive comity  
 
Level 6: Advanced jurisdictional interface rule.   
 
Level 7: Third party enforcement (non-judicial and judicial) 
 
 
As noted previously, the influence of the OECD Recommendations, and of key bilateral 
agreements, has resulted in a high degree of clarity around the concepts and terminology 
in this area, and a degree of uniformity across different international agreements. This 
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facilitates the identification of discrete levels of jurisdictional integration, and the 
reliable coding of agreements against the indices. For instance, the concepts of 
notification, and of positive comity, are well defined, and there are standard clauses in 
many agreements that implement these forms of cooperation.  
 
In addition, there is a consistent progression of cooperation provisions in these 
agreements. That is, in nearly all cases, agreements coded level 5 or 6 contain 
cooperation provisions from all the lower cooperation levels as well - such as 
notification (level 3) and case coordination (level 4). With one exception (the Denmark-
Iceland-Norway Agreement of 2001), all agreements in the dataset rated at level 6 
contain a positive comity clause (level 5).  
 
Nevertheless, as is inevitable when ranking a large number of examples on a single 
scale, there are instances where boundary issues arise and where some further 
clarification of category definitions is required. Box 9 contains some further notes on 
the coding of the 92 agreements. 
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Box 9: Notes on Coding Agreements by Depth of Enforcement Cooperation 
 
• In practice, a key cooperation threshold is a provision that one Competition Authority 
will notify another of enforcement action it is taking that may impact on the interests 
of the other Competition Authority (level 3). If an agreement does not provide for 
notification, it is coded level 2 - with just two exceptions, EC-Turkey and EC-South 
Africa, each of which contains a positive comity clause, and which are coded level 5. 
• Most agreements at level 2 provide for forms of cooperation that are clearly not case-
specific, such as technical cooperation, or sharing of information on laws and 
enforcement concepts. In a small number of cases, however, an agreement that is 
coded level 2 suggests a limited form of case cooperation – such as “exchanging 
investigation cases if possible” (China-Russia), or “exchanging experience in 
handling cases” (China-Kazakhstan, Korea-Russia, and Australia-Fiji). However, 
none of these agreements refers to notification, and they are therefore coded level 2. 
• As noted in chapter 10, any agreement that goes beyond a one word or one sentence 
reference to notification of enforcement action, or to case coordination, and provides 
some details with respect to how or when notification or case coordination should 
occur, is coded at least at level 4. 
• To be rated level 5 an agreement must contain the standard positive comity clause.  
• A small number of agreements contain a three-word reference to “mutual legal 
assistance” e.g. NAFTA, and the Canada-Chile, Canada-Israel, and Chile-Mexico 
RTAs; or refer to the existence of an MLAT between the signatories e.g. Australia-
US 2004. The references to mutual legal assistance have not influenced the ratings for 
the reasons discussed in Chapter 9.3.4. 
• While the language in agreements varies, for example from “shall notify” or “will 
notify” to “may notify”, these are regarded as representing a broadly similar level of 
obligation, given that virtually all these agreements are explicitly non-binding e.g. not 
subject to the dispute resolution provisions in the RTA. 
• No agreements are rated at level 1, which by definition means the absence of any 
formal cooperation agreement. Level 1 may be useful for other research purposes, 
and is in the index for completeness. 
• Provisions for non-discrimination in enforcing competition laws, or to establish or 
ensure the independence of a Competition Authority, are considered to be policy 
commitments (prescriptive jurisdictional integration), not enforcement cooperation. 
 
 
13.2 SUMMARY DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Figures 6 and 7 are relative frequency bar graphs of the two instrument types, showing 
the distribution of agreements across levels 2-7 on the index of enforcement 
jurisdictional integration (EJI).  
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In each case, the mode of the distribution is level 4, the median is also level 4, and the 
range is the same (levels 2-7).  
 
The distribution of CEAs is more peaked at level 4, however, and the right tails of the 
distributions are radically different. There are no RTAs at level 6, a level that entails 
deep cooperation between officials in national anti-trust agencies of a kind that is 
difficult to agree to in multi-sector negotiations led by trade and foreign affairs officials. 
 
There are, however, 8 RTAs at level 7 (third party enforcement). This reflects the fact 
that these RTAs are intended to achieve particularly deep and broad economic 
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integration. Concern that private impediments to trade may frustrate this objective led 
these governments to sacrifice significant formal autonomy in competition policy 
enforcement.  
 
In practice, however, there was a lack of national enforcement capacity in common 
markets and economic unions at the time they were first negotiated. Even with respect 
to the EC, at the time of the Treaty of Rome most member states lacked a national 
competition authority (see Jenny 2005, p. 285). It remains the case today that, in the 
vertically integrated RTAs amongst developing countries, most of the member states 
lack competition authorities at the national level, and many also do not have a national 
competition law (Jenny 2005). Agreement to supranational law in these situations is not 
a substitute for national law, but fills a gap. As capacity in competition law enforcement 
is developed at the national level, the nature of the relationship between national and 
regional jurisdictions in these RTAs will need to be resolved.   
 
Stand-alone agreements between Competition Authorities, however, are carefully 
negotiated within existing domestic legal mandates, and, with only one exception, do 
not entail third party enforcement. The one exception proves the rule: the European 
Competition Network, which is a competition-policy specific agreement between 
Competition Authorities and the EC Competition Directorate (and therefore classified 
here as a CEA rather than an RTA), is an extension of a prior level 7 RTA.   
 
There is a variety of relationships between RTAs and CEAs, as follows: 
There are many instances where there is an RTA between two signatories that contains 
enforcement cooperation provisions, but no CEA between them. 
• There are many instances where there is an RTA between two signatories that 
contains enforcement cooperation provisions, but no CEA between them. 
• There are some instances where enforcement cooperation between two or more 
signatories is dealt with both in an RTA and a subsequent CEA e.g. EC Treaty 
of Rome and the ECN; the EEA 1994 and the 2002 European Competition 
Association Mergers Protocol; NAFTA and the three bilateral CEAs between 
the US, Canada, and Mexico; the 1997 Canada-Chile RTA and 2001 CEA.  
• There are some instances where an RTA contains limited provisions on 
competition policy, but nothing on enforcement cooperation, leaving the latter to 
an Implementing Agreement e.g. Japan-Singapore, Japan-Thailand, Japan-
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Mexico, Japan-Philippines. The Implementing Agreements have been rated as 
RTAs rather than CEAs because they appear to have been negotiated in most 
cases at the same time as the RTA and they cover other policy domains as well. 
• There are a number of instances where there is a CEA between two signatories, 
but no RTA e.g. eight of the CEAs are between G7 countries such as the US, 
Japan, and Canada, or between such countries and the EC, but there is only one 
RTA (NAFTA) involving these parties. 
• For only one country pair, a CEA preceded an RTA containing competition 
enforcement provisions - the CEAs between the US and Australia of 1982 and 
1999 preceded the 2004 RTA. 
 
Table 6 displays all 92 agreements by type, by depth of enforcement cooperation 
(Enforcement Jurisdictional Integration, or EJI), and by whether or not the agreement 
was prior to the year 2000. 
 
The depth of enforcement cooperation in the aggregate, as measured by this index of 
jurisdictional integration, has increased over time. There are 63 agreements in the nine 
years from 2000-2008, whereas there were only 29 agreements in the entire period prior 
to 2000 i.e. since the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the earliest agreement in the dataset. CEAs 
are somewhat unevenly distributed across the two time periods - 18 CEAs pre-2000 and 
33 in 2000-2008, an increase of 83%. However, there was an increase of 173% in the 
number of RTAs containing competition enforcement provisions between the two 
periods (30 compared to 11 pre-2000), reflecting the large increase in the overall 
number of RTAs negotiated over the last decade (Crawford and Fiorentino 2005). 
 
In terms of the average depth of agreements, there was a reduction in the later period. In 
the period prior to 2000, the median agreement was level 5 and the mode was level 4, 
while in 2000-2008 the median was level 4 and the mode was level 2. RTAs accounted 
for nearly all this change, reflecting in particular the large number of shallow FTAs in 
the most recent period, and to a lesser extent, the larger number of deep level 7 
agreements in the earlier period.  
 
However, while the average depth fell, there is a clear tendency for earlier agreements 
to be supplemented or replaced by deeper agreements between the same signatories. In 
every case except two, where an initial CEA or RTA chapter has been supplemented by 
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Table 6: Competition Agreements by Type, Depth of Cooperation, and Year 
 
Depth 
of EJI 
Competition Enforcement Agreements RTA Chapters 
2 Pre-2000: China-Russia; Hungary-Russia; 
China-Kazakhstan; Korea-Russia 
 
2000 and later: Brazil-Russia;  
CIS-Korea-Latvia-Romania;  
Australia-Fiji; Mexico-Russia;  
Bolivia-Russia; Russia-Sweden;  
China-EC; Romania-Turkey;  
Albania-Greece;  
Mongolia-Taiwan; Portugal-Turkey 
Pre-2000: Chile-Mexico 
 
 
2000 and later: Australia-Singapore; 
EFTA-Singapore; NZ-Singapore; 
SACU; Korea-Singapore;  
Singapore-US; Chile-Japan;  
Panama-Singapore;  
Japan-Philippines; EFTA-Lebanon 
3 Pre-2000: Lithuania-Ukraine  
 
2000 and later: EC-Korea;  
France-Taiwan; Korea-Turkey  
Pre-2000: US-Canada-Mexico 
(NAFTA); Canada-Israel; Canada-
Chile 
 
 
2000 and later: Australia-Thailand; 
US-Chile; NZ-Thailand;  
EFTA-Korea; Japan-Thailand 
4 Pre-2000: Germany-US; Australia-US 
1982; Australia-Taipei; Australia-Papua 
New Guinea; CIS Regs  
 
2000 and later: Canada-Chile; Australia-
Korea; Australia-NZ-Taiwan; ECA 
Mergers Guide; Canada-Korea; Australia-
NZ 2006; Canada-UK; Australia-Canada-
NZ; Australia-NZ-UK; Armenia-
Moldova; Australia-New Zealand 
Pre-2000:  
 
 
2000 and later: Canada-Costa Rica; 
Algeria-EC; Chile-EC; Chile-Korea; 
EC-Mexico; Israel-Mexico; Brunei-
Chile-NZ-Singapore; Japan-
Singapore (implementing agreement) 
5 Pre-2000: EC-US 1991; Canada-US 
1995; Brazil-US; Israel-US; Japan-US; 
Canada-EC  
2000 and later: Canada-Japan; EC-Japan; 
Mexico-US; Canada-Mexico; Korea-
Mexico  
Pre-2000: EC-Turkey 
 
 
2000 and later: Australia-US; EC-
South Africa; Chile-EFTA; EFTA-
Mexico; Japan-Mexico 
6 Pre-2000: EC-US 1998; Australia-US 
1999 
 
2000 and later:  Denmark-Iceland-
Norway;341 Canada-US 2004 
Pre-2000:  
 
 
2000 and later: 
7 2000 and later: EC (ECN 2003) Pre-2000: EC 1957; EFTA; 
ANDEAN Group Decision 285; 
EEA; WAEMU; 
CEMAC Reg. 1/99  
 
2000 and later: CARICOM Protocol 
VIII; COMESA Regs 2004 
TOTAL 51 41 
 
 
                                                           
341 Sweden joined in 2004. 
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a subsequent CEA, the later agreement is as deep, or deeper, than the original. For 
instance: 
• The 1982 Australia-US CEA was level 3, the 1999 CEA was level 6. 
• NAFTA 1994 was level 3, while Canada-US 1995 was level 5, Canada-US 2004 
was level 6, and Mexico-US 2000 and Canada-Mexico 2001 were both level 5. 
• EC-US 1991 was level 5, and their 1998 agreement was at level 6. 
• The Australia-Taiwan agreement of 1996 was level 4, as was the tripartite 
agreement in 2002 between Australia, Taiwan and New Zealand. 
• The New Zealand-Singapore agreement of 2002 is level 2, while the four-
country agreement that New Zealand and Singapore signed in 2005 is level 4. 
• The 2002 Japan-Singapore RTA is level 2, while the Implementing Agreement 
of 2004 is level 4. 
 
The first exception to this rule, that subsequent agreements are at least as deep, is the 
Australia-New Zealand Agreement of 2007. For reasons explained in Chapter 9.4, the 
deep cooperation provisions in the 1994 Agreement were not incorporated in the 2007 
Agreement that replaced it. However, the intention is to amend New Zealand legislation 
in order to make the deep cooperation envisaged in the 1994 Agreement possible in 
practice, and then to amend the 2007 Bilateral Agreement accordingly. 
 
The second exception to the “later is deeper” rule is the 2004 Australia-US RTA, which 
broadened the range of competition cooperation between the two countries, without 
limiting the level of cooperation in their 1999 CEA. 
 
It is also interesting to look at the case of Singapore, which did not have a competition 
law at all until 2007, entering force in August 2008. Prior to that time, Singapore 
preferred to rely on openness to international trade to ensure competitive markets. Partly 
due to international pressure from trading partners, it has, however, negotiated seven 
RTAs containing provisions on competition policy enforcement cooperation since its 
first agreement with New Zealand in 2002. The Singapore-US RTA of 2004 obliged 
Singapore to enact general competition legislation by January 2005 (Article 12.2:1). 
While most of Singapore’s agreements are at level 2, it has negotiated two agreements 
at level 4 (the Agreement between Japan and Singapore implementing the 2002 RTA, 
and the 2006 Brunei-Chile-New Zealand-Singapore RTA). 
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Some agreements explicitly foreshadow the possibility of deepening cooperation over 
time by referring to possible future extensions to the agreement e.g. the reference to a 
possible positive comity clause in the Japan-Thailand RTA, suggesting that this trend 
for formal cooperation to deepen over time may well continue. 
 
Finally, Table 6 also reveals the varying practices of countries in terms of the depth of 
agreements they sign. The US has the highest proportion of deep agreements – 12 out of 
the 17 agreements it has signed are level 5 or higher on the EJI index. Corresponding 
proportions for other signatories are the EC (8 out of 17); EFTA (5 out of 8); Japan (4 
out of 8); Canada (5 out of 13); Australia (2 out of 14); Korea (1 out of 8); Chile (1 out 
of 8); and Russia (0 out of 8). The reasons for the varying practice of countries in 
signing shallow or deep agreements are explored in Chapter 14.  
 
The relationship between the increasing number of international competition policy 
agreements and their depth is discussed further in Chapter 14.4. 
 
Figure 8 is a relative frequency bar graph of the combined dataset of 92 agreements by 
the level of enforcement cooperation. This dataset will be used, in the remainder of this 
chapter and in Chapter 14, to conduct exploratory tests of the descriptive propositions 
and inferential hypotheses about international competition policy cooperation.  
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13.3 IDENTIFYING “FAMILIES” OF AGREEMENTS: A VECTOR APPROACH 
 
The main approach used in the literature to identify “families” of RTAs containing 
competition provisions is to distinguish between “EC-style” agreements and “US-style” 
agreements (OECD 2006). The former are said to contain substantive policy 
cooperation provisions rather than enforcement cooperation provisions, while the 
reverse is the case for US-style agreements – although the two categories are intended to 
be flexible, with some overlap between them. This proposition will be tested in Section 
13.4 below. UNCTAD 2005 (p.x) similarly identifies Canadian and US RTAs, on the 
one hand, and EU RTAs on the other hand. 
 
Other approaches used to identify “families” of RTAs containing competition 
provisions include:  
• By depth of trade integration i.e. stages of economic integration (see Cernat 
2005, pp. 9-11). 
• By country level of development (Cernat 2005, pp. 11-14). 
• By whether an RTA entails horizontal or vertical integration of competition 
policy enforcement (Jenny and Horna 2005). 
• By whether an RTA contains specific substantive competition law provisions 
(Hoekman 1998, The, Prusa and Budetta 2007). 
 
The concept of jurisdictional integration and its different dimensions offers an 
alternative method to identify related families of agreements. First, agreements can be 
classified by whether they predominantly entail cooperation with respect to prescriptive 
jurisdiction, enforcement jurisdiction, or inter-state adjudication jurisdiction, or some 
mix of these. This is broader than the current split between policy cooperation and 
enforcement cooperation families in RTAs. 
 
For example, families could be defined by whether they: 
• Contain provisions solely, or mainly, relating to prescriptive jurisdiction e.g. 
most RTA competition policy chapters. 
• Relate only to enforcement cooperation - virtually all CEAs. 
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• Contain any provisions on inter-state adjudication cooperation beyond 
consultations - a small number of deep RTAs only.  
• Contain all three types of jurisdictional integration - again, a small number of 
deep RTAs only. 
 
Secondly, and more precisely, a vector of the three dimensions can be used to 
summarise the key provisions, provide a new basis for comparison across agreements of 
all types, and identify new “families.” 
 
To this end, an initial assessment of the depth of prescriptive jurisdictional integration, 
and of inter-state adjudication cooperation, has been conducted on all 176 RTAs in 
Table 5 and Appendix 2, on all CEAs, and on the 11 multilateral instruments listed in 
Chapter 12. References in the following paragraphs to the “typical” depth of the 
different dimensions of jurisdictional integration in these instruments should be 
regarded as indicative only, and the individual rating of agreements is not therefore 
reported. The mode of these ratings seems likely to be sufficiently accurate, however, 
for the purposes of identifying essential differences in the way the different dimensions 
of jurisdictional integration are treated in the various instruments.  
 
For example, a vector approach could be used as follows with respect to international 
competition policy cooperation: (6,4,1) describes the level of integration of prescriptive 
jurisdiction, enforcement cooperation, and inter-state adjudication, ranked respectively 
against the indices in Box 4 (p.149), Box 8 (p. 182), and Box 6 (p. 156). This is how the 
Australia-New Zealand arrangements on competition policy would rank on the three 
indices. This rating incorporates the CEAs between the two countries, as well as the 
1998 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Australia and the 
Government of New Zealand on Harmonisation of Business Law, including competition 
law. 
 
The vector summary for the EC would be (8, 7, 5), illustrating that the EC is at the 
highest level of integration on each of these three integration vectors. NAFTA’s rating 
would be (3,4,1).  
 
Similarly: 
• A “typical” CEA – i.e. the modal CEA - would rank (1,4,1). 
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• A “typical” RTA, of those RTAs containing any competition provisions, would 
rank (4,2,1). 
• A “typical” multilateral instrument would rank (2,1,1). 
 
Note that, while the median RTA, of those RTAs containing competition enforcement 
cooperation provisions, is level 4 on the index of enforcement cooperation, the majority 
of RTAs with a competition policy chapter contain no provisions on enforcement 
cooperation (only 41/176, or 23%, do so). The vector summaries (4,4,1) and (4,1,1) 
respectively describe this more precisely. 
 
A vector summary also provides a more precise method of describing the key 
differences between RTAs across regions, such as comparing NAFTA, the EC, CER, 
WAEMU, SACU, APEC, and the ANDEAN Group. It also allows more ready 
comparisons between the same types of international policy cooperation irrespective of 
the instrument in which they are contained. This helps to avoid approaches that purport 
to measure policy cooperation at the country level but which do not incorporate the 
variety of types of international instrument a country may have signed. 
 
It would then be possible to combine the three measures to produce a single quantitative 
rating of the level of international competition policy cooperation. This could prove 
useful for research purposes, with the three elements weighted according to the purpose 
at hand. 
 
13.4 TESTING DESCRIPTIVE PROPOSITIONS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 
POLICY COOPERATION 
 
Chapter 11 set out 8 descriptive propositions about international competition policy 
enforcement cooperation. These are now tested in turn. 
1 The proportion of enforcement cooperation agreements that are between 
OECD member countries is declining (UNCTAD 2003). Using the full 
set of 92 agreements, and dividing it into two time periods (pre-2000 and 
2000-2008), the proportion of agreements where all signatories were 
OECD members at the time of signing was 13/29 pre-2000 (45%), and 
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23/63 (37%) in 2000-2008.342 The proposition is correct, although the 
fall in the proportion is relatively small. Subdividing by instrument type, 
however, reveals a different picture. The proportion of CEAs involving 
only OECD members actually increased between the two periods, from 
44% (8/18) to 55% (18/33), while there was a large fall in the proportion 
of RTAs involving only OECD members (from 45%, 5/11, to 17%, 
5/30). These statistics reflect the fact that RTAs are increasingly between 
countries at different levels of development, intended to exploit different 
areas of comparative advantage, while it remains difficult for 
Competition Authorities in non-OECD countries to sign cooperation 
agreements with OECD countries, for reasons discussed further in 
chapter 14. If one were to measure, instead, the proportion of these RTAs 
and CEAs where at least one signatory was an OECD member, there 
was an increase between the two time periods (from 71% (20/28) to 88% 
(56/64).  
From a different perspective, it has been stated that most OECD 
countries have no international competition policy cooperation 
agreement (OECD 2004, pp. 57-58). However, when both CEAs and 
RTAs are considered, 18 of the current 30 members of the OECD are 
party to either a CEA or an RTA with provisions on competition 
enforcement cooperation. This does not include OECD members 
belonging to the EC that are indirectly party to agreements signed by the 
EC. A number of OECD countries are party to multiple agreements, 
including Australia (14 agreements), the US (13), Canada (13), Korea 
(8), and Japan (8). 
2 The vast majority of bilateral agreements (CEAs) signed so far have the 
US as one of the parties. Over the whole sample, there are only 11/51 
(22%) of CEAs where the US is one of the signatories. If the data is 
divided into three sub-periods (1957-1998, 1999-2002, and 2003-2008), 
the corresponding proportions are 56%, 26%, and 4% (5/9, 5/19, and 
1/23). The statement is therefore incorrect, although the proportion of 
agreements prior to 1999 involving the US did exceed one half. In the 
                                                           
342 The Treaty of Rome is coded as an agreement where all signatories are OECD members, despite the 
fact that the OECD was not established until 1960, because all of the original six EC members were 
founding members of the OECD.  
  
 195  
most recent period, only a very small proportion of CEAs involve the 
US. 
It is interesting to note, however, the preponderance of the deepest 
bilateral agreements (levels 5 and 6) that involve the US as one of the 
signatories. Of the total of 14 such agreements, the US is party to 9 of 
them. Other signatories that are party to more than one such deep 
agreement are Canada (5 agreements), the EC (4), and Japan and Mexico 
(3 each). 
3 RTAs with competition provisions signed by the EC focus on the 
adoption by partner countries of competition rules similar or identical to 
EC laws, but, with few exceptions, do not include detailed enforcement 
cooperation provisions. There are only 7 RTAs with the EC as signatory, 
in the dataset of 41 RTAs containing any competition enforcement 
provisions. There are, however, a total of 37 RTAs signed by the EC that 
contain competition provisions of any kind (including agreements with 
countries that subsequently joined the EC), so that only 19% of these 
contain any enforcement cooperation provisions. The statement is 
therefore accurate. 
4 Agreements signed by developed economies other than the EC mostly 
pursue enforcement cooperation rather than policy convergence. There 
is a total of 52 RTAs, in the combined dataset of 176 RTAs, signed by at 
least one developed country other than the EC (developed economy is 
defined here as corresponding to the 30 advanced economies defined by 
the International Monetary Fund).343 Of these, 27 (52%) contain 
enforcement cooperation of any kind, and 25 RTAs (48%) contain policy 
cooperation provisions but no enforcement cooperation. Given the 
margin of error here, it is probably more accurate to say that agreements 
signed by developed economies other than the EC are approximately 
equally likely to contain provisions on enforcement cooperation and 
policy cooperation.  However, it is certainly correct that, compared to 
RTAs signed by the EC, those signed by other developed countries place 
more emphasis on enforcement cooperation compared to policy 
cooperation (52% compared to 19%). 
                                                           
343 See the World Economic Outlook, 2007, Statistical Appendix, pp. 208-213, at www.imf.org/ 
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5 It is virtually impossible for Less Developed Countries to sign a CEA 
with Developed Countries, there are “only a handful. 15/51 (29%) of 
CEAs are between a developed country and a less developed country.344 
There were none in the period prior to 1999 (0/9), but 37% (7/19) of the 
CEAs signed 1999-2002, and 39% (9/23) of those signed 2003-2008 
were between a developed country and a less developed country. This 
suggests that, while the statement was very much correct prior to 2000, it 
is not correct in the post-2000 period. An interesting question, however, 
is whether there is a relationship between the depth of enforcement 
cooperation and the level of country development of the signatories, 
rather than just the existence or absence of an agreement. This will be 
investigated in Chapter 14. 
6 There are no “hard cooperation” agreements involving less developed 
countries. The literature on hard cooperation, and on second-generation 
competition cooperation agreements, focuses on CEAs, and does not 
typically consider competition policy chapters in RTAs. Hard 
cooperation is defined in at least two ways. The OECD Global Forum on 
Competition defines it as the sharing of confidential information (level 
6), while Zanettin (2002) defines it as either sharing confidential 
information or positive comity i.e. levels 5 and 6. On the more restrictive 
definition, one of the 26 CEAs where at least one of the signatories was a 
less developed country provides for sharing of confidential information – 
the European Competition Network.345 This reflects the unique role of 
EC expansion as a mechanism for modernising less advanced 
neighbouring countries. In addition, hard cooperation arguably should be 
defined to include vertical integration of enforcement (level 7). There are 
5 RTAs that are level 7 agreements between less developed countries, 
and which should therefore be considered to constitute hard cooperation. 
When the definition is expanded to include positive comity (level 5), 
there are 4 CEAs and 5 RTAs signed by less developed countries that  
                                                           
344 The 15 agreements are Brazil-US; Australia-PNG; Korea-Russia; Mexico-US; Canada-Mexico; 
Canada-Chile; Australia-Fiji; CIS-Korea-Latvia-Romania; the European Competition Network; Korea-
Mexico; Russia-Sweden; China-EC; Korea-Turkey; Albania-Greece; and Mongolia-Taiwan. 
 
345 While Regulation 1/2003 establishing the ECN was signed in 2003, prior to the 2004 expansion of the 
EU that brought in a number of developing countries, it came into effect in 2004 and applied immediately 
to the ten new member countries. 
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contain this provision.346 Overall, the proposition is correct if hard 
cooperation is defined as the sharing of confidential information within a 
stand-alone competition agreement. However, it is incorrect when 
vertically integrated agreements are taken into consideration, and is 
further from the mark when a broader definition of hard cooperation is 
employed that includes positive comity. 
7 Comity principles are rarely found in RTAs. Of the 41 RTAs, only 6 
contain a positive comity clause, so the proposition is correct. However, 
5/30 (17%) of the RTAs signed in the period 2000-2007 contain the 
clause, or one in six, so the proposition is perhaps not correct in the most 
recent period. 
8 Some competition chapters in RTAs are as advanced, if not more 
advanced, in their provisions to foster cooperation between competition 
authorities on enforcement matters as second generation inter-agency 
agreements between competition authorities i.e. CEAs. There are 9 
agreements providing for vertically integrated enforcement (level 7). Of 
these, 8 are RTAs, and the ninth, the ECN, is an extension of a prior 
level 7 RTA. At this, deepest level of enforcement cooperation, the 
proposition is clearly correct – in fact, it is an understatement. However, 
there are no RTAs at level 6, while there are 4 CEAs at this level. If 
vertical integration is left to one side, the proposition is incorrect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
346 The 4 CEAs signed by a developing country that contain a positive comity clause are Brazil-US, 
Mexico-US, Canada-Mexico, and Korea-Mexico. Note that three of these involve Mexico, an OECD 
member, while Brazil was offered enhanced engagement with the OECD in 2007 with a view to possible 
membership. The five RTAs signed by developing countries that contain positive comity are EC-Turkey, 
EC-South Africa, EFTA-Mexico, Chile-EFTA, and Japan-Mexico. Note that three of these involve 
Mexico or Turkey, both OECD members. Chile was invited in 2007 to open discussions for OECD 
membership, and South Africa was offered enhanced engagement at the same time with a view to 
possible membership. 
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Chapter 14 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
PREDICTING THE DEPTH OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY 
COOPERATION   
 
 
The apparatus constructed in the thesis so far is now used to conduct some initial tests 
of hypotheses about the causes of international competition policy cooperation. 
 
That is, the new concept of jurisdictional integration, in its different dimensions, has 
been used to construct indices of the depth of international policy cooperation, in terms 
of the impact of cooperation on states’ recognized authority to make and enforce their 
own competition policies independently of other states. A new dataset of international 
agreements containing competition policy provisions has been assembled. The sub-set 
of agreements providing for cooperation in enforcing competition policies has been 
ranked on these indices, and summary descriptive statistics derived on the depth of 
international policy cooperation. Descriptive propositions about international policy 
cooperation from the existing literature have been tested using this data, and a number 
have been found to be less than accurate. 
 
The final step is to conduct exploratory statistical analysis of the relationship between 
the depth of international competition policy cooperation and a range of variables that 
are hypothesized to be good predictors of the depth of international cooperation. This is 
the subject of this chapter. 
 
Recall that a number of general hypotheses about international policy cooperation were 
identified in Chapter 7. Additional hypotheses relating specifically to competition 
policy cooperation were set out in Chapter 11. These hypotheses are now confronted 
with the data. 
 
The unit of analysis is either the international agreement, or the signatory country. 
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14.1 ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION, OECD MEMBERSHIP, AND LEVEL OF 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
The hypothesis in Chapter 7 was that there is a strong positive correlation between a 
country’s depth of international economic policy cooperation and its quality of 
governance. 
 
Recall also that the hypothesis advanced in Chapter 11 was that: 
 
A high proportion of North-South RTAs that contain enforcement cooperation 
provisions, and a high proportion of North-South CEAs, are likely to provide 
only for shallow cooperation, while North-North agreements will on average be 
deeper. 
 
These hypotheses will be tested using two different variables: first, the effect of OECD 
membership on the depth of enforcement cooperation; and secondly, the effect of 
advanced economy status (as defined by the IMF). For an agreement to qualify as a 
North-North agreement, all the signatories will have to be OECD members (in the first 
specification) or advanced economies (in the second specification). Both OECD 
membership and advanced economy status are plausibly correlated with country quality 
of governance, and specifically with the existence and capacity of a country’s 
competition enforcement authority. 
 
Table 7 displays the data with respect to OECD membership. High enforcement 
cooperation is defined initially as a score of 4 and above on the EJI index. 
 
Table 7: Competition Enforcement Cooperation and OECD Membership 
       
Enforcement Cooperation 
  Low Cooperation High Cooperation Total Probability of 
high cooperation  
At least one non-
OECD signatory 
 
35 
 
22 
 
57 
 
.39 
OECD-only 
agreements 
 
4 
 
31 
 
35 
 
.89 
Total No. of 
agreements 
 
39 
 
53 
 
92 
 
 
The estimated conditional probability that enforcement cooperation is high, where both 
or all signatories to an agreement are OECD members, is 0.89. On the other hand, the 
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estimated conditional probability of high enforcement cooperation when at least one 
signatory is a non-OECD member, is only 0.39.  
 
OECD membership, therefore, is a very good predictor of the depth of enforcement 
cooperation. The difference of proportions is .5 (.89-.39), with a standard error of .08. A 
95% confidence interval for the true difference is (.34, .66). In other words, we can be 
95% confident that the true difference of proportions is between .34 and .66. 
 
But this confidence interval assumes that the population from which the sample data is 
drawn is very large, in fact infinite, whereas we can be confident that n = 92 is a large 
proportion of the total number of relevant agreements in existence. From the discussion 
in Chapter 12.4, we assume the “true” population to be 150. Adjusting for the finite 
population correction factor (√ N – n / N - 1), the adjusted 95% confidence interval for 
the true difference is (.4, .6). It is highly probable that the difference of proportions is at 
least 40 percentage points. 
 
A further consideration is that, for the confidence interval to be reliable, there needs to 
be a large number of observations, so that we can assume that the data are normally 
distributed. The total number of agreements in the dataset is 92, and when sub-divided 
into OECD-only agreements and other agreements, the sample sizes are only 35 and 57 
respectively. It is sometimes suggested that a sample size of 30 is the minimum required 
for the central limit theorem to hold, and therefore for standard large sample statistical 
methods to be employed. However, in order to test the robustness of the apparently very 
strong relationship between OECD membership and the depth of enforcement 
cooperation, it is prudent to employ an additional statistical technique that does not rely 
on an assumption that the data are normally distributed.  
 
The 92 agreements are therefore assumed to be a sample from a hypergeometric 
distribution. In formal terms, the hypergeometric distribution is a discrete probability 
distribution that describes the number of successes in a sequence of n draws from a 
finite population without replacement. In layman’s terms, the hypergeometric 
distribution is from a finite population in which there are two possible outcomes, 
“success” and “failure” - or in this case, “OECD-only agreement” and “other 
agreement” - and where the probability of success/failure is different in each case.   
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In this case, we know the observed distribution, but not the total population of 
agreements or the “true” distribution. In this situation, a Bayesian approach is used. An 
assumption is made about the distribution of each of the two types of agreement in the 
total population of agreements. The actual observed probability is then used to compute 
the posterior probability that the number of OECD-only agreements equals a specific 
value, using Bayes’ Theorem. In this case, the a priori assumed distribution is the flat 
distribution i.e. each of the possible combinations of OECD-only and other agreements 
is assumed to be equally likely. This “non-informative prior” is the appropriate prior to 
use, because it is generally felt that it “lets the data speak the loudest” i.e. imposes prior 
beliefs on the actual data less than other approaches. 
 
In this case, we cannot compute the mean and other parameters, and simulation must be 
used. We again assume that the total population of agreements in existence is 150, and 
we further assume they are distributed 60/90 between OECD-only agreements and other 
agreements, which approximates the relative number of the two types in the actual 
sample. We use Bayes’ Theorem to compute the posterior probabilities that the number 
of OECD-only agreements equals a specific value. If we let: 
 
P(hi) = the conditional probability that enforcement cooperation is high when all 
signatories are OECD members 
 
Q(hi) = the conditional probability that enforcement cooperation is high when at least 
one signatory is not a member of the OECD 
 
then we can compute the posterior probability that P(hi) > M * Q 
where M is a multiplier. 
 
Using Bayes’ Theorem, the result obtained is that there is a probability of 0.992 that 
P(hi) is 75% larger than Q(hi); and a probability of .884 that it is twice as large.  
 
That is, we can be over 99% confident that the conditional probability of enforcement 
cooperation being high when all signatories are OECD members, is 75% greater than 
the conditional probability of enforcement cooperation being high when at least one 
signatory is not a member of the OECD.   
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The odds ratio is an alternative way to demonstrate the strength of the relationship 
between the depth of enforcement cooperation and OECD membership. From Table 7, 
the odds ratio can be calculated as follows: (35 x 31) / (22 x 4) = 12.3. 
 
This means that the estimated odds of high enforcement cooperation in agreements 
between countries that are both or all members of the OECD, is 12.3 times higher than 
when at least one of the signatories is not an OECD member. 
 
Taken together, these results point to a very strong relationship between OECD 
membership and the depth of competition enforcement cooperation. 
 
Turning to the level of country development, while there is a high degree of overlap 
between developed economies and OECD members, there are some important 
differences. For instance, Mexico and Turkey are OECD members, but are not advanced 
economies, while the reverse is true for Singapore, Taiwan and Israel. Table 8 displays 
the data on the relationship between depth of enforcement cooperation and country level 
of development. 
 
Table 8: Competition Enforcement Cooperation and Level of Development 
 
    Enforcement Cooperation 
  Low Cooperation High Cooperation Total Probability of 
high 
cooperation  
At least one non-
advanced signatory 
 
30 
 
25 
 
55 
 
.45 
Advanced 
economy-only 
agreements 
 
9 
 
28 
 
37 
 
.76 
Total No. of 
agreements 
 
39 
 
53 
 
92 
 
 
The estimated conditional probability that enforcement cooperation is high, where both 
or all signatories to an agreement are advanced economies, is 0.76. On the other hand, 
the estimated conditional probability of high enforcement cooperation when at least one 
signatory is a non-advanced economy, is 0.45.  
 
The difference of proportions is only 0.31 (.76-.45), compared to 0.5 for OECD-
membership. The adjusted 95% confidence interval is (.19, .43). Using the Bayesian 
simulation approach, we can be 99% confident that the conditional probability of 
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enforcement cooperation being high when all signatories are advanced countries, is 20% 
greater than the conditional probability of enforcement cooperation being high when at 
least one signatory is not an advanced country.   
 
The marginal odds ratio here is only 3.7. This means that the estimated odds of high 
enforcement cooperation in agreements between countries that are both or all advanced 
economies, is 3.7 times higher than when at least one of the signatories is not an 
advanced economy. 
 
Comparing the two odds ratios, the marginal odds of enforcement cooperation being 
high in agreements between OECD countries (at 12.9) is 3.3 times greater than in 
agreements between advanced economies (3.7). 
 
These results indicate a much weaker relationship between advanced economy status 
and depth of enforcement cooperation than that for OECD membership. 
 
When high enforcement cooperation is redefined as level 5 on the EJI index, the odds 
ratios are uniformly lower, at 7.1 with respect to OECD countries, and 1.8 for advanced 
economies. The odds of enforcement cooperation being high in agreements between 
OECD countries is then nearly 4 times greater than in agreements between advanced 
economies. 
 
Disaggregating by instrument type reveals that all of the difference between OECD 
membership and advanced economy status arises from RTAs (when high cooperation is 
defined as level 4 and above). For CEAs, the numbers in the four cells, showing the 
relationship between the level of enforcement cooperation and OECD membership or 
advanced economy status respectively, are identical. This produces the same odds ratio 
of 21.7 in each case.  
 
However, for RTAs, the estimated odds of high enforcement cooperation in OECD-only 
agreements is 5.5, while for agreements between advanced economies only, it is 0.6. In 
the latter case, less than half of the 12 RTAs (42%) between advanced economies entail 
high enforcement cooperation, while more than half (55%) of agreements involving at 
least one non-advanced economy entail high cooperation. This result is heavily 
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influenced by the fact that Singapore, an advanced economy that is not a member of the 
OECD, has signed five RTAs involving low-level cooperation.  
 
Overall, all signatories to an agreement being members of the OECD is a very strong 
(89%) predictor of whether international competition enforcement cooperation will be 
high. It is a much stronger predictor than whether all signatories are advanced 
economies. However, for stand-alone competition enforcement agreements, OECD 
membership and advanced economy status are equally strong predictors of depth of 
enforcement cooperation. For RTAs that contain enforcement cooperation provisions, 
on the other hand, advanced economy status is a poor predictor of depth of enforcement 
cooperation.  
 
14.2 ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
 
From Chapter 7, the hypothesis to be tested is that there is a strong positive correlation 
between a country’s depth of international economic policy cooperation and its level of 
international economic integration. 
 
The most commonly used measure of international economic integration is the total 
trade: GDP ratio. This measures total exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. This 
is a good measure of the overall level of international economic exchange. It is plausible 
that increases in this ratio will be associated with increased potential for anti-
competitive behaviour, such as cartels, abuse of dominant position, and mergers.  
However, the overall ratio by country contains no information on the distribution of 
trade flows between different partner countries. The theoretical model in this thesis is 
that the pattern of trade flows between countries will influence the depth of policy 
cooperation between countries. Therefore the appropriate data to use is trade flow 
statistics at the country level. 
 
An alternative measure of international economic integration is the ratio of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) to GDP. It is plausible that an increase in FDI will be associated 
with an increase in some types of potentially anti-competitive behaviour, such as 
mergers and acquisitions. Using FDI to test the hypothesis would be consistent with 
Babones (2007), who suggests that it is appropriate to use foreign investment as an 
indicator of economic globalisation where the theoretical model is explicitly concerned 
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with issues of economic control. However, FDI statistics are not yet available at the 
country level.347 
 
The IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics records trade between individual country pairs, 
and also shows trade flows to and from the EU as a whole. This allows an assessment of 
the relationship of trade flows between pairs of countries and their depth of cooperation 
in competition policy. Specifically, the data are total merchandise trade (exports plus 
imports) between each signatory in the year prior to the agreement, as a percentage of 
each country’s total global merchandise trade in that year, averaged over the number of 
countries.348  
 
There are 11 agreements where the ratio exceeds .2, but most of the agreements (63%) 
line in the range 0.0-0.1, with a median of approximately 0.05. Simply splitting the 
agreements into high and low trade integration according to whether the ratio is greater 
than or equal to 0.05, or below 0.05, results in 42 agreements rated high trade 
integration, and 43 rated low. Table 9 shows the relationship between depth of 
enforcement cooperation and level of trade integration – with high enforcement 
cooperation defined initially as level 4 or above on the EJI index. 
 
Table 9: Competition Enforcement Cooperation and Trade Integration 
 
    Enforcement Cooperation   
  Low 
Cooperation 
High 
Cooperation 
Total Probability of high 
cooperation  
Low trade 
integration 
25 20 45 .44 
High trade 
integration 
11 33 44 .75 
Total No. of 
agreements 
 
36 
 
53 
 
89 
 
 
The estimated conditional probability that enforcement cooperation is high, when trade 
integration is high, is 0.75. On the other hand, the estimated conditional probability of 
high enforcement cooperation when trade integration is low, is 0.44. High trade 
                                                           
347 Note however that the IMF has initiated a Coordinated Direct Investment Survey to collect data on the 
source and destination of direct investment by individual country. See IMF Survey on line, August 1, 
2008 at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/home.aspx 
 
348 The data cover 89 agreements. In a small number of cases, the trade data precede the agreement by 
two or three years rather than one, due to post-2004 Direction of Trade Statistics data not being freely 
available. Data for some RTAs are from UNCTAD (Intra-trade of groups as a percentage of total exports 
of each group). See UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, various years. 
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integration is a fairly good predictor of the depth of enforcement cooperation. However, 
the difference of proportions is only 0.31, with a standard error of 0.099. An adjusted 
95% confidence interval for the true difference is (.19, .43). 
 
The marginal odds ratio is (25 x 33) / (11 x 20) = 3.8. This means that the estimated 
odds of high enforcement cooperation between countries with high trade integration, is 
3.8 times higher than the odds where trade integration is low. When high enforcement 
cooperation is redefined as level 5 or above, the odds ratio is 3.7. 
 
If the agreements are separated into two groups (RTAs and CEAs), the marginal odds 
ratios are 2.9 and 4.6 respectively. CEAs between countries with high trade integration 
are somewhat more likely to be deeper than are RTAs between countries with high trade 
integration. This is also true when high enforcement cooperation is redefined as level 5 
and above.  
 
Finally, if the nine deep agreements at level 7 are excluded – on the basis that vertically 
integrated enforcement cooperation is of a sufficiently different character to not be fully 
comparable with horizontal agreements – then the odds ratios are slightly lower. The 
odds ratio when high enforcement cooperation is defined as level 4 and above is 3.3 
(compared to 3.8), and when it is set at level 5 and above, is 3.1 (compared to 3.7). 
 
Overall, these results suggest only a moderate positive relationship between the level of 
trade integration between countries and their depth of enforcement cooperation. 
 
14.3 ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION AND ECONOMIC ASYMMETRY 
 
Recall that the hypothesis advanced in Chapter 7 was that the effect of economic 
asymmetry on the depth of enforcement cooperation is strongly negative. That is, large 
economies are less likely to agree to constrain their enforcement jurisdiction in 
agreements with small countries. 
  
The methodology used to measure economic asymmetry between signatories to an 
agreement is based on that used in Smith (2000), who measured the level of economic 
asymmetry between signatories of RTAs. Smith calculated country shares of “trade area 
GDP,” using GDP data in US dollars in the year the agreement was signed. Smith used 
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two methods to rank agreements into low and high asymmetry. The methods produced 
almost identical results, and the simpler of his methods is used here. A bilateral 
agreement is defined as being asymmetric where one country’s share exceeds 70% of 
joint GDP.349 For a plurilateral agreement, asymmetry is defined as the largest country 
share being more than two times larger than the second largest economy. The 
signatories include only those countries that were party to the agreement at the time it 
was signed, or at the date it first entered force in the case of RTAs.  Table 10 displays 
the data, for 90 agreements. 
 
Table 10: Competition Enforcement Cooperation and Economic Symmetry 
 
     Enforcement Cooperation 
  Low Cooperation High Cooperation Total Probability of 
high 
cooperation  
Low symmetry 29 35 64 .55 
High symmetry 8 18 26 .69 
Total No. of 
agreements 
 
37 
 
53 
 
90 
 
 
The estimated conditional probability that enforcement cooperation is high when 
economic symmetry is high i.e. when asymmetry is low, is 0.69, and when economic 
asymmetry is high it is 0.55, yielding a difference of proportions of 0.14. The marginal 
odds ratio is 1.9, and the 95% confidence interval, adjusted by the Finite Population 
Correction Factor, is (0, .28). There is a slightly higher probability that enforcement 
cooperation will be high when the economies of signatories are of a similar size. When 
high cooperation is redefined as level 5 and above, the difference of proportions is only 
.04, (.35 v .31), and the odds ratio is 1.2  
 
When CEAs are compared to RTAs, it turns out that the difference is mainly due to 
RTAs, which are 2.7 times more likely to feature high cooperation when economic 
symmetry is high than when it is low. 
 
Overall, these results suggest only a weak positive relationship between the depth of 
enforcement cooperation and the similarity of size of signatories’ economies. 
 
                                                           
349 The source of GDP data for most countries is the Groningen Total Economy Database as at October 
2008. GDP is expressed in 1990 US dollars.  For 8 agreements, the Groningen dataset does not have data 
for the signatory countries, and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators dataset was used (GDP 
in current US $). 
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14.4 ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION AND THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
 
The hypothesis advanced in Chapter 11 was that: 
 
Competition policy enforcement cooperation agreements, whether in RTAs or 
CEAs, will be deeper between countries that are party to a Customs Union or 
more advanced stage of economic integration agreement, and shallower where 
only an FTA is in place; but this dichotomy will have weakened over time. 
 
In effect there are two hypotheses here. The first is that RTAs that are Customs Unions 
or deeper will have deeper enforcement cooperation than RTAs that are FTAs, but this 
will be less so over time. The second is that CEAs between countries that are part of a 
Customs Union or deeper trade arrangement, will be deeper than CEAs where the 
parties have signed an FTA, but this will also be less so over time. Table 11 displays the 
data on enforcement cooperation in different types of RTA. 
 
Table 11: Competition Enforcement Cooperation in Customs Unions and FTAs 
 
 Customs Unions Depth of 
Cooperation 
FTAs Depth of 
Cooperation 
1957-
1989 
EC 
 
Level 7 
 
 
EFTA Level 7 
1990-
1999 
ANDEAN Group 
 
WAEMU 
 
EC-Turkey 
 
CEMAC 1/99 
 
Level 7 
 
Level 7 
 
Level 5 
 
Level 7 
EEA 
 
NAFTA 
 
Canada-
Israel 
 
Canada-
Chile 
 
Chile-
Mexico 
Level 7 
 
Level 3 
 
Level 3 
 
 
Level 3 
 
 
Level 2 
2000-
2007 
CARICOM 
 
SACU 
 
COMESA Regs. 
2004 
Level 7 
 
Level 2 
 
Level 7 
27 FTAs 350 Range from level  
2-5 
Totals 8  33  
  
                                                           
350 See Table 25 for details of the individual agreements. 
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Of the eight Customs Unions, six are level 7 agreements, one is level 5, and one is level 
2. Of the 33 FTAs, only two are level 7 agreements, while the remaining 31 range from 
levels 2-5. Clearly, enforcement cooperation is, in general, much deeper in Customs 
Unions than in RTAs, in line with the hypothesis. There are only two Customs Unions 
at less than level 7, and only two FTAs that are deeper than level 5 (there are also 5 
FTAs that are at level 5).  
 
The small number of agreements involved makes accurate measurement of trends 
difficult. In the period prior to 1990, there were only three RTAs with competition 
policy enforcement cooperation provisions. Two were Customs Unions and one was an 
FTA, and all three of these agreements were level 7 agreements. There was thus no 
difference in depth of enforcement cooperation between Customs Unions and FTAs in 
the first period.  
 
In the period 1990-1999, there were only nine relevant RTAs. Four were Customs 
Unions (three level 7, one level 5), and five were FTAs (one level 7, three level 3, and 
one level 2). Overall, the second period saw the appearance of a gap between the 
average depth of Customs Unions and of FTAs (the latter being less deep than the 
former), rather than the narrowing of a gap.  
 
In the period 2000-2007, there was a large increase to 30 RTAs with enforcement 
cooperation provisions. Of these, 27 were FTAs, ranging from levels 2-5, and three 
were Customs Unions; in all three cases these represented the addition of competition 
provisions to an already existing Customs Union.   Two of the three are level 7 
agreements. The third, the 2002 SACU Agreement, is only a level 2 agreement, the 
parties merely agreeing that: “Member States shall cooperate with each other with 
respect to the enforcement of competition laws and regulation”(Article 40). In the latest 
period, enforcement cooperation remained deeper on average in Customs Unions than in 
FTAs. However, in the aggregate, there is much more de jure international competition 
enforcement cooperation taking place in FTAs than in Customs Unions, because there 
are 27 FTAs containing such provisions and only 3 Customs Unions. 
 
Overall, the data do not support the hypothesis – that the dichotomy between deep 
Customs Unions and shallow FTAs would become less pronounced over time. There are 
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two factors at play here. The first, as noted, is the small number of agreements, 
especially of Customs Unions, making it very difficult to establish trends.  
 
Secondly, the deepening of FTAs has been accompanied by a significant broadening in 
the number of countries signing FTAs with enforcement cooperation provisions. For 
instance, the large increase in the number of FTAs after 1999 comprises two subsets: an 
increasing number of deep FTAs – of the six level 5 FTAs, five are post-1999 – and an 
increasing number of shallower FTAs involving countries newly active in international 
competition policy enforcement cooperation. For example, Singapore signed its first 
FTA with enforcement cooperation provisions in 2002, and had signed six more 
agreements by 2006. Of these, five agreements were at levels 2 and 3, and two were 
level 4.  
 
The overall data therefore masks two sub-trends: an increasing number of deeper FTAs, 
in combination with a broadening in the number of countries signing FTAs with 
provisions on competition enforcement cooperation. 
 
Turning to the depth of cooperation in CEAs between signatories that are also party to 
an RTA, Table 12 displays the data. Where there is more than one CEA between the 
same signatories, the agreement cited is the deepest agreement. 
 
There are only two CEAs between countries that are signatories to a Customs Union or 
deeper trade arrangement, both in the post-1999 period. One agreement is at level 7, the 
other at level 4. For FTA-signatories, in the post-1999 period there are three level 6 
agreements, three at level 5, and five at level 4. Customs Unions are associated with 
slightly deeper enforcement cooperation than FTAs in the most recent period. 
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Table 12: Competition Enforcement Cooperation in CEAs by Form  
of Associated RTA 
 
Date of 
CEA 351 
CEA and a 
Customs Union 
Depth of 
Cooperation in 
CEA 
CEA and an FTA Depth of 
Cooperation in 
CEA 
1957-
1989 
None 
 
 None  
1990-
1999 
 
None 
 
 
 
Australia-US 
 
Israel-US 
 
Australia-Papua 
New Guinea 
 
CIS Regs 
 
Level 6 
 
Level 5 
 
Level 4 
 
 
Level 4 
2001-
2007 
European 
Competition 
Network (ECN) 
 
Australia-New 
Zealand 2006352 
 
 
  
Level 7 
 
 
 
Level 4 
 
 
ECA  
 
Denmark-Iceland-
Norway 353 
 
Mexico-US 
 
Canada-Mexico 
 
Canada-Chile 
 
Canada-US 
 
Armenia-
Moldova 
 
Level 4 
 
Level 6 
 
 
Level 5 
 
Level 5 
 
Level 4 
 
Level 6 
 
Level 4 
 
Disaggregating by time period, the average level of cooperation in FTAs remained 
approximately the same over the two time periods, but it is not possible to draw 
conclusions on the relative depth of FTAs and Customs Unions due to the small number 
of agreements. Table 13 displays the comparative data. 
 
 
                                                           
351 There are two CEAs between Australia and New Zealand (2006, 2007), and both are level 4 
agreements. 
 
352 The CER Agreement between Australia and New Zealand is not a Customs Union, but it has many 
features of a Common Market, and so is coded here as an agreement that is a “Customs Union or deeper 
RTA”, rather than as an FTA. While the WTO classifies CER as an FTA, this is an artefact of the WTO’s 
legally determined definition of RTAs as either FTAs or Customs Unions. That is, the WTO’s categories 
are defined solely by the signatories’ tariff policies with respect to the rest of the world, and ignore the 
varying depth of all other economic policies. The WTO does not recognize Common Markets or 
Economic Unions as being deeper than FTAs, unless they are also Customs Unions. It would be 
inappropriate for the purpose at hand to classify CER as an FTA. 
 
353 These three countries are members of the EEA.  
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Table 13: Competition Enforcement Cooperation in CEAs by Form of Associated 
RTA and by Period 
 
 Customs 
Unions 
FTAs FTAs FTAs FTAs 
  Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 
1990-
1999 
None 2 1 1 0 
2000-
2007 
1 at level 7 
1 at level 4 
3 2 2 0 
 
Overall, the data do not support the hypothesized reduction in the dichotomy between 
shallower CEAs amongst FTA-signatories and deeper CEAs between signatories to 
Customs Unions.  
 
14.5 ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION AND THE SIMILARITY OF COMPETITION LAWS 
 
This section explores the relationship between the depth of enforcement cooperation 
between countries and the similarity of their competition laws.  
 
Recall from Chapter 10 that there are two hypotheses of the sign of this relationship.  
On the one hand, the more plausible hypothesis is that cooperation between 
Competition Authorities is facilitated by a degree of similarity of substantive laws or 
doctrines and enforcement practices. The alternative view is that there is a negative 
relationship between the presence or depth of enforcement cooperation provisions, and 
provisions relating to convergence or harmonization of competition laws. On this view, 
countries have pursued enforcement cooperation as an alternative/substitute for policy 
convergence.  
 
These hypotheses can be tested using a dataset on the similarity of the competition laws 
of 11 APEC economies compiled by Bollard.354 Bollard’s index of similarity is an un-
weighted aggregation of scores for 22 elements under 7 broad areas of competition law 
(the treatment of mergers, dominant firm behaviour, horizontal agreements, vertical 
restraints, unfair trading, and judicial and enforcement characteristics). The result is a 
score of between 0 (totally different competition laws) and 100 (an identical pair of 
laws), for 55 country pairs, as shown in Table 14 (reproduced from Bollard and Vautier 
1998, Table 6.4, p. 142).355 Bollard calculated the index based on information in an 
                                                           
354 In Bollard and Vautier, 1998, pp. 129-143. 
 
355  Vautier and Lloyd, 1997, p. 52. 
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unpublished 1994 survey undertaken by the New Zealand government for APEC, and 
cites a number of qualifications in using it, two of which are relevant here: information 
may not be completely up to date as at 1994; and it is subject to different interpretations 
and translations of terms.356 
 
To compare these country pair scores with the depth of enforcement cooperation 
between the same pairs of countries, the similarity index scores are divided into two 
categories, low similarity and high similarity. The range of scores is 14-77, suggesting a 
mid-point around 45. Inspection shows that a dividing line of 45 results in a low 
category with 35 observations and a high category with 20 observations, whereas a 
dividing line of 40 results in a low category with 28 observations, and a high category 
with 27 observations. In the initial analysis below, a dividing line of 45 is used, 
although analysis is also conducted in which high similarity is defined as a score over 
40, to test the sensitivity of the results to this specification. 
 
Of the 55 country pairs for which a legal similarity index is available, there are 19 
country pairs for which an enforcement cooperation score is also available in the 
dataset. In three cases the country pair score for jurisdictional integration is obtained 
from a trilateral enforcement cooperation agreement. The NZ-Canada enforcement 
cooperation score is obtained from the NZ-Canada-Australia agreement of 2000; the 
Australia-Canada score is obtained from the same agreement; and the New Zealand-
Taiwan score is obtained from the Australia-NZ-Taiwan agreement. Where there is 
more than one agreement between the same country pair, the score used is the deepest 
agreement involving each country pair.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
356 See Bollard and Vautier 1998, p. 141. 
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Table 14: Measures of Similarity of Competition Laws 
Between APEC Country Pairs 
 
 
 
 Australia Canada China Chinese 
Taipei 
Japan Korea Mexico NZ Philippines Thailand US 
Australia 0           
Canada 67 0          
China 17 17 0         
Chinese Taipei 41 46 17 0        
Japan 41 47 17 47 0       
Korea 43 44 17 53 54 0      
Mexico 47 50 17 31 41 41 0     
NZ 77 70 17 53 53 56 59 0    
Philippines 20 20 29 21 31 31 14 23 0   
Thailand 17 16 22 26 29 27 23 14 23 0  
US 51 53 17 43 61 46 47 47 36 29 0 
             
From Bollard and Vautier, 1998, Table 6.4, p. 142.
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With high cooperation defined as level 5 or above on the EJ Index, and high legal 
similarity defined as 45 and over on the Bollard index, these 19 cases are distributed as 
follows: 
 
Table 15: Competition Enforcement Cooperation and 
Similarity of Competition Laws (n = 19) 
 
Enforcement Cooperation 
 Low High Total Probability of 
high cooperation  
Low similarity of laws 7 2 9 .22 
High similarity of laws 4 6 10 .60 
Total No. of agreements 11 8 19  
 
The estimated conditional probability that enforcement cooperation is high, 
where competition laws are similar, is 0.6, while when competition laws are not similar 
it is 0.22. Having similar competition laws does not appear to be a very good 
predictor of deep enforcement cooperation, while the absence of similar laws is not a 
particularly strong predictor of low cooperation.  The marginal odds ratio is 5.3. 
 
Given the search techniques used to compile the dataset, however, including searches on 
node country web sites and drawing on the APEC Competition Law and Policy 
Database and the Free Trade of the Americas Inventory, we can have some confidence 
that few or even possibly none of the remaining 36 country pairs has any formal 
competition policy enforcement cooperation agreement at all. There is, therefore, a need 
to incorporate these country pairs in the analysis. Of the 36 country pairs with no formal 
agreement in our dataset, 10 pairs rank high on the legal similarity index, while 26 pairs 
rank low on that index.  
 
If we make the strong assumption that none of these 36 country pairs has a CEA or 
RTA containing competition enforcement cooperation provisions, and defining high 
enforcement cooperation and high legal similarity in the same way as in Table 15 
above, the resulting contingency table is shown in Table 16. 
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Table 16: Competition Enforcement Cooperation and 
Similarity of Competition Laws (n = 55) 
 
  Enforcement Cooperation 
 No/Low High Total Probability of high 
cooperation  
Low similarity of laws 33 2 35 .06 
High similarity of laws 14 6 20 .30 
Total No. of agreements 47 8 55  
  
Now, the estimated conditional probability that enforcement cooperation is high, 
where competition laws are dissimilar, is only 0.06. This means that we can be very 
confident that enforcement cooperation will be low when legal similarity is low. The 
marginal odds ratio is (33 x 6) / (2 x 14) = 7.1, which means that the estimated odds of 
enforcement cooperation being high between a country pair where the competition laws 
are similar, is 7 times greater than the odds for a country pair with dissimilar 
competition laws. The difference of proportions is .24.  
 
On the other hand, when legal similarity is high, the estimated conditional probability 
that enforcement cooperation is high is only 0.3.  Not surprisingly, these results suggest 
that similarity of substantive competition laws is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition, for high enforcement cooperation.  
 
While these results are an upper bound, given the strong assumption that the dataset 
includes all the CEAs that exist between these country pairs, it seems unlikely that any 
missing agreements are high enforcement cooperation agreements. A CEA of level 5 or 
above is more likely to be on a web site, or at least referenced in the public domain, than 
is a lower cooperation agreement. This is because a high cooperation agreement is likely 
to involve an OECD node country, such as the USA, Canada, Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
Australia, or New Zealand. All these countries post their CEAs in English on official 
web sites, their agreements attract attention in the competition policy community and 
amongst academics, and they comprise 7 of the 11 countries in the Bollard index. Any 
deep enforcement cooperation agreement involving one of these node countries and any 
one of the other 4 countries in the Bollard index seems likely to be posted on the node 
country's web site (or failing that, to perhaps have been included either in the APEC 
inventory, or, with respect to the USA, Canada, and Mexico, in the FTAA inventory).  
 
While it is quite possible that there is a small number of low cooperation agreements 
involving these country pairs that are missing from the dataset, any that were between 
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countries with dissimilar competition laws would only further strengthen the association 
between low legal similarity and low enforcement cooperation. Alternatively, while an 
omitted low cooperation agreement that was between countries with high legal 
similarity would lower the odds ratio, this would not weaken the result that we can be 
very confident that enforcement cooperation will be low when legal similarity is low.  
 
To test the sensitivity of this result to the specification of legal similarity, high legal 
similarity is redefined as a score of 40 or above on the Bollard index (instead of a score 
of 45). As a result, seven country pairs shift from low legal similarity to high similarity. 
The revised contingency table is: 
 
Table 17:  Competition Enforcement Cooperation and 
Similarity of Competition Laws (legal similarity redefined) 
 
 Enforcement Cooperation 357 
 No/Low High Total Probability of 
high cooperation 
Low similarity of Laws 28 0 28      .02 358 
High similarity of laws 19 8 27 .30 
Total No. of agreements 47 8 55  
 
The estimated conditional probability that enforcement cooperation is high, 
where competition laws are dissimilar, is even lower, at 0.02, while, when legal 
similarity is high, it remains at 0.3. The marginal odds ratio is much higher, at 
24.8, indicating a much stronger relationship between depth of enforcement cooperation 
and similarity of competition laws.  
 
Clearly, the relationship between legal similarity and depth of enforcement cooperation 
is sensitive to the specification of legal similarity. Furthermore, the Bollard index is 
subject to the limitations noted, the sample size is small – 11 countries and 55 country 
pairs – and the legal similarity index is calculated at a single point in time (1994), while 
the depth of enforcement cooperation is measured over the period 1996 – 2006. The 
similarity of laws of these countries may have changed somewhat over this period, and 
it is possible that there are a few formal cooperation agreements involving these country 
pairs that are not in the dataset. 
 
                                                           
357 High cooperation is defined as level 5 or above on the EJI index. 
 
358 Calculated by adding 0.5 to the two cells in the row, so they read 28.5 and 0.5. 
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However, the strength of the association between low legal similarity and low 
enforcement cooperation, and the size of the odds ratios, which range from 5.3 - 24.8 
across all specifications, provides clear support for the hypothesis that enforcement 
cooperation between competition authorities is facilitated by a degree of similarity of 
substantive competition laws; and that enforcement cooperation is not a substitute for 
convergence of substantive competition laws. 
 
14.6 ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION AND GEOGRAPHY 
 
Recall from Chapter 10 the hypothesis that there will be a strong positive correlation 
between countries’ depth of international economic policy cooperation and their 
geographic proximity. 
 
To test this, two measures of geographic proximity have been employed. The first is 
whether the signatories share a common land border. In the case of agreements with 
multiple signatories, the test is whether half or more of the signatories share a common 
border. The second measure is whether signatories belong to the same sub-regional 
grouping, as defined by UNCTAD (see UNCTAD 2008). In the few cases where 
countries that share a common border are defined by UNCTAD as belonging to 
different regional groupings e.g. China and Russia, they are defined here as belonging 
to the same region. 
 
Table 18 shows the relationship between depth of enforcement cooperation and whether 
signatories share a common land border, with high cooperation defined as level 4 or 
above on the EJI index. 
 
Table 18: Competition Enforcement Cooperation 
And Common Land Border 
 
     Enforcement Cooperation 
   
                 
              
Low High Total Probability of 
high 
cooperation 
Non-contiguous 34 40 74 .54 
Contiguous 5 13 18 .72 
Total No. of agreements 35 57 92  
 
The estimated conditional probability that enforcement cooperation is high, 
where countries share a common land border, is 0.72, while for non-contiguous 
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countries it is 0.54, a difference of proportions of only 0.18. The 95% confidence 
interval, after adjusting for the finite population, is (.05, .31), and the marginal odds 
ratio is only 2.2. This means that the estimated odds of high enforcement cooperation 
between countries sharing a common land border is only slightly more than two times 
higher than the odds where countries are non-contiguous. However, when high 
enforcement cooperation is redefined as level 5 or above, the odds ratio is 4.5, 
indicating a somewhat stronger relationship at deeper levels of cooperation. 
 
Turning to the relationship between depth of enforcement cooperation and whether 
signatories are in the same region, Table 19 displays the data. 
 
Table 19: Competition Enforcement Cooperation and 
Common Region 
 
    Enforcement Cooperation                            
 Low High Total Probability of 
high 
cooperation 
Different region 29 34 63 .54 
Common region 10 19 29 .66 
Total No. of agreements 39 53 92  
 
The estimated conditional probability that enforcement cooperation is high, 
where countries are in the same region, is 0.66, while for non-regional countries it 
is 0.54, giving a difference of proportions of only 0.12. The 95% confidence interval, 
after adjusting for the finite population, is (-0.02, 0.26), and the marginal odds ratio is 
only 1.6, lower than in the contiguous case. This means that the estimated odds of high 
enforcement cooperation between countries in the same region is only one and a half 
times higher than the odds where countries are in different regions. When high 
enforcement cooperation is redefined as level 5 or above, the odds ratio is 2.7. 
 
However, when the data is disaggregated by instrument type, it shows a marked 
difference between CEAs and RTAs. There is a very weak relationship between depth 
of cooperation in CEAs and geographic proximity, and a strong relationship between 
RTAs and proximity.  
 
For CEAs, the conditional probability of cooperation being high is almost the same for 
countries sharing a land border and countries that do not (.67 and .62). Common land 
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border and depth of enforcement cooperation are close to being independent variables 
with respect to CEAs.  
 
The conditional probability of cooperation being high in CEAs where countries are in 
the same region is 0.59, while for countries in different regions it is higher, at 0.65. 
Being in the same region is clearly not associated with deeper enforcement cooperation. 
 
For RTAs, however, the conditional probability of enforcement cooperation being high 
when signatories share a common land border is 0.78, and when they do not it is 0.44, a 
difference of proportions of 0.34. The adjusted 95% confidence interval is (0.12, 0.56). 
For the relationship between enforcement cooperation and shared region, the 
corresponding conditional probabilities are 0.75 and 0.41, a difference of proportions of 
.34. 
 
Using the Bayesian approach from 14.1, and letting P(hi) = the conditional probability 
that Enforcement Cooperation is high when half or more signatories to an RTA share a 
land border, and Q(hi) = the conditional probability that Enforcement Cooperation is 
high when less than half do so, there is a probability of .986 that P(hI) is 20% larger 
than Q(hi).  
 
That is, we can be over 98% confident that the conditional probability of enforcement 
cooperation being high when half or more of the signatories of an RTA share a common 
land border, is 20% greater than the conditional probability of enforcement 
cooperation being high when fewer than half of the signatories share a common border.   
 
The marginal odds ratio for the relationship in RTAs between high enforcement 
cooperation and common land border is 4.5, and for common region it is 4.3. When 
high cooperation is redefined as level 5 and above, the marginal odds ratios are 12.5 and 
14.4 respectively. 
 
To test the extent to which there results are driven by the inclusion of the 8 deep RTAs 
at level 7, these 8 agreements were omitted. For the remaining 33 RTAs, the 
relationship between common land border and depth of cooperation was negative. The 
same was true for the relationship with common region. 
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In conclusion, geographic proximity appears to play little role in influencing the depth 
of cooperation in stand-alone competition enforcement agreements. For RTAs, 
geographic proximity is a good predictor of the depth of cooperation, but only when the 
eight level 7 agreements are included in the dataset. 
 
14.7 ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION AND TRANSGOVERNMENTALISM 
 
As noted in Chapter 12, Slaughter states that there is a fundamental difference between 
intergovernmental cooperation - formal state-to-state Treaties that can create 
binding obligations - and transgovernmental cooperation - agreements between 
government agencies rather than between states themselves.359 Slaughter states that 
agency-to-agency agreements have no formal recognition in international law.  
 
In making this distinction, Slaughter builds on earlier work in international relations by 
Keohane and Nye (1971), who defined transgovernmental relations as “sets of direct 
interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely 
guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments.” The 
concept is an alternative to the predominant view that international relations consist of 
formal treaties between unitary states. 
 
A small number of international legal scholars have recently applied the concept of 
transgovernmentalism to the qualitative analysis of international competition policy 
cooperation (Raustiala 2002, Slaughter 2004, Whytock 2005). These studies all 
conclude, on the basis of an assessment of CEAs only, that the level of 
transgovernmentalism in international competition policy cooperation is high.  
 
However, the empirical study of transgovernmentalism is in its infancy. As discussed in 
Box 10, there is a tension between the definitions of transgovernmentalism used in 
some of this research, and the authors’ subsequent categorization of some legally 
binding CEAs as transgovernmental.  
 
The framework developed in this thesis, together with the dataset compiled in Chapter 
12, allows some in-depth, cross-country, and multi-instrument exploration of the 
concept of transgovernmentalism in international competition policy cooperation. 
                                                           
359 Slaughter 2004, p. 33. 
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Box 10: Transgovernmentalism as a Dependent Variable 
 
As defined by Keohane and Nye (1971), transgovernmental relations are “sets of direct 
interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely 
guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments.” In the last 
ten years, a small number of scholars have applied this definition of transgovernmentalism to 
the analysis of the growing networks of direct interactions between government agencies 
across state borders. Slaughter (2004) introduced the concept of transgovernmental networks, 
identifying three types: government networks within international organizations; government 
networks within the framework of agreements negotiated by heads of state; and spontaneous 
government networks that arise without interstate agreement, comprising either formal 
regulatory organizations, or agreements between counterpart regulatory agencies that can be 
implemented by the regulators themselves. 
 
Slaughter, Raustiala (2002) and Whytock (2005) call for research on transgovernmentalism, 
and both Raustiala and Whytock define transgovernmentalism for the purpose of case study 
research on international competition policy cooperation. The definitions lack clarity 
however. For instance, Slaughter’s categories of government networks negotiated by heads of 
state, and spontaneous government networks without inter-state agreement, need to be refined 
when attempting to actually measure transgovernmentalism. There is a gray area between 
agreements negotiated by heads of state, and agreements purely on an agency-to-agency basis 
– as Keohane and Nye’s definition allows for e.g. in international competition policy 
cooperation, some apparently agency-to-agency agreements are legally binding e.g. some 
agreements signed by the US Department of Justice, which have the status of executive 
agreements in US law. Raustiala acknowledges their legally binding nature, yet describes 
them as “informal agreements”, and categorizes them as transgovernmental on the basis that 
they resemble informal MOUs in several respects, and that the use of a legally binding 
instrument in international competition cooperation, rather than an MOU, may be a historical 
accident (Raustiala 2002, FN 173). Whytock, in discussing one of these agreements (the 1999 
EC-US CEA), distinguishes it from a treaty because, unlike treaties, executive agreements do 
not override any provisions of US law with which they may be inconsistent, and because the 
particular agreement was not signed by the President, unlike many other executive 
agreements (Whytock 2005, FN 167).  
 
The categorization of these binding US agreements as transgovernmental by Raustiala and 
Whytock does not sit well with their definitions of transgovernmentalism, or with Slaughter’s 
definition of a spontaneous government network. While there may be a basis for 
distinguishing between a treaty and an executive agreement, both are legally binding and 
therefore appear to fit Whytock’s definition of an intergovernmental agreement. While they 
may resemble an MOU in some respects, and may, but for historical accident have been cast 
in the form of an MOU, they are in fact legally binding. 
 
Whytock uses a qualitative measure of the relative levels of transgovernmentalism and 
intergovernmentalism in his case study “because of the difficulty of establishing a baseline 
with reference to which absolute levels of interstate and transgovernmental cooperation could 
be assessed…” The concept of jurisdictional integration put forward in this thesis is such a 
baseline. Whytock notes that: “improvements need to be made in the operationalisation of the 
concept of transgovernmentalism…improvement that will depend on further theoretical and 
empirical work.” (Whytock 2005, p. 117). 
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The starting point is the natural distinction between agreements embodied in a chapter 
of an RTA, and stand-alone competition policy agreements. Using Keohane and Nye’s 
definition, RTAs are high profile instruments that are “controlled or closely guided” by 
governments. Even allowing for the fact that Competition Policy Chapters are typically 
not subject to the dispute settlement provisions in the RTA, they certainly would seem 
to have more of an inter-governmental character than a CEA signed only by the 
respective heads of the Competition Authorities. The second step is to recognize that 
not all CEAs are purely agency-to-agency agreements. While many of them are 
explicitly between, and signed by the heads of, the respective Competition Authorities, 
many of them are not. As noted by Holmes et. al., some CEAs are explicitly agreements 
between governments, not between agencies, and are signed by representatives of 
governments.360 This arguably lends them considerably more of an intergovernmental 
character than an agency-to-agency agreement. Zanettin concludes, from an analysis of 
four or five CEAs, that, with the exception of a 1984 Memorandum of Understanding 
between the US and Canada, the parties to the agreements were the governments of the 
relevant states, not their competition authorities.361 
 
It may be legitimate, therefore, to group Competition Chapters in RTAs, with CEAs that 
are explicitly government-to-government agreements. Whether these agreements should 
be classified as intergovernmental, or as a deep form of transgovernmental agreement, is 
a moot point at this stage. They will be referred to here as “intergovernmental”, to 
distinguish them from transgovernmental agreements (the remaining CEAs that are 
agency-to-agency agreements). 
 
Having made this distinction, it is possible to explore the relationship between the depth 
of enforcement cooperation, and the form of the agreement. The hypothesis would be 
that deeper agreements are much more likely to be “intergovernmental.” A state is likely 
to be less willing to delegate authority to its Competition Authority to sign international 
commitments that impinge more on the state’s enforcement jurisdiction.362 For this 
                                                           
360 Holmes et. al. undated, p. 51. In the case of agreements involving the EC, they are agreements by the 
EC, or the European Commission, not the Directorate General responsible for competition. In fact, the 
European Court of Justice held in 1994 that the Competition Commissioner was not competent to 
conclude the 1991 EC-US agreement.  
 
361 Zanettin, 2002, p. 77. 
 
362 See Sokol for a short discussion of principal-agent issues in the relationship between the executive and 
the anti-trust agency with respect to international competition cooperation. Sokol, 2007b, p.78. 
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purpose, deep enforcement cooperation is defined as agreements containing positive 
comity or beyond i.e. levels 5, 6, or 7 on the EJI Index. Positive comity is judged to 
represent a significant threshold in international competition policy cooperation. Any 
relationship between depth of cooperation and form of agreement is more likely to be 
apparent at higher levels of the index. 
 
Table 20 presents the data. 
 
Table 20:  Competition Enforcement Cooperation and 
Transgovernmentalism 
 
Enforcement 
Cooperation 363 
Transgovernmental “Intergovernmental” Total Probability of  
high cooperation 
Low 
Cooperation 
29 33 62 .53 
High 
Cooperation 
2 28 30 .93 
Total No. of 
agreements 
31 61 92  
 
The first result that can be read from Table 20 is that, on this definition of 
transgovernmentalism, international competition policy cooperation is predominantly an 
“intergovernmental” phenomenon: 66% (61/92) of agreements are “intergovernmental.” 
This is due in part to the inclusion of RTAs in the dataset, and partly due to the 
classification of 20 CEAs as “intergovernmental.” 
 
Secondly, 93% of the agreements where enforcement cooperation is high, are 
“intergovernmental” agreements, while only 53% of the agreements where enforcement 
cooperation is low are “intergovernmental.” This produces a difference of proportions 
of .4, and an odds ratio of 12.3. 
 
Because Competition Chapters in RTAs are by definition classified here as 
“intergovernmental”, it is interesting to look just at the stand-alone competition 
agreements. Table 21 presents the data.  
 
More than half (61%, or 31/51) of agreements are now transgovernmental. The more 
interesting result, however, is that the difference of proportions is now 0.71 (.88-.17). 
 
                                                           
363 High cooperation is defined as level 5 or above on the EJI index. 
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Table 21:  Transgovernmentalism and Depth of Cooperation  
in CEAs 
 
    Form of Agreement 
Enforcement 
Cooperation364 
Transgovernmental “Intergovernmental” Total Probability of  
high cooperation 
Low 
Cooperation 
29 6 35 .17 
High 
Cooperation 
2 14 16 .88 
Total No. of 
agreements 
31 20 51  
 
How confident can we be of this relationship? The adjusted 95% confidence interval for 
the true difference is (.57, .85). In other words, we can be 95% confident that the true 
difference of proportions is between .59 and .83. 
 
Again using the Bayesian approach from 14.1, and letting P(hi) = the conditional 
probability that a CEA is “intergovernmental” when enforcement cooperation is high, 
and Q(hi) = the conditional probability that a CEA is transgovernmental when 
enforcement cooperation is high, there is a probability of .978 that P(hi) is 300% larger 
than Q(hi).  
 
That is, we can be nearly 98% confident that the conditional probability of a CEA being 
“intergovernmental” when enforcement cooperation is high is three times greater than 
the conditional probability of a CEA being transgovernmental when enforcement 
cooperation is high.   
 
The odds ratio is 33.8 i.e. the estimated odds of a CEA being “intergovernmental” when 
enforcement cooperation is high, is 33.8 times higher than the odds of it being 
transgovernmental. 
 
These results suggest that the depth of enforcement cooperation is a very good predictor 
of whether an agreement is transgovernmental or “intergovernmental.”  
 
                                                           
364 High cooperation is defined as level 5 or above on the EJI index. 
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The results also suggest that there is value in disaggregation below a “soft/hard” 
instrument dichotomy. Because of the absence of binding dispute settlement 
mechanisms, and because many of the agreements explicitly state they are not binding, 
these 51 agreements are all arguably soft law instruments. Yet by disaggregating them 
by depth of jurisdictional integration, it is possible to discern two very clear patterns of 
state practice. Agreements that impinge less on states’ enforcement jurisdiction are left 
to inter-agency agreements, while deeper agreements are very likely to attract the 
attention and the imprimatur of the government. This in turn supports the validity of the 
concept of jurisdictional integration, and the value of the enforcement cooperation index 
for measurement and research. 
 
14.8 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
Thus far the analysis has been confined to bivariate analysis, which does not allow for 
the possible confounding effect of unobserved variables on the two-way correlations. In 
this section, some initial multivariate analysis is undertaken to further test the strength 
of some of the relationships found in the previous sections. This analysis is conceived as 
exploratory analysis, and does not begin to attempt to rigorously control for the effect of 
confounding variables.  
 
To begin with, a four-way contingency table is constructed that illustrates the 
relationships between the depth of enforcement cooperation and three variables. 
Variable 1 records whether the signatories to an agreement are both/all OECD 
members. A zero indicates there is at least one signatory that is a non-OECD member, 
and a 1 indicates that all signatories are members of the OECD. Variable 2 is the level 
of economic symmetry between signatories (0 = low symmetry, 1 = high symmetry). 
Variable 3 is whether the agreement is transgovernmental or “intergovernmental” (0 = 
transgovernmental). Table 22 presents the results. 
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Table 22: Enforcement Cooperation, OECD Membership, Economic Symmetry, 
and Form of Agreement 
 
       Enforcement Cooperation 
 Low  High  Total  Probability of high 
cooperation 
0,0,0 8 2 10 .20 
0,0,1 17 12 29 .41 
0,1,0 4 2 6 .33 
0,1,1 3 5 8 .63 
1,0,0 2 4 6 .67 
1,0,1 2 16 18 .89 
1,1,0 1 6 7 .86 
1,1,1 0 5 5 1.0 
Total 37 52 89  
 
The row 0,0,0 refers to those agreements where a zero is recorded for each of the three 
variables. That is to say, of the agreements where at least one of the signatories was not 
an OECD member, and where economic symmetry was low, and which was a 
transgovernmental agreement, the row shows that 8 contained low enforcement 
cooperation, and 2 contained high cooperation (4+ on the EJI index). 
 
From this four-way table, three-way tables can be constructed to analyse the effect of 
confounding variables one at a time on the relationship between OECD membership 
and the depth of enforcement cooperation.  
 
For instance, the relationship between enforcement cooperation, OECD membership, 
and economic symmetry can be read from Table 22, and is presented in Table 23 below.  
 
When the agreements are between countries with similar-sized economies (high 
economic symmetry), enforcement cooperation was high 42 percentage points more for 
OECD agreements compared to non-OECD agreements (92% - 50%). 
 
When the agreements are between countries with very different-sized economies, 
enforcement cooperation was high 47% more for OECD agreements compared to non-
OECD agreements (83% - 36%). 
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Table 23: Enforcement Cooperation, Economic Symmetry and OECD 
Membership 
 
 OECD 
membership 
Low 
Cooperation 
High 
Cooperation 
Total Probability 
of High 
Cooperation  
Low symmetry Non-OECD 
OECD 
25 
4 
14 
20 
39 
24 
.36 
.83 
High symmetry Non-OECD 
OECD 
7 
1 
7 
11 
14 
12 
.50 
.92 
Total Non-OECD 32 21 53 .40 
 OECD 5 31 36 .86 
 Total 37 52 89  
 
The difference of proportions is very similar in both cases. Thus, the strong relationship 
between OECD membership and the depth of enforcement cooperation, evident from 
the marginal association in Table 7, remains strong after allowing for the confounding 
effect of the level of economic asymmetry between the signatories. The level of 
economic asymmetry still appears to have little influence on the depth of enforcement 
cooperation. 
 
Turning to the relationship between depth of cooperation, OECD membership, and the 
form of agreement, Table 24 presents the data. 
 
When the agreements are transgovernmental, enforcement cooperation was high 52 
percentage points more for OECD agreements compared to non-OECD agreements  
(.77-.25). 
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Table 24: Enforcement Cooperation, Form of Agreement, and OECD Membership 
 
Form of agreement OECD 
membership 
Low 
Cooperation 
High 
Cooperation 
Total Probability 
of High 
Cooperation 
Transgovernmental Non-OECD 
OECD 
12 
3 
4 
10 
16 
13 
.25 
.77 
“Intergovernmental” Non-OECD 
OECD 
20 
2 
17 
21 
37 
23 
.46 
.91 
Total Non-OECD 32 21 53 .40 
 OECD 5 31 36 .86 
 
When the agreements are “intergovernmental,” enforcement cooperation was high 45 
percentage points more for OECD agreements compared to non-OECD agreements  
(.91-.46). 
 
Again, the difference of proportions is very similar in both cases. Thus, the strong 
relationship between “intergovernmental” agreements and the depth of enforcement 
cooperation, evident in Table 20, remains strong after allowing for the confounding 
effect of OECD membership.  
 
These results reflect the fact that OECD agreements are deeper, and deeper agreements 
are more likely to be “intergovernmental” i.e. the likely direction of influence (or causal 
mechanism) runs from depth of agreement to form of agreement, not the other way 
around. 
 
Finally, the combination of OECD-only agreements and “inter-governmental” 
agreements appears to be a very good predictor of the depth of enforcement 
cooperation. When both of these variables are present, enforcement cooperation is high 
in 91% of cases (21/23 agreements). 
 
 
 
 
 
 230  
14.9 VALIDITY OF RESULTS 
 
A test of inter-rater reliability is required in order to provide some assurance of the 
validity of the ordinal scale and the reliability of the rankings. That is, it is necessary to 
provide some assurance that other researchers and competition policy experts rate the 
agreements in broadly the same way; and that the methodology is reliable and can be 
replicated by other researchers.  
 
To test this, a stratified random sample of 10 of the agreements was selected for 
independent ranking. The sample was taken from the population of 87 agreements in the 
dataset at the time (5 agreements were subsequently added). The sample was stratified, 
so that the distribution of agreements across levels 2-7 on the index is the same in the 
sample as in the dataset. 
 
The selected agreements were: 
1 CIS-Korea-Latvia-Romania 2003. 
2 EFTA-Singapore 2003. 
3 Japan-Thailand 2007. 
4 Chile-Mexico 1999. 
5 Australia-New Zealand 2006.  
6 Brunei-Chile-New Zealand-Singapore 2005. 
7 EC-South Africa 2000. 
8 EFTA-Mexico 2001. 
9 US-Canada 2004. 
10 ANDEAN Group Decision 285 of 1991. 
 
These 10 agreements were then independently rated by Dr. Philip Marsden on the basis 
of information sent to him drawn from Chapter 13.1 (with all references to specific 
agreements removed). Dr. Marsden is an expert on international competition policy 
cooperation. He is Director of the Competition Law Forum at the British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, Editor of the European Competition Journal, and a 
Non-Executive Director of the UK Office of Fair Trading. 
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Dr. Marsden’s immediate ratings resulted in agreement in 8 out of the 10 cases. 
Subsequent discussion resulted in agreement on one further rating. Therefore, the final 
adjusted rate of agreement is 90%.  
 
Dr. Marsden’s rating of, and subsequent discussion of the tenth agreement, prompted a 
small redefinition of the index, through a change to the treatment of references to 
mutual legal assistance. This affected the rating of only four agreements. 
 
The results of the inter-rater reliability check provide a high degree of confidence in the 
validity and replicability of the results in this thesis. 
 
14.10 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results in this chapter can be summarised as: 
1. There is a very strong positive relationship between the depth of 
enforcement cooperation and whether all the signatories are OECD 
members, but only a moderate relationship between the depth of 
enforcement cooperation and country level of development. 
2. We can be very confident that enforcement cooperation is low when 
signatories’ substantive competition laws are dissimilar. Legal similarity is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for deep enforcement cooperation. 
3. The depth of enforcement cooperation is a very good predictor of whether an 
agreement is a transgovernmental agreement or an “intergovernmental” 
agreement, especially when the effect of OECD membership is also 
incorporated. 
4. There is only a moderate positive relationship between the depth of trade 
integration between countries and their depth of enforcement cooperation. 
5. Economic asymmetry appears to have little impact on the depth of 
enforcement cooperation. 
6. Geographic proximity appears to be an important factor influencing the 
depth of competition enforcement cooperation in RTAs, but appears to play 
little if any role in influencing the depth of cooperation in CEAs. 
7. Enforcement cooperation in Customs Unions is in general deeper than in 
FTAs, but the data do not support the hypothesis that this gap is narrowing 
over time. The reason appears to be that the deepening of enforcement 
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cooperation in some FTAs has been accompanied by an increasing number 
of shallower FTAs involving countries newly active in international 
competition policy enforcement cooperation. 
8. Within RTAs, Customs Unions as a category are becoming less and less 
relevant. Nearly all new trade agreements are now FTAs, and it is variation 
in the depth of enforcement cooperation in FTAs that should be the object of 
more attention. 
 
The result suggesting that the level of economic asymmetry has only weak effects on 
the depth of enforcement cooperation is, at first glance, perhaps surprising. There are 
theoretical reasons to expect that larger economies will not want to constrain their 
ability to act unilaterally in enforcing their competition laws. The fact that this variable 
appears to have little influence over the depth of enforcement cooperation may be due to 
the fact that the two largest economies, the US and the EC, are widely acknowledged to 
have been engaged in regulatory competition, in an attempt to have their model of 
competition law and enforcement adopted by countries in their region and more 
widely.365 This both provides advantages to their domestic firms operating in foreign 
jurisdictions, and increases their leverage in multilateral negotiations on international 
competition policy cooperation. Regulatory export could explain why large economies 
have signed relatively deep cooperation agreements with much smaller economies. In 
the case of the EC, foreign policy considerations are also an important factor that could 
explain the masking of the functionalist, economic causal mechanisms. 
 
In addition, the relationship between economic asymmetry and depth of enforcement 
cooperation may be masked by the methodology used here. Transforming continuous 
data on GDP into ordinal categories (high and low symmetry), in order to undertake 
contingency table analysis, means that some of the information in the continuous data is 
lost. The same is true for data on trade integration. Additional statistical analysis, using 
logit or probit regression techniques would be an interesting follow-on from this study. 
 
With respect to an “OECD-effect”, on this evidence OECD membership appears to be a 
much better predictor of the depth of enforcement cooperation than country level of 
development. There are plausible reasons for this. The OECD has been very active in 
                                                           
365 See for instance the discussion in Raustiala 2002. 
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promoting deeper enforcement cooperation, both through its successive 
Recommendations on Restrictive Business Practices since 1967, and through the 
activities of its Competition Law and Policy Committee, which promotes networking 
and fosters the relationships between Competition Authorities that are necessary to 
support the development of trust and closer cooperation.  
 
On the other hand, a small number of observations drive this result. Mexico, a non-
advanced economy, is a party to a number of deep cooperation agreements, and this 
could be in part a “NAFTA effect” rather than an “OECD effect.” NAFTA came into 
force the same year that Mexico joined the OECD, and increased the attractiveness of 
Mexico for international business and as a partner in economic cooperation agreements.  
 
Countering this is the fact that Singapore is an advanced economy that has, as noted, 
signed seven RTAs with competition enforcement provisions, five of which are only 
level 2 or level 3 agreements. It seems plausible to speculate that Singapore’s late 
adoption, for an advanced economy, of a competition law is related to the fact that it is 
not an OECD member. Section 12-1 of the 2004 Singapore-US FTA stipulated that 
Singapore shall enact general competition legislation by January 2005. 
 
The case of Chile, a non-advanced country that is not a member of the OECD, could 
point either to an “OECD effect” or to a “NAFTA effect,” although the latter is perhaps 
more plausible. Chile has signed six deep enforcement cooperation agreements (level 4 
or 5) since 1997. It has been participating in OECD activities for a number of years, and 
in 2007 was invited to open discussions towards becoming an OECD member. This 
may reflect a wider “OECD effect.” 366 On the other hand, Chile has actively been 
seeking to join NAFTA since the mid-1990s, and its Competition Policy Chapters in 
FTAs with Canada and Mexico in 1997 and 1999 respectively were closely modelled on 
the Competition Chapter in NAFTA.367 
 
                                                           
366 In addition, the Israeli Competition Authority, which has a positive comity agreement with the US, has 
been an observer within the OECD since 2001 (although the Israel-US agreement was concluded in 
1999). Dabbah, 2007, p.67. The OECD’s influence in competition policy extends considerably beyond its 
member and prospective member countries. Yacheivstova notes its influence in the CIS countries since 
the mid-1990s. Yacheivstova 2000, p. 14. 
 
367 See Marsden 2005, p.5. Marsden notes that Chile was invited by the three NAFTA signatories in 
December 1994 to begin accessions talks.  
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OECD membership may reflect, in turn, at least two causal mechanisms. The first is the 
hypothesized influence of quality of governance on the depth of enforcement 
cooperation – although this should also show through when using country level of 
development as a proxy for quality of governance, and, as noted, this is less apparent.  
 
A second causal mechanism is elite norm diffusion, which does not operate with the 
same force amongst all advanced economies. “Advanced economy” is an administrative 
classification, not the basis of an international network or organisation. Participation in 
the OECD Competition Law and Policy Committee is viewed as a powerful 
transmission belt for the diffusion of norms, and a mechanism for the socialisation of 
officials in common ways of thinking.368 Furthermore, one would have expected that 
elite norm diffusion would operate more through CEAs than through RTAs, because of 
the much closer involvement of Competition Authority officials, who participate in 
OECD meetings, in negotiating CEAs. The statistical results that show a much stronger 
relationship between depth of enforcement cooperation and OECD membership in 
CEAs than in RTAs provide support for this.  
 
 
Overall, the evidence is that common membership of the OECD is a very strong 
predictor of the depth of enforcement cooperation. Given the very active role played by 
the OECD over the last few decades in promoting international competition policy 
cooperation, and the consensus that its activities have an impact, the results suggest that 
membership of the OECD is likely to be a causal factor. Further empirical analysis is 
required to test this conclusion, however, both case study research, and additional 
multivariate analysis that attempts to control for the effects of confounding variables 
e.g. democracy.  
 
 
Finally, when the data are disaggregated into CEAs and RTAs some differences are 
apparent in the relationship between the depth of enforcement cooperation and 
independent variables. There are theoretical reasons to expect some differences between 
CEAs and RTAs in this respect. First, RTAs are multi-sector instruments, which allow 
bargaining and trade-offs across issue areas. This can expand the set of feasible 
outcomes in the direction of deeper enforcement cooperation. Secondly, CEAs are 
negotiated directly by competition officials, and this facilitates the development of the 
                                                           
368 Waller, 1999, p. 1125, cited in Slaughter 2004, p. 253. 
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trust necessary to support deeper agency to agency cooperation. These factors are 
reflected in the fact that the deepest cooperation (level 7) is found only amongst 
countries that are signatory to an RTA; and the deepest competition policy-specific 
agreements (level 6) are CEAs. They may also be a factor in two of the further findings 
in this Chapter – when economic symmetry and geographic proximity are high, RTAs 
are somewhat more likely to feature high enforcement cooperation than are CEAs. 
However, it is difficult to discern a theoretical explanation for the difference in the 
relationship between CEAs and RTAs, on the one hand, and the level of trade 
integration, or advanced economy status on the other. When disaggregated, the number 
of agreements is relatively small, and there may be idiosyncratic features relating to a 
small number of agreements that is affecting the relationships. Further statistical 
analysis and case study research may help to throw additional light on this.
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Table 25:  Summary Table: International Cooperation in Enforcing Competition Laws 
 
 
Agreement 
 
Year 
signed 
 
EJI 
rating 
 
EJI 
High 
(4 +) 
 
EJI 
High 
(5 +) 
 
Both 
CEA 
and 
RTA1 
 
OECD  
only 
 
Advanced 
economy   
only 
 
High 
trade 
integ.2 
 
High 
eco. 
symm.3 
 
High legal 
similarity4 
 
Share 
land 
border5 
 
Same 
region6 
 
“Inter-
governmental” 
 
              
A.  Stand-
alone 
Competition 
Enforcement 
Agreements 
(CEAs) 
             
Germany-US 1976 4 1 0 0 1 1 1 0  0 0 1 
Australia-US 1982 4 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
EC-US  1991 5 1 1 0 1 1 1 1  0 0 1 
Canada-US 1995 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
                                                           
1 This column records the existence of both a stand-alone competition enforcement agreement between the parties, and an RTA containing competition enforcement provisions. 
 
2 High trade integration is defined as the top half of the sample in terms of the ratio of total merchandise trade between each signatory as a percentage of each signatories’ total global 
merchandise trade. 
 
3 High economic symmetry is defined (following Smith 2000), for a bilateral agreement, as where neither country’s GDP exceeds 70% of joint GDP; and for a pluritalateral 
agreement, where the largest country’s GDP share is not more than twice as large as the second largest country’s share. 
 
4 High legal similarity is defined as a score of 45+ on the Bollard index (see Table 14). 
 
5 Where an agreement has more than two signatories, it is ranked as involving countries with a common land border if half or more of the signatories have a common border. 
 
6 As defined by UNCTAD 2008 in terms of sub-regions; except where countries share a land border, they are always scored here as being in the same region. Where an agreement 
has more than two signatories, it is ranked as involving countries from the same region if half or more of the signatories are from the same region. 
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Agreement 
 
Year 
of sig. 
 
EJI 
rating 
 
EJI 
High 
(4 +) 
 
EJI 
High 
(5 +) 
 
Both 
CEA 
and 
RTA 
 
OECD  
only 
 
DC  only 
 
High 
trade 
integ. 
 
High 
eco. 
symm. 
 
High legal 
similarity 
 
Share 
land 
border 
 
Same 
region 
 
“Inter-
governmental” 
 
Australia-
Taipei 
1996 4 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
China-Russia 1996 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  1 1 1 
Lithuania-
Ukraine 
1996 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 1 0 
Hungary-
Russian Fed. 
1997 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0  0 1 0 
EC-US 1998 6 1 1 0 1 1 1 1  0 0 1 
Australia-US 1999 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Brazil-US 1999 5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0  0 0 1 
Israel-US 1999 5 1 1 0 0 1 1 0  0 0 1 
Japan-US 1999 5 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Canada-EC 1999 5 1 1 0 1 1 0 0  0 0 1 
Australia-
Papua New 
Guinea 
1999 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 0  0 1 0 
China-
Kazakhstan 
1999 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  1 1 1 
Korea-Russia 1999 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  0 0 0 
CIS Regs. 1999 4 1 0 1 0 0 1 0  1 1 1 
Mexico-US 2000 5 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Australia-
Canada- NZ 
2000 4 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 A-C 1 
C-NZ 1 
0 0 0 
Canada-
Mexico 
2001 5 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Denmark-
Iceland-
Norway  
2001 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 1 0 
Canada-Chile 2001 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 
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Agreement 
 
Year 
signed 
 
EJI 
rating 
 
EJI 
High 
(4 +) 
 
EJI 
High 
(5 +) 
 
Both 
CEA 
and 
RTA 
 
OECD  
only 
 
DC  only 
 
High 
trade 
integ. 
 
High 
eco. 
symm. 
 
High legal 
similarity 
 
Share 
land 
border 
 
Same 
region 
 
“Inter-
governmental” 
 
Brazil-Russia 2001 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  0 0 1 
Australia-
Korea 
2002 4 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Australia- NZ-
Taiwan 
2002 4 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 A-T 0 
NZ-T 1 
0 0 0 
Australia-Fiji 2002 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0  0 1 0 
ECA Mergers  2002 4 1 0 1 1 1  0  1 1 0 
Australia-NZ-
UK 
2003 4 1 0 0 1 1 1 0  0 0 0 
Canada-UK 2003 4 1 0 0 1 1 0 1  0 0 0 
CIS- Korea 
Latvia-
Romania 
2003 2 0 0 0 0 0  1  0 0 0 
EC-Japan 2003 5 1 1 0 1 1 1 0  0 0 0 
ECN (Reg. 
1/2003) 
2003 7 1 1 1 0 0 1 1  1 1 1 
Mexico-
Russian Fed. 
2003 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  0 0 0 
Bolivia-
Russian Fed. 
2003 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 
Canada-US 2004 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
France-Taiwan  2004 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0  0 0 0 
Korea -
Mexico 
2004 5 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
EC-Korea  2004 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 0  0 0 0 
Russian Fed.-
Sweden 
2004 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 1 0 
China-EC 2004 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1  0 0 0 
Canada -Japan  2005 5 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
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Agreement 
 
Year 
signed 
 
EJI 
rating 
 
EJI 
High 
(4 +) 
 
EJI 
High 
(5 +) 
 
Both 
CEA 
and 
RTA 
 
OECD  
only 
 
DC  only 
 
High 
trade 
integ. 
 
High 
eco. 
symm. 
 
High legal 
similarity 
 
Share 
land 
border 
 
Same 
region 
 
“Inter-
governmental” 
 
Korea -Turkey 2005 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 1  0 0 0 
Romania-
Turkey 
2005 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Australia-NZ 2006 4 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1  1 0 
Canada-Korea  2006 4 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Albania-
Greece 
2006 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0  1 1 0 
Armenia-
Moldova 
2007 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 1  0 0 0 
Australia-NZ 2007 4 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Mongolia-
Taiwan 
2007 2 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 
Portugal-
Turkey  
2008 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 0  0 0 0 
              
Total CEAs  
(percentage) 
51  32 
63% 
16 
31% 
13 26 
51% 
 
25 
49% 
 
26 
51% 
19 
37% 
 9 
18% 
 
17 
33% 
 
19 
37% 
 
              
B. RTAs with 
enforcement 
cooperation 
             
EC 1958 7 1 1  1 1 1 1  1 1 1 
EFTA 1960 7 1 1  1 1 1 0  0 1 1 
ANDEAN 
Group 
(Decision 285) 
1991 7 1 1  0 0 0 1  1 1 1 
EEA 1994 7 1 1  1 1 1 0  0 1 1 
NAFTA 1994 3 0 0  1 0 1 0 All 1 1 1 1 
WAEMU 1994 7 1 1  0 0 1 0  1 1 1 
EC-Turkey 1996 5 1 1  1 0 1 0  1 1 1 
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Agreement 
 
Year 
signed 
 
EJI 
rating 
 
EJI 
High 
(4 +) 
 
EJI 
High 
(5 +) 
 
Both 
CEA 
and 
RTA 
 
OECD  
only 
 
DC  only 
 
High 
trade 
integ. 
 
High 
eco. 
symm. 
 
High legal 
similarity 
 
Share 
land 
border 
 
Same 
region 
 
“Inter-
governmental” 
 
Canada-Israel 1997 3 0 0  0 1 0 0  0 0 1 
Canada-Chile 1997 3 0 0  0 0 0 0  0 0 1 
Chile-Mexico 1999 2 0 0  0 0 0 0  0 0 1 
CEMAC 1/99 1999 7 1 1  0 0 0 0  1 1 1 
CARICOM 
Protocol VIII 
2000 7 1 1  0 0 1 1  0 1 1 
EC-Mexico 2000 4 1 0  1 0 0 0  0 0 1 
Israel-Mexico 2000 3 0 0  0 0 0 0  0 0 1 
EC-South 
Africa 
2000 5 1 1  0 0 1 0  0 0 1 
EFTA-Mexico 2001 5 1 1  1 0 0 0  0 0 1 
NZ-Singapore 2001 2 0 0  0 1 0 1  0 0 1 
Japan-
Singapore 
2002 4 1 0  0 1 1 0  0 0 1 
Canada-Costa 
Rica 
2002 4 1 0  0 0 0 0  0 0 1 
SACU 2002 2 0 0  0 0    1 1 1 
Algeria-EC 2002 4 1 0  0 0 1 0  0 0 1 
Chile-EC 2003 4 1 0  0 0 1 0  0 0 1 
EFTA-
Singapore 
2003 2 0 0  0 1 0 0  0 0 1 
Australia-
Singapore 
2003 2 0 0  0 1 0 0  0 0 1 
Chile-EFTA 2004 5 1 1  0 0 0 1  0 0 1 
Chile-Korea 2004 4 1 0  0 0 0 0  0 0 1 
Chile-US 2004 3 0 0  0 0 1 0  0 0 1 
Singapore-US 2004 2 0 0  0 1 1 0  0 0 1 
COMESA 
Regs 
2004 7 1 1  0 0 1 0  1 1 1 
Australia-US 2005 5 1 1  1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
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Agreement 
 
Year 
entry 
in 
force 
 
EJI 
rating 
 
EJI 
High 
(4 +) 
 
EJI 
High 
(5 +) 
 
Both 
CEA 
and 
RTA 
 
OECD  
only 
 
DC  only 
 
High 
trade 
integ. 
 
High 
eco. 
symm. 
 
High legal 
similarity 
 
Share 
land 
border 
 
Same 
region 
 
“Inter-
governmental” 
 
Japan-Mexico 2005 5 1 1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Australia-
Thailand 
2005 3 0 0  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
NZ-Thailand 2005 3 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Brunei-Chile- 
NZ- Singapore 
2006 4 1 0  0 0 0 1  0 0 1 
Korea-
Singapore 
2006 2 0 0  0 1 0 0  0 0 1 
Panama-
Singapore 
2006 2 0 0  0 0 1 0  0 0 1 
EFTA-Korea 2006 3 0 0  1 1 0 0  0 0 1 
Japan-
Philippines 
2006 2 0 0  0 0 1 0  0 1 1 
EFTA-
Lebanon 
2007 2 0 0  0 0 0 0  0 0 1 
Japan-
Thailand 
2007 3 0 0  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Chile-Japan 2007 2 0 0  0 0 0 0  0 0 1 
              
              
Total  RTAs  
(percentage) 
41  21 
51% 
14 
34% 
13 10 
24% 
12 
29% 
18 
44% 
7 
17% 
 8 
20% 
12 
29% 
41 
100% 
              
Total CEAs  
(percentage) 
51  32 
63% 
16 
31% 
 26 
51% 
25 
49% 
26 
51% 
19 
37% 
 9 
18% 
17 
33% 
19 
37% 
              
Total CEAs 
and RTAs 
92  53 
58% 
30 
33% 
13 36 
39% 
37 
40% 
44 
48% 
26 
28% 
 17 
18% 
29 
32% 
60 
65% 
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PART   4 
_________________________________________ 
       
    
 
Conclusion  
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Chapter 15 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
THESIS CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
15.1 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
 
The burgeoning literature on globalization has focused on international economic 
integration, but has paid relatively little attention to international policy integration as a 
distinct phenomenon. The result is that there is no recognized direct measure of the 
depth of international policy cooperation, in terms of measuring the extent to which 
states voluntarily agree to limit their authority to make and/or to implement policies. 
 
Existing indicators use proxies that are less and less accurate as measurements of the 
depth of policy cooperation – such as the number of treaties a country has signed or 
whether an RTA is an FTA or a Customs Union. International economic cooperation 
increasingly takes place directly between government agencies and their counterparts in 
other states, rather than in formal government-to-government agreements such as FTAs. 
And, with respect to FTAs, merely counting their increasing number fails to account for 
the very wide variation across and within different FTAs, in the extent to which their 
provisions impinge on signatories’ authority to make or to enforce rules free from 
external interference or involvement. 
 
There appear to have been few previous attempts to directly measure the depth of 
international policy cooperation. There have also been few attempts to assess policy 
cooperation in a specific policy domain across the different international instruments in 
which such cooperation is embodied. A number of studies, for instance, analyze 
international policy cooperation in a particular policy domain by looking only at the 
provisions in RTAs, or only at the provisions in stand-alone Competition Enforcement 
Agreements. 
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This thesis has attempted to address this “international policy cooperation deficit” in a 
comprehensive and systematic way. It has done so by: 
1. Developing a new conceptual framework based on the concept of state 
jurisdiction rather than state sovereignty. 
2. Defining a new variable to measure the depth of international economic 
policy cooperation – jurisdictional integration – and designing instruments 
to measure distinct dimensions of jurisdictional integration in the field of 
competition policy. 
3. Compiling a comprehensive dataset of international competition policy 
cooperation agreements, and ranking the agreements against the ordinal 
indices. 
4. Generating summary descriptive statistics, and testing descriptive 
propositions in the literature. 
5. Conducting exploratory statistical analysis of hypothesized relationships 
between the depth of policy cooperation and a range of predictor variables. 
  
The “international policy cooperation deficit” is first and foremost due to the fact that 
there is no conceptually coherent basis for measuring the depth of international policy 
cooperation. A key finding of the literature reviews was that insufficient attention has 
been paid to the phenomena of voluntarily agreed limitations on a state’s recognised 
authority to make and to enforce policies. For instance, international law has focused on 
the problem of excessive extra-territorial assertions of state jurisdiction, and of 
overlapping and conflicting jurisdiction, rather than on the degree of intrusion on 
jurisdiction voluntarily agreed to between states. International relations theorists, on the 
other hand – with the exception of a neglected literature on regional integration from the 
1960s, and the recent legalization literature – have focused on the conditions under 
which cooperation occurs, and the functions cooperation performs, rather than how 
cooperation varies in its impact on de jure state authority.  
 
These conceptual shortcomings are inevitably reflected in an inability to satisfactorily 
measure the depth of international policy cooperation. Existing datasets were primarily 
compiled to measure phenomena such as the legal form of an agreement, the simple 
presence or absence of specific agreement features, or the extent to which provisions are 
compatible with the multilateral trading system, not to measure the depth of 
cooperation.  
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To address these conceptual shortcomings, the fundamental but contested concept of 
state sovereignty must be revisited. Responding to calls for “research on the 
transformation of fundamental structures in international relations” (Ruggie, 1993), and 
an “…almost urgent need for much better analytical and disaggregated explorations of 
…international economic law concepts” (Jackson, 2006), the thesis has argued that the 
concept of state jurisdiction is more conceptually coherent than the concept of state 
sovereignty.  
 
In particular, the thesis introduces the concept of jurisdictional integration to better 
characterise the contemporary practice of state sovereignty. Drawing on established 
categories of international law, jurisdictional integration is defined as a process by 
which a state chooses, through entering formal agreements with other states, to restrict 
its recognized authority to autonomously make and/or to enforce decisions in a specific 
policy domain. 
 
Jurisdictional integration constitutes a new variable to measure the depth of 
international economic policy cooperation. It is conceptually similar to, but more 
precise than Krasner’s concept of “compromises of Westphalian sovereignty by 
invitation.”  
 
The conceptual framework thus builds on and is fully consistent with core concepts in 
international law, relating to state jurisdiction. It is also consistent with international 
relations scholarship on the nature of state sovereignty. 
 
The distinct dimensions of jurisdictional integration identified in the thesis facilitate the 
identification and coherent categorization of the diverse range of international economic 
cooperation provisions. The new taxonomy introduced – simple cooperation, 
coordination, horizontal integration, vertical integration – also facilitates a richer 
discussion and a more precise exploration of policy alternatives than the prevailing 
“binary” approaches, such as shallow or deep cooperation, soft or hard law, or 
intergovernmental or supranational agreements. 
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The thesis then attempted to demonstrate that jurisdictional integration is not only more 
conceptually coherent as a characterization of international economic policy 
cooperation, it is also more tractable.  
 
To that end, two approaches were taken to operationalize the conceptual framework 
erected in Part 2 of the thesis. First, the concept of jurisdictional integration was applied 
to an existing WTO dataset of non-tariff provisions in RTAs. This yielded a measure of 
the changing depth of policy cooperation in RTAs. This new approach to the data 
reveals that the aggregate level of policy cooperation in RTAs signed between 1990-
1998 was over six times higher than in pre-1990 RTAs; and that the average incidence 
of the deep policy cooperation provisions per RTA increased by 118% between the two 
periods. 
 
For the period to 1998, these results constitute evidence refuting the hypothesis that 
multilateral trade liberalization leads to less politically integrated RTAs. The results 
also provide limited support for the hypothesis put forward in this thesis, that 
international economic policy cooperation is a complement to the increase in the 
number of countries - building on Alesina and Spolaore, 2003, whose research explored 
the relationship between trade liberalization and the size and number of countries. 
 
The WTO dataset on non-tariff provisions does not allow for measurement of the depth 
of policy cooperation by country. Nor is there, to the author’s knowledge, an existing 
dataset of the provisions of a substantial number of international economic agreements 
that would allow the ranking of countries by the depth of policy cooperation.  
 
Therefore, to provide further evidence of the utility of the concept of jurisdictional 
integration, a new dataset was constructed of international agreements containing 
provisions on competition policy cooperation. This dataset is significantly larger than 
existing datasets in this field, and spans both RTAs and stand-alone Competition 
Enforcement Agreements, rather than being confined to one instrument. The dataset is 
available for use by other researchers. 
  
Competition policy is a good candidate to pilot this research approach, for a number of 
reasons. First, increasingly mobile economic actors create the need for increased 
“regulatory reach” and potential jurisdictional conflict. Secondly, the rapid expansion in 
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the number of countries that have national competition laws has increased the potential 
for jurisdictional conflicts. Thirdly, there is a growing number of international 
agreements of various types that are publicly available. Finally, for some time there has 
been a high level of international policy and research interest in international 
cooperation in competition policy, in part reflecting heightened concern over the 
welfare costs of international anti-competitive activities. For instance, it has been 
estimated that the monopoly rent extracted by international cartels is in the range of 
US$20-25 billion per annum, approaching half the volume of total international 
development assistance.369 
 
Measuring the depth of international competition policy cooperation required the 
construction of new measurement instruments. To that end, ordinal indices of 
jurisdictional integration, across the different domains of state jurisdiction, were 
designed. These are based on the framework of jurisdictional integration constructed in 
Part 2 of the thesis.  
 
The indices were then used to rank the depth of enforcement cooperation in 92 
international agreements. As a result of the influence of successive OECD 
Recommendations, and of key Competition Enforcement Agreements, there is a high 
degree of clarity around the concepts and terminology in this area, and a high degree of 
uniformity of substantive provisions across different international agreements 
containing provisions on enforcement cooperation. This facilitated the identification of 
discrete levels of jurisdictional integration, and the reliable coding of agreements 
against the indices. These rankings by depth of enforcement cooperation are similarly 
available to other researchers. 
 
Compared to the binary distinction that is typical of many pre-existing approaches, the 
ordinal indices provide a more detailed ordering of distinct levels of depth of 
cooperation. It is difficult to use existing methods to directly compare the depth of 
policy cooperation across regions, across instrument types, or across different chapters 
in an RTA, because they mainly rely on proxies for depth of policy cooperation rather 
than direct measures. The method developed here facilitates comparisons between 
different regional agreements, including incorporation of the EC in such comparisons, 
and it is capable of comparing integration arrangements of varying types. This 
                                                           
369 Jenny, 2003, pp. 615-616. 
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functionality has been identified in the literature on comparative regional integration as 
a gap. 
 
The indices of depth of jurisdictional integration build on the work of an earlier wave of 
scholars of regional integration, lead by Lindberg and Nye, who were interested in 
measuring levels of regional integration, and whose contribution has been somewhat 
neglected. The indices also build on the recent literature on the legalization of 
international relations, by adding to that literature’s focus on adjudication, the important 
dimensions of prescriptive and non-judicial enforcement cooperation. The thesis also 
builds on the research by Smith (2000), whose index of legalism in dispute settlement 
mechanisms in RTAs is conceptually similar, and was drawn on in developing the index 
of integration of inter-state adjudication jurisdiction in this thesis. Smith’s use of the 
index of legalism to test hypotheses about the causes of legalism in RTAs shows the 
potential for this general approach to add value. This thesis generalises Smith’s 
approach to all types of international economic cooperation, and all types of agreements 
and instruments.  
 
The 92 enforcement cooperation agreements were then used to compile summary 
statistics describing the nature of international cooperation in this field. These were used 
to test a number of descriptive propositions in the literature about the nature of 
international competition policy cooperation. Some of the propositions were found to be 
less than accurate, others to be no longer accurate, or to apply to one but not both types 
of agreement. For instance: 
1. While the proportion of all enforcement cooperation agreements that are 
between OECD members is declining, as asserted in the literature, a different 
picture emerges from an analysis by instrument type. The proportion of stand-
alone Competition Enforcement Agreements involving only OECD countries 
actually increased in the period 2000-2008, while there was a more than off-
setting fall in the number of RTAs with provisions on competition enforcement 
cooperation that involved only OECD members.  
2. It is no longer correct that the US is a partner in the majority of stand-alone 
Competition Enforcement Agreements. While the US was a party to just over 
half (55%) of all such agreements in the period prior to 1999, in the most recent 
period (1999-2008) it is a party to only six (15%) of the forty one agreements. 
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3. It is not correct that RTAs signed by developed economies other than the EC 
mostly pursue enforcement cooperation, rather than convergence of substantive 
competition policies. Approximately half of such agreements contain policy 
convergence provisions – albeit entailing low-level policy cooperation - but no 
enforcement cooperation, and half contain enforcement cooperation provisions 
in addition to policy cooperation.  
4. It is no longer correct that less developed countries find it virtually impossible to 
sign a Competition Enforcement Agreement with a developed country. In the 
period 1999-2002, there were seven new agreements of this type, and between 
2003 and 2008 there were nine such new agreements, representing over a third 
of all new agreements in each period. 
5. There are hard cooperation agreements involving less developed countries – if 
hard cooperation is defined to include vertical integration of enforcement 
authority. There are five vertically integrated RTAs between less developed 
countries. If hard cooperation is defined to include positive comity, there are 9 
agreements involving less developed countries that contain this provision. 
6. Overall, positive comity is indeed rarely found in RTAs. However, in the most 
recent period (2000-2007) one in six new RTAs that contain competition 
enforcement provisions contains a positive comity clause.  
7. While international competition policy enforcement cooperation in the form of 
CEAs is primarily transgovernmental, once competition chapters in RTAs are 
incorporated in the analysis, international cooperation in this domain is 
predominantly an “intergovernmental” phenomenon – when 
“intergovernmental” is defined as government-to-government agreements rather 
than agency-to-agency agreements. 
 
The data also show that the depth of enforcement cooperation in the aggregate has 
increased over time. There were 63 agreements in the period 2000-2008, but only 29 in 
the entire period prior to 2000. There is a clear tendency for earlier agreements to be 
supplemented or replaced by deeper agreements between the same signatories. At the 
same time, this deepening has been accompanied by broadening: an increasing number 
of shallower FTAs have been signed by countries newly active in international 
competition policy cooperation, so that the median and modal depth of agreements fell 
in 2000-2008 compared to the previous period. 
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Limited measurements are also reported of the depth of prescriptive jurisdictional 
integration in RTAs and Competition Enforcement Agreements, and the depth of 
cooperation in multilateral instruments, in order to illustrate how the concept of 
jurisdictional integration enables the identification of new “families” of agreements.  
 
To this end, a vector approach was suggested as a means to succinctly summarise the 
depth of key dimensions of policy cooperation in an agreement or set of agreements. A 
vector summary provides a more precise method of describing the key differences 
between RTAs across regions, allowing more ready comparisons between the same 
types of international policy cooperation irrespective of the instrument in which they are 
contained.  
 
The final step in the thesis was to use the ranked agreements to test hypotheses of the 
relationship between international economic policy cooperation, as the dependent 
variable, and a range of predictor variables. The main findings from this analysis are: 
1. We can be very confident that enforcement cooperation is low when 
signatories’ substantive competition laws are dissimilar. Similarity of 
substantive competition laws appears to be a necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition for deep international cooperation between Competition 
Authorities. This result casts doubt on a rival hypothesis, that enforcement 
cooperation is a substitute for convergence of competition laws. 
2. Common OECD membership is a very good predictor of the depth of 
enforcement cooperation between signatories, while common advanced 
economy status is only a moderately good predictor. Disaggregating by 
instrument type reveals that all the difference is due to RTAs, for which 
advanced economy status is a poor predictor of depth of cooperation.  
3. Enforcement cooperation is deeper in Customs Unions than in FTAs, but the 
data do not support the hypothesis that this gap is narrowing over time.  
4. Within RTAs, Customs Unions as a category are becoming less and less 
relevant. Nearly all recent RTAs are FTAs. It is variation in the depth of 
enforcement cooperation in FTAs that should be the object of more 
attention.  
5. The level of trade integration between countries appears to be a moderately 
good predictor of their depth of competition enforcement cooperation.  
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6. The level of economic asymmetry between signatories is a weak predictor of 
the depth of their enforcement cooperation.   
7. Geographic proximity appears to play little role in influencing the depth of 
enforcement cooperation in stand-alone competition enforcement 
agreements, but it is a good predictor of the depth of competition 
enforcement cooperation in RTAs.  
8. When using jurisdictional integration as a predictor variable rather than the 
dependent variable, the depth of enforcement cooperation is a very good 
predictor of the legal form of the agreement i.e. whether an agreement is 
transgovernmental, or a more formal “intergovernmental” agreement. 
9. Finally, the combination of agreements that involve only OECD members, 
and that are “inter-governmental,” appears to be a very good predictor of the 
depth of enforcement cooperation. When both of these variables are present, 
enforcement cooperation is high in 93% of cases (21/23 agreements). 
 
This thesis contributes to the small empirical literature on the causes of international 
policy cooperation, which at present is largely confined to studies looking at a binary 
choice of cooperation versus no cooperation. Examples include Mansfield, Milner and 
Rosendorff 2002, and Baier and Bergstrand 2002, who investigate why countries sign or 
do not sign RTAs; and Simmons 2000, who investigates the determinants of country 
acceptance of IMF obligations to maintain current account convertibility. An alternative 
approach is that taken by Wu 2004, who uses the stage of economic integration as a 
combined measure of economic and policy integration, rather than directly measuring 
the depth of policy cooperation.  
 
In the field of competition policy, the results of this thesis build on the finding by 
Cernat with respect to the inclusion of consultation and notification provisions in North-
South and North-North RTAs (as discussed in Chapter 11.2). Cernat found that a 
slightly higher percentage of North-South RTAs contain notification provisions of any 
kind compared to North-North RTAs. When CEAs are incorporated in the analysis, and 
the depth of cooperation is measured in addition to the presence of a notification clause, 
North-North agreements are found to be much deeper on average than North-South 
agreements. 
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This empirical literature also includes the study by Smith of the determinants of the 
depth of legalism in dispute settlement mechanisms in RTAs (Smith 2000). Smith 
directly measures the depth of cooperation in a particular field, given the prior decision 
to cooperate. He developed a new index of legalism, which is analogous to the depth of 
policy cooperation, and found that legalism in RTAs was low where economic 
asymmetry between partners was high. His explanation for this was that large 
economies gain relatively less from trade, and are unwilling to constrain their ability to 
resort to diplomatic power to settle disputes with smaller economies e.g. by issue 
linkage, or the threat of retaliatory sanctions. This finding supports a realist perspective 
on international relations, where the wishes of more powerful states tend to prevail. 
 
At first glance, the finding in this thesis, that the depth of competition enforcement 
cooperation is almost invariant to the level of economic asymmetry, is in contrast to 
Smith’s finding, and to a realist perspective. However, two points should be borne in 
mind. First, with the exception of the deepest level of enforcement cooperation – 
vertical integration – none of the international competition enforcement agreements 
have binding force. This is in contrast to the deeper levels of Smith’s legalism index, 
which are binding. Therefore, the logic suggesting that larger economies will be 
unwilling to constrain their policy flexibility, has much less force in the case of 
competition policy.  
 
Secondly, part of the motivation of the US and the EC in signing deeper cooperation 
agreements with smaller (developed) economies is likely to reflect their desire to export 
their approach to competition law and its enforcement. Regulatory competition is very 
much in line with a realist perspective of international relations. The literature on 
international competition policy supports regulatory export being an important 
motivation for the US and the EC e.g. Raustiala 2002, Slaughter 2004, pp. 174-176.  
 
The findings in this thesis suggest that OECD membership is likely to be an important 
factor influencing the depth of international agreements to cooperate in enforcing 
competition policies. This provides some support for elite norm diffusion as a causal 
mechanism of international economic policy cooperation. The qualitative literature on 
international economic policy cooperation strongly suggests the possibility that the 
OECD has been influential in this policy domain. 
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Both elite norm diffusion via the OECD, and regulatory competition, are possible 
explanations for the relatively weak relationship found between depth of enforcement 
cooperation and geographic proximity. They may also result in some masking of the 
functionalist, economic causal mechanisms, such as level of trade between signatories, 
and the level of economic asymmetry. 
 
Finally, this thesis builds on the emerging literature on transgovernmentalism in 
international law and international relations, by: 
1. Suggesting a new approach to operationalizing the dependent variable. 
2. Assembling a large cross-country dataset rather than using a case study method. 
3. Finding that international cooperation in enforcing competition policies is 
primarily “intergovernmental” rather than transgovernmetal, in contrast to 
previous studies. 
4. Finding that the depth of international cooperation in enforcing competition 
policies is a very good predictor of whether an agreement is 
“intergovernmental.” This finding supports a hypothesis that states are less 
likely to delegate authority to their competition agencies to sign international 
agreements that impinge on the state’s enforcement jurisdiction. 
 
15.2 LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
15.2.1 Potential Limitations of this Research 
The first potential limitation of the thesis is the validity of the concept of jurisdictional 
integration. The fact that the concept is based on analytical distinctions in authoritative 
texts in international law (such as The Third Restatement) and international relations 
(such as Krasner’s work on sovereignty) provides a measure of confidence that the 
conceptual framework is sound, although no doubt in this initial formulation it can 
benefit from further improvement and refinement. Applying the framework of 
jurisdictional integration to additional policy domains will provide a good opportunity 
to do so. The full application of the index of integration of enforcement jurisdiction to 
the 92 agreements entailed an iterative refinement of that index. There is a need to 
similarly further develop and refine the indices in Chapter 10 of integration of 
prescriptive, judicial enforcement, and inter-state adjudication in competition policy; 
and to operationalize the concept of executive implementation jurisdiction  
in Chapter 5.2.  
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A second question is how significant are the different levels on the index of 
enforcement cooperation? With most of the agreements being non-binding, and in many 
cases only limited actual use being made of the cooperation provisions in them, it could 
be argued that too much significance is being placed on differences in the wording of 
the agreements. Guzman, for instance, states that bilateral agreements i.e. Competition 
Enforcement Agreements as defined here, are extremely limited tools because they fail 
to bind states to coordinate laws or commit them to share information or otherwise 
cooperate.370 It is clear, however, that the benchmark against which Guzman was 
judging bilateral agreements is a legally binding international commitment that imposes 
substantive or procedural rules of some kind, and perhaps even a supranational 
competition authority.  
 
The fact that most current international competition cooperation agreements fall well 
short of a legally binding obligation does not, however, render them homogenous, in 
terms of their impact on states’ authority to enforce their competition laws without the 
need to engage in any form of discussion, justification, or cooperative action with other 
states. The glass of international competition cooperation may not be half full, but 
neither is it empty. States go to considerable lengths to negotiate the wording of 
international agreements and international standards (as argued, for instance, by Chayes 
and Chayes, 1995, pp. 3-4). This is true also in competition policy cooperation. State 
behaviour suggests that the inclusion or exclusion of different provisions is regarded as 
salient. Leading international lawyers, such as Slaughter, consider the concept of 
positive comity, developed largely in the anti-trust community, to be a significant 
development and have advocated its expansion to other policy domains.371 Some 
commentators, such as Zanettin, consider some bilateral CEAs to be binding under 
international law.372 The very strong relationship found in this thesis, between the 
existence of provisions such as positive comity, and the legal form of the agreement, 
lends support to the view that such provisions do indeed reflect a deeper level of 
international cooperation – or at least, they reflect a deeper level of intended or 
permitted cooperation, as there may still be obstacles to actual cooperation, such as 
constraints on sharing confidential information. 
                                                           
370 Guzman 2007, pp. 426-427. 
 
371 Slaughter, 2004, pp. 250-253. Quotation is from p. 250.  
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Furthermore, in all cases the statistical tests in this thesis use a binary approach, in  
which the 7 levels on the enforcement cooperation index are collapsed into two 
(high/low cooperation). This greatly reduces the scope for statistical results to be driven 
by spurious or immaterial distinctions between broadly similar levels of cooperation. In 
addition, in a number of instances level 5, positive comity, is used as the threshold 
between low and high cooperation to test the sensitivity of results to the specification of 
high cooperation. Positive comity, as noted, is widely regarded as a significant and 
deeper level of cooperation. In addition, in some cases the sensitivity of the results to 
the inclusion of agreements at level 7 on the index – the binding agreements involving 
vertical integration – is tested on the basis that these agreements are arguably of a 
different character, rather than just constituting a higher level on the same index. 
 
A related potential limitation is the validity of the indices of jurisdictional integration 
with respect to competition policy, particularly the index of enforcement cooperation on 
which most of the statistical analysis is based. The well-established and carefully 
defined concepts of international enforcement cooperation (such as notification, positive 
comity, and third party enforcement) appear to provide coherent gradations of 
increasing depth of cooperation. These are confirmed in the extensive literature on the 
subject. In addition, the progressive evolution of the OECD Recommendations through 
the addition of deeper levels of cooperation, and the manner in which bilateral and 
regional agreements have evolved in practice, in some cases foreshadowing future 
deepening, provide further confidence that the enforcement cooperation index does 
measure what it purports to measure: increasing degrees of intrusion on the recognized 
authority of signatory states to enforce their competition laws free from external 
interference or involvement. This confidence is increased by the fact that there is a 
consistent progression of cooperation provisions in most of the agreements rated. For 
instance, in nearly all cases, agreements coded level 5 or 6 contain cooperation 
provisions from all the lower cooperation levels as well. 
 
The next potential limitation is the reliability of the coding of agreements against the 
index. Even if the enforcement cooperation index is coherent and well designed, if the 
92 agreements have not been accurately coded this would call into question the validity 
of the statistical results. Relevant here is the fact that the influence of the OECD 
                                                                                                                                                                              
372 Zanettin, 2002, p. 77. 
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Recommendations, and of key bilateral agreements, has resulted in a high degree of 
uniformity in structure and language across these agreements. In many cases, identical 
language is used in key clauses, such as notification and positive comity, based on the 
OECD Recommendations. This greatly facilitates the reliable coding of agreements.  
 
However, in view of the importance of this issue, an inter-rater reliability test was 
conducted. A random sample of 10 agreements was rated against the index by Dr. Philip 
Marsden, an expert in international competition policy cooperation. This resulted in an 
adjusted 90% rate of agreement, which provides a high degree of confidence in the 
reliability of the ratings. 
 
One inevitable limitation in this sort of research is that the dataset of international 
competition enforcement cooperation agreements may not be representative of the total 
population of such agreements. While the 92 agreements could well represent at least 
60% of all agreements, the fact that there are a number of known agreements missing 
from the dataset because they are not available in English, could represent a source of 
systematic bias in the descriptive or inferential results. It would be possible to analyse 
the missing agreements to check whether any of the results are dependent on the 
existing sample. Similarly, the small number of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties that 
are applicable to competition policy enforcement cooperation could be incorporated in 
the analysis. 
 
The analysis of the changing depth of policy cooperation in RTAs in Chapter 8 is also 
limited by the availability of data. It would be possible to apply the approach used here 
to analyse the depth of policy cooperation in post-1998 RTAs, to check whether there 
has been any further change in the most recent period. 
 
With respect to the statistical analysis, the objective has been to begin to explore 
relationships between the depth of international cooperation and some of the more 
salient predictor variables, rather than attempt to identify all the predictor variables and 
rigorously control for confounding effects. Additional multivariate analysis of 
relationships between predictor variables and the depth of enforcement cooperation 
would provide more complete and robust tests of possible confounding effects. 
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15.2.2 Possible Extensions of this Research 
The influence of additional predictor variables on the depth of international enforcement 
policy cooperation could be tested e.g. domestic political regime, country size, number 
of signatories, allies, former colonies. With respect to country size, it might be 
hypothesized that international economic policy cooperation will be deeper for smaller 
countries, because they are typically more open to and dependent on international trade. 
On the other hand, in the realm of competition policy, in small economies there will be 
more markets where the dominant firm has yet to attain a minimum scale for productive 
efficiency. Small countries may therefore have less of an incentive to curtail anti-
competitive conduct. This makes the relationship between country size and depth of 
international policy cooperation in competition policy theoretically ambiguous. 
 
International competition policy agreements could be ranked against the index of 
prescriptive jurisdictional integration, and the indices of adjudication jurisdictional 
integration, to further test the practicality of the approach taken in this thesis. This 
would also enable additional hypothesis testing, for example, of the relationship 
between economic asymmetry and the depth of prescriptive jurisdictional integration. 
However, measuring the depth of integration of prescriptive jurisdiction in competition 
policy may well be more difficult than measuring the depth of enforcement cooperation 
(and more difficult than measuring the depth of legalism, as carried out in Smith 2000). 
There may be less clear-cut categories and more grey areas, which could make reliable 
coding more difficult. 
 
An attempt could be made to combine measures of enforcement cooperation and 
prescriptive jurisdictional integration to produce a single quantitative rating of the depth 
of international competition policy cooperation by country. This could prove useful for 
research purposes, with the elements weighted according to the purpose at hand. 
 
There are inherent limitations to cross-country, cross-section analysis, that might be 
reduced by supplementing the approach taken in this thesis with a carefully designed 
case study e.g. to test the presence of an “OECD-effect” or a “NAFTA effect” in the 
diffusion of international cooperation; or to measure the relationship between de jure 
authority to cooperate and actual levels of cooperation (see below). 
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The thesis is confined to measuring the effects of depth of cooperation, given an 
existing cooperation agreement. This could be supplemented by a two-step approach, 
which also tests factors associated with decisions by countries over whether or not to 
sign cooperation agreements in the first place - similar to the approach of Mansfield, 
Milner and Rosendorff 2002 with respect to participation and non-participation in 
PTAs. 
 
It would also be interesting to analyse the relationship, in international competition 
policy enforcement cooperation, between de jure cooperation and de facto cooperation. 
This would require data on actual cooperation activities pursuant to international 
agreements, which may be difficult to obtain at a broad cross-country level, but which 
may be available through a case study approach e.g. the case study of competition 
cooperation by Marsden and Whelan (2005). 
 
The measures of depth of enforcement cooperation could be used as a predictor 
variable, rather than the dependent variable, in an attempt to discern what impact de jure 
cooperation has on variables of policy interest, such as levels of foreign investment or 
trade – similar to the research by Anderson and Evenett 2006. 
 
Analysis could also be attempted of the relationship between the different categories of 
jurisdiction. How do prescriptive, enforcement, and adjudicative jurisdictional 
integration co-vary in practice? What would be hypothesized? For instance, the 
American Law Institute has observed, with respect to prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction to adjudicate, that: “These categories of jurisdiction are 
often interdependent, and their scope and limitations are shaped by similar 
considerations. Jurisdiction to prescribe may be more acceptable where jurisdiction to 
adjudicate or to enforce is plainly available; jurisdiction to adjudicate may be more 
acceptable where the state of the forum also has jurisdiction to prescribe by virtue of its 
links to the persons, interests, relations or activities involved. However, the purposes 
and consequences of the different categories of jurisdiction are not necessarily 
congruent, and balancing the competing interests in the different contexts can lead to 
different results.”373  Testing these propositions would be worthwhile. 
 
                                                           
373 American Law Institute 1987, p. 233. 
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Taking a further step, the framework could be used to help explore normative questions 
such as what the policy options are for balancing the prescriptive and adjudicative 
powers. For instance, Trachtman has commented: “One of the core problems of the 
WTO is the imbalance between its dispute resolution authority, on the one hand, and its 
extremely limited legislative capacity.”374 Trachtman goes on to suggest a normative 
rule for the allocation of regulatory authority between states and international 
organisations such as the WTO: “The basic goal is to allocate authority to those to 
whom it is most valuable – those most greatly affected – at the lowest transaction cost.” 
The framework of jurisdictional integration and its different dimensions may help to 
identify the full range of horizontal and vertical policy options for allocating regulatory 
authority at the international level. 
 
15.2.3 Possible Applications to Other Policy Domains 
In principle, it should be possible to apply the analytical framework and measurement 
techniques developed in this thesis to other types of international economic cooperation. 
For example, the approach could be applied to: 
• Other Chapters in RTAs, such as Chapters on Investment, on Technical  
Barriers to Trade, on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, or to the 
provisions on Services. 
• Measuring the depth of cooperation in other policy domains across the 
different types of international agreements in which cooperation is embodied 
– for example, measuring the depth of cooperation in the regulation of 
international financial markets, and in international investment agreements, 
such as RTAs, Bilateral Investment Treaties, and the WTO 1994. 
• The comparative analysis of Regional Integration Agreements in different 
parts of the world, whether they are FTAs, Customs Unions, Common 
Markets or some other type of arrangement. 
• The comparative analysis of the depth of cooperation within the EU across 
different policy domains, for example by developing ordinal indices of the 
depth of cooperation. 
• Measuring the depth of international regulatory coordination in different 
domains, including steps such as mutual recognition of various types, 
convergence, harmonization, and third party enforcement.  
                                                           
374 Trachtman 2007, p. 649. 
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• Measuring the depth of international cooperation in the realm of fiscal 
policy. While fiscal authority is in general closely held by states (even in the 
EC), there is arguably a progression of steps at lower levels of cooperation. 
• Exploring why, in some policy domains, domain-specific cooperation 
between two or more countries is deeper than the general jurisdiction-to-
jurisdiction cooperation, while in other domains it is determined by the 
latter. 
 
However, it is not clear the extent to which there is sufficient data available to 
researchers in other policy domains to replicate the approach used in this thesis. 
It may also be the case that there is less uniformity of provisions and language in areas 
outside competition policy. The influence of the OECD Recommendations, and of key 
bilateral agreements, in creating a uniformity of approach and of specific clauses and 
language, may not be as apparent in some other policy domains, making the 
development of coherent indices, and the consistent coding of the depth of cooperation 
more difficult. 
 
It should be possible to replicate the approach in this thesis to measuring 
transgovernmentalism and intergovernmentalism in other policy domains. 
 
More broadly, it would be possible to attempt to devise a better, practical measure of a 
country’s overall depth of international policy cooperation, to replace the current 
measures of international “political engagement.” 
 
In the medium term, an attempt could be made to devise and operationalize a 
framework for measuring the horizontal scope of international (economic) policy 
cooperation – as conceived by Nye and Lindberg in the 1960s. This would make it 
possible to combine measures of vertical depth and horizontal scope to produce 
measures of the overall volume (or footprint) of international cooperation, by policy 
domain or domains, or even by country.  
 
Finally, it is recognized that the concept of jurisdictional integration has potential for 
broader application than to international economic agreements alone. In principle, it 
would appear capable of providing a framework for the conceptualisation and analysis 
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of the full range of international agreements.375 The choice of foreign economic policy 
as the domain of interest, reflects the fact that most international integration of policies 
and institutions (whether bilateral, regional or multilateral) has taken place in the form 
of trade and economic cooperation agreements - even though other policy objectives, 
such as defence and security, may at times have been the underlying driver. It also 
reflects the theoretical perspective from international relations theories (neo-realism, 
neo-liberal institutionalism) that international cooperation is more likely in the “low 
politics” areas of economic policy than the “high politics” areas of defence and security, 
where power relationships are expected to predominate. Confining the scope of this 
thesis to international economic cooperation, it is hoped, has successfully revealed the 
range of phenomena involved, while offering gains in tractability. Nevertheless, 
exploring the application of the concept of jurisdictional integration to international 
cooperation in non-economic policy domains, such as the environment, security, and 
human rights, could be a fruitful avenue for further research. 
 
 
 
                                                           
375 It might also be applied to the measurement and analysis of the allocation of functions between 
national and sub-national governments. 
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Appendix 1: Table of Selected Empirical Studies of International Policy Cooperation376 
 
Author Objective/thesis 
investigated 
Dependent 
variable 
Explanatory 
variables 
Data sources Methods Findings 
Smith, 2000 
 
 
 
 
Legalism reflects trade-
off between treaty 
compliance and policy 
discretion. Legalism 
most likely where 
economic asymmetry is 
low and proposed level 
of integration is high 
Levels of 
legalism in 
dispute 
settlement 
mechanisms in 
sixty-two 
RTAs signed 
1957-1995 
(both 
successful and 
failed 
agreements) 
Index of economic 
asymmetry, 
proposed level of 
integration (shallow 
(FTA, CU), deep 
(CM, EU)), and a 
term capturing 
interaction between 
these two 
 
Various (e.g. 
web sites, 
International 
Legal 
Materials, UN 
Treaty Series) 
Developed new index of 
legalism; Chi-squared tests 
of statistical significance 
between level of legalism, 
economic asymmetry, 
proposed depth of 
integration, and their 
interaction 
Ordered probit regression. 
Null hypothesis of 
independence rejected with 
very high levels of 
confidence (less than .01) 
suggesting significant 
relationship to legalism 
Economic asymmetry, interacting 
with the proposed depth of 
integration, is a robust predictor 
of dispute settlement design. 
 Legalism low where asymmetry 
high (even where proposed level 
of integration is deep). Where 
asymmetry low, legalism is high 
when proposed level of 
integration is deep 
Schiff, 2000 
 
Uses two theories – that 
multilateral trade 
liberalization (MTL) 
leads to more Regional 
Integration Agreements 
(RIAs) (Ethier) and that 
MTL leads to political 
disintegration (Alesina 
et al, below) to 
hypothesize that MTL 
will result in more, but 
less politically 
integrated RIAs 
The ratio of 
FTAs to 
Customs 
Unions, taken 
as a measure 
of policy and 
institutional 
integration 
Index of global 
openness (world 
exports to GDP) 
WTO for 
information on 
RTAs 
Simple ratio analysis Ratio of FTAs to Customs 
Unions 3-7 times higher in the 
1990s (following increased MTL 
in earlier decades) 
Ratio higher for north-south 
RIAs than for south-south RIAs 
(hypothesis: less heterogeneity in 
south-south) 
                                                           
376 These studies use levels of international policy cooperation as either the dependent variable or as a predictor variable. 
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Author Objective/thesis 
investigated 
Dependent 
variable 
Explanatory 
variables 
Data sources Methods Findings 
Mansfield, 
Milner and 
Rosendorff, 
2002 
To test whether more 
democratic states are 
more likely to form 
PTAs because they 
represent more credible 
commitments than 
unilateral trade barrier 
reduction 
Binary 
dependent 
variable is log 
of the odds 
that a pair of 
countries 
enters a PTA 
in a given year  
1951-1992 
Index of 
democracy, GDP, 
change in GDP, 
exports, former 
colony, ally, 
military disputes, 
distance, GATT 
membership, trade 
hegemony 
For PTAs, 
primarily 
WTO 
 
Jaggers and 
Gurr index of 
regime type; 
Summers-
Heston; IMF; 
various other 
Mathematical model of the 
economy and polity, and 
the impact of trade 
agreements on voter and 
government behaviour 
Pool data across time and 
country pairs, then logistic 
regression 
Derived probability of pair 
of states entering a trade 
agreement 
Democracies twice as likely, and 
pairs of democracies four times 
as likely to form PTA compared 
to autocratic pairs. 
Probability of PTA membership 
declining with GDP. Countries 
more likely to form PTA where 
home market small, prior 
colonial relationship, alliance 
partners, parties to GATT, close 
geographic proximity, and during 
periods of waning hegemony. 
Baier and 
Bergstrand 
2002 
To test the cross-
sectional variation in 
FTAs for a given year, 
to determine the 
economic factors 
influencing likelihood 
of pairs of countries 
forming FTAs. Hope to 
provide an empirical 
benchmark for 
determinants of FTAs 
upon which strategic 
and political factors can 
subsequently be 
embedded 
Presence of 
full FTA 
between 54 
country pairs, 
1996 
Capital/labour 
ratios, distance, 
remoteness, 
population, real and 
per capita GDP, 
capital per worker. 
1996 data except 
used 1960 data for 
incomes, capital 
stocks, and 
populations to 
account for 
endogenous 
influence of (prior) 
FTA on 1996 levels 
of these variables. 
WTO (full 
FTAs and 
Customs 
Unions 
notified) 
Four methods: general 
equilibrium model of world 
trade,; qualitative discrete 
choice model (FTA, no 
FTA) 
Probit regressions, percent 
correctly predicted. 
Sensitivity analysis to test 
for non-independence of 
bilateral observations 
(country clusters of FTAs), 
to exclude European 
countries, and to test for 
exogeneity of 1996 values 
of income and capital stock. 
Probability of FTA higher the 
closer the economies 
geographically, the more remote 
a pair of natural trading partners 
is from the rest of the world, the 
larger and more similar in 
economic size, the larger the 
difference in capital/labour ratios. 
These effects are economically 
and statistically significant. 
These pure economic 
characteristics can accurately 
predict 83% of the 289 FTAs 
existing among 1,431 country 
pairs in 1996, and 97% of the 
remaining 1,142 pairs of 
countries with no FTAs. 
 
 
 
 
 264  
Author Objective/thesis 
investigated 
Dependent 
variable 
Explanatory 
variables 
Data sources Methods Findings 
Dorrucci, 
Firpo, 
Fratzscher 
and 
Mongelli, 
2002 
To test the hypothesis 
that institutional 
integration interacts 
with economic 
integration at the 
regional level. 
(Institutional integration 
defined as outcome of 
joint policy decisions 
designed to affect 
breadth and depth of 
regional integration). 
Original index 
of institutional 
integration 
(based on 
Balassa 
stages) for 
EU-15 from 
1957-2001 
and for 
Mercosur 
members 
1991-201 
Synchronization of 
business cycles; 
convergence of 
inflation and 
interest rates; 
exchange rate 
variability; trade 
openness; financial 
market integration; 
income 
convergence. 
Detailed 
expert 
knowledge of 
EU history of 
policy 
decisions. 
Assign scores from 0-25 for 
each of the four stages for 
each point in time, on the 
basis of expert judgment of 
when implementation of 
relevant regional policy 
decisions started since EU-
6 created. 
Non-linear approach (last 
integration step scores 
higher than intermediate 
steps). 
Simple comparison of 
economic integration and 
institutional integration 
across periods. 
Cluster analysis to identify 
groupings of similar 
countries over six sub-
periods.   
 
 
Strong correlation between 
economic integration and 
institutional integration for EU 
(following each institutional 
phase, economic integration 
deepened; further institutional 
integration feasible only if 
economic integration supports it). 
 
Between 1950s-1970s economic 
integration in EU occurred 
among geographically close 
countries. Since early 1980s, 
clusters correspond more closely 
to institutional arrangements (e.g. 
participation or not in EMU) than 
to neighbours. 
 
 
 
 
 
Alesina, 
Spolaore, 
and 
Wacziarg, 
1997, 
Alesina and 
Spolaore  
2003 
Economic integration 
has lead to, and will 
continue to lead to 
political disintegration 
Number of 
countries in 
world; country 
size (log of 
population, 
log of total 
GDP) 
Trade openness 
(average ratio of 
imports + exports to 
GDP) by country 
Encyclopaedia 
Britannica for 
date of 
country 
independence; 
Summers-
Heston for 
trade: GDP 
ratio 
Formal model derives 
equilibrium number and 
size of nations as function 
of trade regime 
Regression analysis 
 
Qualitative discussion of 
history of country 
formation and dissolution 
 
 
Support for two critical 
implications of model: 1) the 
effect of country size on 
economic growth falls as trade 
openness increases; 2) the history 
of nation creation and secession 
influenced by trade regime. 
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Author Objective/thesis 
investigated 
Dependent 
variable 
Explanatory 
variables 
Data sources Methods Findings 
Dorrucci, 
Firpo, 
Fratzscher 
and 
Mongelli, 
2004 
Building on Dorrucci et 
al 2002, assess whether 
institutional integration 
leads to more economic 
integration or vice 
versa; is a certain 
degree of economic 
integration a pre-
requisite for deepening 
institutional integration? 
Original index 
of institutional 
integration for 
EU-6 from 
1960-2000 
and for 
Mercosur 
members 
1991-2001 
 
 
 
As for Dorrucci et 
al 2002 
As for 
Dorrucci et al 
2002 
Non-structural VAR model 
to test for direction of 
causality between real 
exchange rate variability 
and index of institutional 
integration. Impulse 
response functions show 
how each endogenous 
variable reacts over time to 
an exogenous positive 
shock in each variable in 
the VAR system. Granger 
causality test 
 
Exogenous changes in 
institutional integration lead to 
deeper economic integration. 
 
European countries experienced 
sharp acceleration of economic 
integration in the 1960s and 
1990s. 
 
A virtuous circle may be 
identified between institutional 
integration and economic 
integration at the regional level. 
Vlachos 
2004 
To investigate 
systematically whether 
harmonization of 
securities regulations 
actually promotes 
financial market 
integration 
The log of 
portfolio asset 
holdings in 
country j by 
residents of 
country i, for 
38 countries 
Main variable is 
index of differences 
in securities 
regulation. 
Plus per capita 
GDP, volume of 
bilateral trade, 
common land 
border and 
language, religious 
beliefs, judicial 
efficiency, 
membership in 
RTAs, index of 
govt. effectiveness 
Indices of 
securities 
regulation 
from La Porta 
2003. 
IMF trade 
data, WB on 
pop. and GDP. 
Rose 2002 for 
common 
language, land 
border, 
Alesina et al 
2003 for 
religion  
Empirical gravity model 
(ala trade theory). Country-
pair specific detailed 
indices of regulatory 
differences constructed.  
OLS and 2SLS regression 
analysis. 
Home and host country 
fixed effects, standard 
controls for bilateral trade 
relations. 
Used instrumental variables 
(pop. size, GDP, rule of 
law) to investigate direction 
of causality between 
harmonization and asset 
holdings, using differences 
in regulation as dependent 
variable 
Harmonization of securities 
regulation can have very large 
effects on integration of 
securities markets. 
Differences in institutional 
quality and religious beliefs 
decrease asset holdings. 
 
When investigating reverse 
causality, larger differences in 
regulation associated with 
differences in legal origin, larger 
geographic distance, common 
border, reverse for trade volumes, 
common language. With 
instrumentation, found  
“surprisingly” that instrumented 
asset holdings associated with 
larger regulatory differences 
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Author Objective/thesis 
investigated 
Dependent 
variable 
Explanatory 
variables 
Data sources Methods Findings 
Wu, 2004 To isolate common 
traits of RTAs and 
define contributing 
characteristics; to test 
whether economic or 
political uncertainty is a 
positive contributor to 
the chosen level of 
integration. 
Level of 
regional 
integration of 
150 countries 
1960-1998 
and 1987-
1998 
Trade uncertainty 
(X+M: GDP), 
political uncertainty 
(indices of eco. 
freedom and 
corruption), 
business cycle 
uncertainty (change 
in GDP), price 
uncertainty 
(inflation), 
democracy, 
geographic 
indicators, 
membership of 
IMF, OECD 
Penn World 
Tables; World 
Bank; 
Economic 
Freedom of 
the World; 
Transparency 
International; 
Polity 
Database of regional trade 
integration developed 
which ranks levels of 
integration across countries 
according to the Balassa 
stages of economic 
integration. Each country 
coded with its highest level 
RTA 
 
Ordered probit maximum 
likelihood estimation in a 
discrete choice framework 
of probability a country 
chooses a given level of 
regional integration given 
country characteristics. 
Higher regional integration 
associated with democracy, 
geographic characteristics, IMF 
membership, per capita income, 
economic freedom and trade 
openness 
For the sub-period 1987-1998, 
only democracy and per capita 
income contributed significantly 
(inferred that end of cold war 
changed country motivations) 
Obydenkova 
2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What factors contribute 
to transnational 
cooperation between 
the EU and the 89 
regions of Russia, given 
that such cooperation 
varies widely across 
regions despite 
common history and 
institutional framework 
The level of 
Regional 
Cooperation 
with EU 
comprising: 
Trade coop., 
project coop., 
investment 
risk, and 
investment 
performance 
Geographical 
proximity, common 
border, size, level 
of economic 
development, 
ethnicity, 3 level 
index of autonomy 
from Moscow  
EBRD, 
Russian legal 
sources 
Logistic and linear 
regression on each of the 4 
components of the level of 
Regional Cooperation in 
turn 
Levels of economic development, 
ethnicity, constitutional 
autonomy, geographic proximity 
not important for trade or project 
cooperation 
Cross-regional integration seems 
to be an alternative to 
nationalism and secession. 
Common border important for 
project cooperation. Autonomy 
important both for trade and 
project cooperation. 
Level of investment risk reduced 
by geographic proximity and 
level of economic development.  
 
 267  
Appendix 2: Table of RTAs Containing Provisions on Competition Policy 
Cooperation Other Than Enforcement Cooperation 
 
C. RTAs with Competition-related 
provisions other than enforcement 
cooperation 
 
In OECD 
2006 
 
In Cernat 
2005 
   
Albania-Bosnia √  
Albania-Bulgaria*377 √  
Albania-Croatia √ √ 
Albania-Macedonia √  
Albania-Romania* √  
Albania-Serbia √  
Algeria-EC √ √ 
Australia-NZ (ANZCERTA) √  
Armenia-Georgia √  
Armenia-Kazakhstan √  
Armenia-Kyrgyzstan √ √ 
Armenia-Moldova √  
Armenia-Russian Federation √  
Armenia-Turkmenistan √  
Armenia-Ukraine √  
Azerbaijan-Georgia √ √ 
BAFTA Industrial goods  √ 
Bosnia-H-Croatia √ √ 
Bosnia-H-Macedonia √  
Bosnia-H-Slovenia*  √ 
Bosnia-H-Turkey √ √ 
Bulgaria-Estonia*  √ 
Bulgaria-Israel* √ √ 
Bulgaria-Latvia*  √ 
Bulgaria-Lithuania*  √ 
Bulgaria-Macedonia*  √ 
Bulgaria-Moldova* √  
Bulgaria-Serbia* √  
Bulgaria-Turkey*  √ 
CARICOM-Costa Rica  √ 
CEFTA* √ √ 
CEMAC  √  
Central America-Chile  √ √ 
Central America-Dominican Republic   
CIS √  
COMESA √ √ 
Croatia-EFTA √  
Croatia-Lithuania*  √ 
Croatia-Macedonia √ √ 
Croatia-Moldova √  
Croatia-Slovenia*  √ 
Croatia-Turkey √ √ 
Czech Rep.-Estonia*  √ 
   
                                                           
377 * Signifies agreements involving at least one country that subsequently joined the EU. 
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Agreement In OECD 
2006 
In Cernat 
2005 
   
Czech Rep.-Latvia*  √ 
Czech Rep.- Lithuania*  √ 
Czech Rep.- Slovakia*378  √ 
Czech Rep.-Turkey*  √ 
EC-Albania   
EC-Armenia   
EC-Azerbaijan   
EC-Bosnia-H   
EC-Bulgaria*  √ 
EC-Croatia  √ 
EC-Czech Rep. *  √ 
EC-Egypt (updated) √ √ 
EC-Estonia*  √ 
EC-Georgia   
EC-Hungary*  √ 
EC-Iceland  √ 
EC-Israel  √ 
EC-Jordan √ √ 
EC-Latvia*  √ 
EC-Lithuania*  √ 
EC-Lebanon (updated) √ √ 
EC-FYRMacedonia  √ 
EC-Moldova   
EC-Montenegro   
EC-Morocco √ √ 
EC-Norway  √ 
EC-Poland*  √ 
EC-Romania*  √ 
EC-Russian Federation   
EC-Slovakia*  √ 
EC-Slovenia*  √ 
EC-Switz./Licht.  √ 
EC-Tunisia  √ 
EC-Ukraine   
EFTA-Bulgaria*  √ 
EFTA-Czech Rep. *  √ 
EFTA-Estonia*  √ 
EFTA-Hungary*  √ 
EFTA-Israel  √ 
EFTA-Jordan √ √ 
EFTA-Latvia*  √ 
EFTA-Lithuania*  √ 
EFTA-Macedonia √ √ 
EFTA-Morocco  √ 
EFTA-Poland*  √ 
EFTA-Romania*  √ 
EFTA-Slovakia*  √ 
   
                                                           
378 * Signifies agreements involving at least one country that subsequently joined the EU. 
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Agreement In OECD 
2006 
In Cernat 
2005 
EFTA-Slovenia*  √ 
EFTA-Turkey  √ 
Estonia-Hungary*  √ 
Estonia-Slovakia*  √ 
Estonia-Slovenia*379  √ 
Estonia-Turkey*  √ 
Estonia-Ukraine*  √ 
Georgia-Kazakhstan √ √ 
Georgia- Russian Federation  √ √ 
Georgia-Turkmenistan √ √ 
Georgia-Ukraine √ √ 
Hungary-Israel*  √ 
Hungary-Latvia*  √ 
Hungary-Lithuania*  √ 
Hungary-Turkey*  √ 
Israel-Poland*  √ 
Israel-Slovakia*  √ 
Israel-Slovenia*  √ 
Israel-Turkey  √ 
Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan  √ 
Kyrgyzstan-Moldova  √ 
Kyrgyzstan- Russian Federation  √ 
Kyrgyzstan-Ukraine  √ 
Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan  √ 
Latvia-Poland*  √ 
Latvia-Slovakia*  √ 
Latvia-Slovenia*  √ 
Latvia-Turkey*  √ 
Lithuania-Poland*  √ 
Lithuania-Slovakia*  √ 
Lithuania-Slovenia*  √ 
Lithuania-Turkey*  √ 
FYR Macedonia-Slovenia*  √ 
FYR Macedonia-Turkey √ √ 
MERCOSUR √  
Moldova-Romania*  √ 
Morocco-Turkey   
Poland-Turkey*  √ 
Romania-Turkey*  √ 
SADC   
Slovakia-Turkey*  √ 
Slovenia-Turkey*  √ 
   
TOTAL of RTAs with Competition 
Cooperation Provisions Other Than 
Enforcement Cooperation 
133  
                                                           
379 * Signifies agreements involving at least one country that subsequently joined the EU. 
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GLOSSARY 
_________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Comity: the passive and voluntary deference accorded by one state to the acts of 
another state unless the state judges such deference to be not in its own interests  
(Slaughter 2004, p. 250). 
  
Competition policy: used in this thesis in the narrow sense of competition law, or in 
US-parlance, anti-trust law. While the term is also used to refer to a broader set of 
policies that promote competitive markets – including trade policies and market de-
regulation – the focus here is solely on generic, economy-wide laws that directly 
regulate the structure of markets and the behaviour of firms in the market. 
 
De facto: in practice, in fact (in contrast to what the law says). 
 
De jure: what the law says, by law (as opposed to in practice). 
 
Enforcement jurisdiction: the authority to induce or compel compliance or to punish 
non-compliance, whether through the courts or by use of executive, administrative, 
police, or other non-judicial action. 
 
Hard core cartels: an anticompetitive agreement, concerted practice, or arrangement 
by competitors to fix prices, make rigged bids, establish output restrictions or quotas, 
or share or divide markets (OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning 
Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, 1999). 
 
International economic integration: can be defined broadly as increasing levels of 
trade and foreign investment, the trans-national integration of production chains 
within firms, and the progressive creation of single markets for factors of production. 
 
International policy cooperation: refers to the wide variety of agreements or 
arrangements between states to cooperate in the development or implementation of 
government policies. International policy cooperation is embodied in international 
agreements, official international organisations, or less formal cross-border 
interactions between official institutions. 
 
Jurisdiction: the recognized authority to apply legal rules or processes to persons or 
property. 
 
Jurisdictional integration: a process by which a state chooses, through entering 
formal agreements with another state or states, to restrict its recognized authority to 
autonomously make, and/or to enforce, and/or to adjudicate decisions in a specific 
domain or domains.  
 
Negative comity: “a country’s consideration of how it may prevent its law 
enforcement actions from harming another country’s important interests”  
(OECD, 1999).  
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Positive comity: “…a country’s consideration of another country’s request that it 
open or expand a law enforcement proceeding in order to remedy conduct that is 
substantially and adversely affecting another country’s interests.” (OECD,1999). 
 
Prescriptive jurisdiction: the recognized authority to make rules applicable to 
particular persons or circumstances. 
 
State Sovereignty: used variously to refer to the possession of international legal 
personality, or to the possession of particular legal competences or powers. It may 
refer to de jure state authority or to de facto state capacity. It may be used to refer to 
the full set of a state’s legal powers or capacities, to the minimum autonomy a state 
must possess to be a state, or to just one or other of those powers and capacities. It is 
often not clear which aspect or meaning is being applied in a particular case. 
 
Stages of economic integration: refers to progressively deeper levels of international 
economic integration and international policy cooperation, typically described as 
being embodied in the stages of Free Trade Agreement, Customs Union, Common 
Market, Economic Union, and total economic integration. 
 
State jurisdiction: the recognized authority of a state under international law to 
govern persons and property by its municipal law i.e. domestic or national law. In 
European terminology, jurisdiction as recognized authority is also referred to as 
competence. 
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